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FOREWORD
KRISTEN JEFFERS
Kristen Jeffers is a 
researcher with the EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP project‘Access to 
citizenship and its impact on 
immigrant integration.’ In 
this role, she contributed 
to the development of the 
EUDO Citizenship Indicators.  
She has also been involved 
with research on immigrant 
integration in the United 
States.  She is based in 
University College Dublin in 
Ireland.  
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Historically, international migrants in Europe 
were temporary labourers; their role in society 
was exclusively economic, precluding consider-
ation of their political interests (Martiniello 2006). 
Today, changes in the size, characteristics, and 
rights of the migrant population in Europe have 
transformed the political capacity of this group, 
establishing immigrants as legitimate political ac-
tors.  An estimated 32.5 million people across the 
European Union, nearly seven per cent of the pop-
ulation, are non-citizens of the country in which 
they reside.1  Increases in the number of long-term 
residence permits issued in most Member States, 
as well as the shift from employment-based to 
family-based migration, suggest that a large por-
tion of migrants in Europe have the intention of 
permanent settlement.  
Notwithstanding these trends, requirements for 
the acquisition of national citizenship remain 
demanding, making the effective representation 
of this group an ongoing challenge for Member 
States.  Electoral rights for non-citizen residents 
in EU Member States are also limited.  The 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht and 1992 Council of Europe 
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners 
in Public Life at the Local Level2 provide for the 
electoral participation of foreign residents at the 
municipal and European levels3.  In 2012, these 
instruments are the only European legal stan-
dards that pertain to the electoral participation of 
foreign residents.  Nineteen Member States have 
implemented local voting rights for foreign resi-
dents beyond the requirements of EU law.  Natu-
ralisation continues to be a prerequisite for access 
to national voting rights in all but three Member 
1.  Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 34/2011
2.  ETS No. 144
3.  Only EU citizens may participate in European level 
elections.
States.4  The democratic consequence of this situ-
ation is apparent: the presence of a population of 
permanent residents who are subjected to the rule 
of law but lack access to legislative representation 
creates a deficit in the democratic legitimacy of 
the European Union and its Member States.  
In this publication, academics, policy-makers, and 
representatives of civil society explore the history 
and nature of migrant political participation in 
Europe and consider policy options for remedy-
ing the democratic deficit in light of the politi-
cal realities of modern Europe.  In what follows, 
contributors provide a comprehensive discussion 
of inclusive democracy in the European Union, 
considering principles of democracy, conceptions 
of national and EU citizenship, and the political 
and institutional practicalities of national and Eu-
ropean policy change. 
Structure of the eBook
The eBook is divided into two sections.  The first 
section brings together contributions from the 
2011 Dissemination Conference organised by 
the European Union Democracy Observatory 
(EUDO, www.eudo.eu ) and co-funded by the 
European Commission (Lifelong Learning Pro-
gramme, Jean Monnet action) on  Inclusive De-
mocracy in Europe. The conference, which took 
place on 9 and 10 November 2011 in Brussels, dis-
seminated comparative and updated knowledge 
on external electoral rights for non-resident EU 
4.  The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Portugal allow for 
the participation of certain foreign-residents in national 
elections. Commonwealth citizens and citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland may vote in all elections in the Unit-
ed Kingdom.  Citizens of the United Kingdom may vote 
in general elections in Ireland. In Portugal, Brazilian 
citizens with ‘special status of equality of political rights’ 
enjoy voting rights in regional and national elections.
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citizens and internal electoral rights for non-cit-
izen residents.  Speakers also discussed the influ-
ence of electoral rights on the evolution and per-
ception of EU citizenship and trends in political 
participation in the European Union.  Contribu-
tions in this section focus primarily the nature of 
migrant political participation in the European 
Union, aptly framing the debate on the expansion 
of political rights of foreign residents in the EU.  
The second section of the eBook exhibits the 
EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate on the vot-
ing rights of second-country nationals in the Euro-
pean Union.  Contributors to the debate examine 
the contradictory nature of two of the fundamen-
tal rights of EU citizenship: the right to free move-
ment and the right to participate in the political 
life of one’s country of residence.  Those who exer-
cise their right to free movement sometimes for-
feit their right to vote in national elections in their 
country of origin but are also disenfranchised in 
their country of residence.
EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debates begin 
with a controversial question of general interest 
to academic and policy communities. To start the 
debate on voting rights for second-country na-
tionals, Philippe Cayla and Catriona Seth suggest 
that all EU citizens should have the franchise to 
vote  in the national elections of their country of 
residence.  The authors propose the creation of a 
European Citizens’ Initiative on the matter, which 
has since been officially launched.  The ‘Let me 
Vote’ ECI supports the enfranchisement of all EU 
citizens residing in another Member State for all 
political elections in their country of residence on 
the same conditions as the nationals of that State.
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Forum participants respond to Cayla and Seth’s 
proposal, revealing the complexity of the issue of 
enfranchisement.  While all authors agree that the 
loss of democratic participation rights as the result 
of free movement is contrary to the spirit of EU 
citizenship, they have divergent ideas regarding 
the solution to this problem: should EU citizens 
vote in their countries of origin, of residence, or 
be given a choice? Should third-country nationals 
be included in a broader electoral reform? Will it 
be possible to convince a sufficient number of EU 
citizens of this initiative, given the disappointing 
turnout rates in European Parliament elections? 
Forum contributions were published online by 
EUDO CITIZENSHIP between 24 February and 
14 June 2012 (see Bauböck, Cayla, and Seth 2012). 
This eBook is equally useful for academics, policy-
makers, and the public.  It provides valuable infor-
mation on the political incorporation of migrants 
and also offers readers the opportunity to engage 
in an accessible debate on fundamental principles 
and policies of democracy in the European Union. 
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 1
THE 
PARTICIPATION 
OF IMMIGRANTS 
IN POLITICAL 
PROCESSES AND 
INSTITUTIONS
JAN NIESSEN
Jan Niessen is Director of 
Migration Policy Group in 
Brussels, and is a member of 
the organisation’s Board of 
Directors. He has overall 
responsibility for MPG’s 
programmes and leads the 
Diversity and Migration 
programmes.
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This paper identifies the main legal obstacles faced 
by immigrants to participate in political life by com-
paring the situation in the European countries cov-
ered by the Migrant Integration Policy Index. It also 
describes organisational barriers for these persons 
to become actively involved in political parties and 
institutions and makes proposals for how political 
parties can mainstream diversity.
A recent survey among immigrants5 in fifteen 
European cities in seven countries demonstrated 
that they are as much interested in participating in 
elections as nationals. When asked whether they 
would vote in tomorrow’s general elections if they 
had the right to, they answered that they would. 
They also wished for more diversity in politics and 
said they were willing to vote in support of it, be-
lieving elected officials of immigrant backgrounds 
better understand and represent them (Hud-
dleston & Dag Tjaden, 2011).
The full and equal participation of all members of 
society in the political decision-making process is 
crucial for the legitimacy of the democratic politi-
cal systems of Europe’s increasingly diverse societ-
ies. The Common Basic Principles on Integration 
maintain that the participation of immigrants in 
the democratic process and formulation of inte-
gration policies supports their integration (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2004). However, immi-
grants are in many ways marginalized in decision-
making processes and institutions. They often do 
not have (full) voting rights and their political 
liberties are in many cases not entirely secured. 
Their participation in elections tends to be lower 
than that of nationals. They are underrepresented 
among members, elected officials and leaders of 
political parties, as well as among employees and 
suppliers of political institutions.
Being the objects of, rather than participants in, 
decision-making tends to reinforce processes of 
5.  In this chapter, immigrants are defined as third-country 
nationals, including refugees.
societal exclusion. Notably in times of economic 
recession and when populist sentiments are gain-
ing ground, citizens and residents need to be mo-
bilised to counteract marginalisation and exclu-
sion. The propagated mainstreaming of immigrant 
integration in social, economic, and cultural poli-
cies also requires the participation of immigrants 
in decision-making. Decisions are made at many 
levels of governance on how budgets are divided 
among social, economic and cultural programmes, 
as well as how, and to whom, institutions provide 
public services. It cannot be taken for granted that 
the interests of immigrants are considered, nor 
that policies explicitly aim to prevent or redress 
their marginalisation. Mainstreaming can become 
more effective when immigrants have a seat at the 
table, when their voices are heard and their exper-
tise used. Integrating immigrants into civic life 
and political institutions thus enhances not only 
their civic participation and social responsibility 
but also the effective implementation of policies.
Comprehensive approaches are needed to give 
immigrants access to decision-making. Generally 
three types of strategies are applied: (1) the re-
moval of legal barriers for participation by grant-
ing political rights and facilitating naturalisation; 
(2) the mobilisation and empowerment of im-
migrant communities by providing training and 
support for immigrants and their organisations, 
and (3) the removal of organisational barriers for 
immigrant participation in societal entities by 
anti-discrimination and diversity mainstreaming. 
Whereas many projects concern the first two types 
of action, fewer concern the third type. This ap-
plies in particular to political parties and institu-
tions which discuss and adopt and oversee the im-
plementation of general and specific integration 
policies. However, these entities are less inclined 
to act on what they can do themselves to include 
immigrants in their own organisations.
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Political and civic rights for 
immigrants
The MIPEX strand on political participation in-
cludes four dimensions that measure electoral 
rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and 
implementing policies on the basis of some fifteen 
policy indicators. 
Respectively, this strand establishes whether:
•	 immigrants have the right to vote in local, re-
gional and national elections, and can stand in 
local elections; 
•	 they have a right to create associations, political 
parties and their own media; 
•	 consultative bodies are set up; 
•	 information campaigns exist and immigrant as-
sociations are supported. 
Figure 1 shows how countries score on these four 
dimensions and fifteen indicators. In most coun-
tries (including traditional immigration countries 
such as Canada and the United States) the situa-
tion is rather unfavourable as they score less than 
60 points, with only a handful of European coun-
tries with favourable conditions scoring more 
than 60 points. 
Immigrants have limited opportunities to inform 
and improve policies that affect them daily. They 
can vote locally in nineteen counties, regionally 
in seven countries and nationally in two coun-
Figure 1: Countries with barriers and opportunities for political participation
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tries. They can stand as municipal candidates in 
thirteen countries. In eleven mostly Central Euro-
pean countries, laws deny immigrants basic politi-
cal liberties. Consultative bodies exist at the local 
level in fifteen countries and at the national level 
in eleven. About half of the countries fund immi-
grants’ civic activities, while a third inform them 
of their political rights.
Granting electoral rights and political liberties 
to immigrants can be considered a sign of confi-
dence that countries of immigration have in their 
political system and in their capacity to accommo-
date immigrants. In Europe, established and new 
countries of immigration diverge significantly, 
which may point at the fact that this confidence 
grows over time. Immigrants enjoy nearly none of 
these rights in Central Europe, the three Baltic Re-
publics, Cyprus and Malta. Only Ireland and Por-
tugal have opened as many political opportunities 
as countries in Northern and Northwest Europe. 
Established countries of immigration with less fa-
vourable frameworks, especially on voting rights, 
need either constitutional changes (such as Aus-
tria, Germany, Italy and Spain), or greater political 
will (France, United Kingdom) (MIPEX, 2012).
Official and structured consultation with immi-
grants is often presented as an alternative to elec-
toral rights (the first and third dimension of this 
MIPEX strand, respectively). Such consultation 
can take different forms. For example, immigrants 
can participate in an advisory capacity in the de-
liberations of official committees of public au-
Figure 2: Electoral rights, political liberties and consultative bodies in the EU
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thorities. Such committees can also have a mixed 
membership comprising of nationals and non-na-
tionals. Consultative committees or councils may 
also have only immigrants as members (Council 
of Europe, 1992). If consultative bodies are in-
deed an alternative for granting voting rights, one 
would expect that such bodies exist where voting 
rights are not secured and that they do not exist 
where these rights are secured.
However, looking at the European Union as a 
whole (figure 2), there does not seem to be a trade-
off between electoral rights and consultations. The 
overall EU MIPEX scores for electoral rights and 
consultative bodies are almost equally low, around 
30 and 20 points out of 100, respectively. Whereas 
the number of countries granting electoral rights 
has been increasing over the last ten to twenty 
years, such a trend cannot be identified for coun-
tries establishing consultative bodies. Particularly 
in countries where they do not have a strong legal 
basis, consultative bodies come and go depending 
on the political mood in the country or at local 
level.
 It is important to note that the absence of electoral 
rights and consultative bodies does not necessar-
ily mean that political liberties are also denied in 
individual countries.
A more detailed EU overview (figure 3) demon-
strates that eight countries score neither on elec-
toral rights nor on consultation. Seven countries 
score higher on consultative bodies than on elec-
toral rights, including France, Germany and Italy, 
which do not score on electoral rights at all. In 
this case it is important to understand what the 
mandate of these bodies is and to assess to what 
extent this mandate compensates for the lack of 
electoral power. Important issues to consider are 
Figure 3: Electoral rights and consultative bodies in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland 
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whether consultation takes place on an ad-hoc 
or structural basis, whether the members of con-
sultative bodies are appointed or elected, who are 
the persons leading the bodies and chairing their 
meetings, and what powers these bodies have (for 
example, rights of initiative and response, binding 
or non- binding opinions, etc.).6
Fourteen countries score higher on electoral rights 
than on consultative bodies and the difference 
can be more or less significant. In these countries 
the two may be seen as complementary strategies 
that compensate for their respective weaknesses. 
Countries with a longer and a shorter history of 
immigration score in similar ways. Consultative 
6. See Huddleston (2011) for further analysis.
bodies may or may not compensate for the ab-
sence of electoral rights; they are nevertheless a 
testing ground and spring board for immigrants 
to become engaged with decision-making pro-
cesses and institutions.
In conclusion, in a great many countries across 
Europe there are major obstacles for immigrants 
to participate in local, regional and national elec-
tions and to stand as candidates in such elections. 
Consultative bodies cannot be considered to be a 
generally applied alternative for electoral rights.7 
In many countries political liberties are neverthe-
less guaranteed.
7. See also Jacobs, Delmotte & Herman (2009). 
Figure 4: Access to nationality 
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Access to citizenship
Electoral rights are very much associated with 
citizenship. It can be argued and often is argued 
that immigrants should become citizens first be-
fore they can enjoy full electoral rights. Making 
citizenship more accessible can then be seen as a 
means to enhance political participation. The sur-
vey among immigrants in 15 cities in seven coun-
tries concluded that three out of four immigrants 
are or want to become citizens. Those who were 
not interested do not see the difference with their 
status of long-term resident or face obstacles for 
naturalisation (such as years of residence before 
applying, the documentation that must be provid-
ed and the non-recognition of dual citizenship).
The four dimensions of the MIPEX strand on na-
tionality deal with questions of eligibility, appli-
cation conditions, security of the status and dual 
nationality. Around twenty indicators establish 
what first generation immigrants, spouses or part-
ners of nationals and second and third generations 
have to do in order to become a citizen. Are lan-
guage and citizenship tests taken? What economic 
resources and documents are required? What is 
the minimum duration of the procedure and what 
are the cost involved? The indicators also help to 
check what the grounds are for refusal and with-
drawal of the status and whether dual citizenship 
is allowed. Figure 4 shows that there are favour-
able conditions in the North American tradition-
al immigration countries and in a few European 
Figure 5: Four dimensions of access to nationality in the European Union 
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countries, but slightly unfavourable to unfavour-
able conditions in most European countries.
In Europe it takes immigrants on average seven 
years to become citizens and the procedures are 
still discouraging many immigrants from applying 
which may be one of the explanatory factors be-
hind the low numbers of naturalisation in Europe. 
Half of the European countries surveyed by MI-
PEX make citizenship conditional upon income 
and high fees. Applicants are normally required to 
know the language, but often at high or unclear 
levels. Naturalisation tests rarely come with the 
support to pass them. After rather discretionary 
procedures, applicants can appeal a decision and 
enjoy some protection against statelessness and 
withdrawal of citizenship. Dual nationality and jus 
soli (birth right citizenship for second generation 
immigrants) are also slowly becoming the norm 
in Europe.
Figure 5 summarises European scores for the four 
dimensions of the MIPEX strand on nationality. 
It shows low scores for eligibility (who can apply) 
and the conditions to be complied with (what must 
this person do), meaning that there are quite a lot 
of obstacles that immigrants have to overcome. 
Once acquired, the status is not fully secured and 
in many cases immigrants have to give up their 
initial nationality.
Figure 6 compares the scores of electoral rights 
and access to nationality (eligibility and condi-
Figure 6: Electoral rights and access to nationality in the EU
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tions) and shows rather low scores for all three di-
mensions at the European level.
As is the case with electoral rights and consultative 
bodies, there does not seem to be a trade-off at the 
European level between electoral rights and access 
to nationality. Individual countries may promote 
the acquisition of citizenship and therefore are not 
prepared to offer full electoral rights. Countries in 
which it is difficult to become a national may offer 
electoral rights as an alternative. In this scenario, 
one could expect that electoral rights are either 
guaranteed or that the acquisition of citizenship is 
facilitated by removing legal obstacles. However, 
analysis of the situation in the EU Member States, 
Norway and Switzerland suggests that there is no 
statistically significant correlation between the two 
complete MIPEX strands of political participation 
and nationality. Nevertheless, the results seem to 
suggest that there is a positive relation, namely the 
higher the scores for the nationality strand, the 
higher the scores for political participation. The 
situation per countries differs considerably. There 
are countries that combine moderate scores on 
both, or have higher and lower scores across the 
strands. There is no negative relationship, which 
confirms that there is no trade-off between the 
two complete strands (Jacobs et al., 2009).
Figure 7 provides details for the individual EU 
Member States, Norway and Switzerland and 
compares electoral rights (one dimension of the 
MIPEX political participation strand) with two di-
mensions of the MIPEX nationality strand, name-
ly those which directly concern access to nation-
ality (eligibility and conditions). Analysis of this 
Figure 7: Electoral rights and access to nationality in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland 
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situation by and large confirms the analysis of the 
relationship between the two complete strands of 
political participation and nationality. This means 
that when it comes to policy choices concerning 
political participation and naturalisation, it is only 
in exceptional cases a neither nor or an either or 
situation.
On the MIPEX scale, policies are slightly favour-
able when they score between 60 to 80 percentage 
points and they are favourable when they score 
between 80 to 100 percentage points. On electoral 
rights, there are six countries that score more than 
60 points, namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Figure 8 shows 
how these countries score on access to nationality 
(eligibility and conditions). Only Sweden receives 
an (almost) slightly favourable score for condi-
tions and eligibility. Policies to promote political 
participation and naturalisation seem to reinforce 
each other. The five other countries receive (al-
most) favourable scores for eligibility but not for 
conditions. Electoral rights seem to somewhat 
compensate for the difficulties to acquire citizen-
ship.
Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom are the top ten Euro-
pean countries on the MIPEX scale on access to 
nationality scoring between 58 and 82. Figure 9 
shows how they score on electoral rights. France, 
Germany and to some extent Italy have very simi-
lar scores in the sense that immigrants have no 
electoral rights, with Germany and France scor-
ing high on eligibility but weak on naturalisation 
Figure 8: Access to nationality in countries scoring high on electoral rights 
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conditions. Portugal and Belgium are also simi-
lar. These countries are rather weak on electoral 
rights but strong on access to nationality. Ireland 
is strong on electoral rights and on who can apply 
for citizenship but there are difficult conditions to 
be met. Luxembourg and the UK are rather mod-
erate on all three dimensions but in different ways.
Electoral rights and access to nationality are re-
lated but distinct policy questions. There are good 
reasons to plea for naturalisation as a strategy to 
enhance political participation as there are for vot-
ing rights. Both require fundamental changes in 
national legislation and the political will to make 
them, which seems to be lacking in most Europe-
an countries nowadays. Acquiring citizenship has 
advantages over enjoying voting rights. The resi-
dence of voting non-nationals is not completely 
secured, but for citizens it is. Citizens enjoy full 
citizens’ rights. For example, no labour market re-
strictions apply as is often the case for immigrants 
in public service jobs. Citizens are also better pro-
tected against discrimination in countries where 
anti-discrimination law does not include national-
ity as a ground of discrimination. Voting rights are 
for a special and small category of persons whose 
stay is considered to be temporary and whose chil-
dren become citizens over time. Promoting citi-
zenship is the expression of a country’s intention 
to include immigrants and of these persons’ inten-
tion to become active members of society.
Figure 9: Electoral rights in countries scoring relatively high on access to nationality 
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Mainstreaming diversity in 
political institutions and 
parties
Even when legal barriers for political participa-
tion are removed, measures are required to en-
hance the actual participation of immigrants in 
decision-making processes and institutions. To 
that end policy-making institutions and political 
parties should consider themselves societal enti-
ties and ensure that they respond to and reflect so-
ciety’s diversity. Governments are not only regula-
tors and makers of (integration) policies, but also 
employers, consumers and providers of services. 
They are often among the biggest employers in 
cities, regions and countries. They spend a huge 
amount of money on buying goods and services 
and for the construction and maintenance of pub-
lic infrastructure. They provide directly or indi-
rectly services to a diverse population, from edu-
cation, to housing and health care. They can in-
corporate immigrants in what they do and can be 
guided by diversity principles in how they operate.
The purpose of government is laid down in consti-
tutions, national and international laws and pol-
icy statements. As regulators and policy-makers, 
governments can adopt anti-discrimination and 
equality law, undertake equality-proofing of ex-
isting general policies and laws, and implement 
policies facilitating equal access to employment, 
education, health, other public services, decision-
making and citizenship. The purpose of non-
governmental entities is usually described in acts 
establishing their legal status and in mission state-
ments. The former provide organisations with a 
proof of existence and licence to operate as, for 
example, a commercial firm, a social enterprise, a 
welfare or community organisation, a sports club, 
a civic and political organisation, or a cultural 
and scientific institute. The latter describe an or-
ganisation’s aims, the means to achieve them and 
the values on which these goals are based. Their 
social commitment can find an expression in the 
implicit and explicit acknowledgement of society’s 
diversity, which inspires:
•	 compliance with anti-discrimination and equal-
ity policies and laws; 
•	 the screening of by-laws and internal regula-
tions on provisions preventing or facilitating 
the  participation of specific groups of individu-
als; 
•	 programmes, projects and products that are de-
signed to be beneficial to a diverse  population; 
•	 the setting of clear targets for specific categories 
of people within the population.  
While it is a democratic duty for the public sector 
to act upon and reflect the diversity of the popu-
lation, for civil society and the private sector this 
is more a matter of good citizenship. By includ-
ing diversity considerations in their employment, 
procurement and service delivery practices, gov-
ernments at different levels not only demonstrate 
their commitment to diversity, but also set a pow-
erful example that may attract followers in the 
private and civil society sectors.  Political parties’ 
role in promoting immigrant integration cannot 
be limited to designing, adopting and review-
ing the implementation of public policies. They 
should also promote their implementation by 
political institutions (such as parliaments, minis-
tries, agencies, etc.) and by parties (and affiliated 
organisations) themselves. Parties can be asked 
whether they reflect the diverse population they 
want or claim to represent. They can also be asked 
to demonstrate (a willingness to undertake) a sys-
temic and proactive approach to opening up their 
organisations to immigrants. This entails the ap-
plication of diversity principles in electoral strate-
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gies, recruitment and training of members, lead-
ers and elected officials, employees and suppliers 
(Kirchberger, Kefferpütz, Niessen & Friel, 2012).
One of the obstacles making it difficult for im-
migrants to become politically engaged is the fact 
that there often exists a disconnect between what 
political parties promote in terms of public poli-
cy and what they adopt as organizational policy. 
Parties see themselves first and foremost as policy 
actors wanting to gain or control political power, 
defending interests and pursuing goals. However, 
they are also membership organisations in sup-
port of their mission. They promote equality and 
diversity policies for society as a whole, but too 
often do not apply these principles to their own 
organisations.
Another impediment is that political parties often 
seem to want to do something for immigrants but 
not necessarily with them. Political parties should 
know and do better. Drafting a programme, mo-
bilising voters, running campaigns, gaining seats 
and posts are collaborative efforts involving the 
beneficiaries of policies. Engaging immigrants in 
shaping parties and their programme enhances 
not only the quality of democratic processes but 
also parties’ attractiveness among immigrant 
communities. To that end, parties could collect 
and better use existing data on the population’s 
diversity with a view to informing their electoral 
strategy, their membership drives, the selection of 
their candidates for public office and party leader-
ship, and management of their organisations. They 
can assess whether certain groups are underrepre-
sented among voters, members, elected officials, 
party leaders, staff and suppliers. Immigrants are 
such a group.
On the basis of such an assessment, parties can 
identify and address the reasons for the underrep-
resentation of immigrants. This can go from the 
identification of rather simple obstacles for im-
migrants to become involved, to more serious im-
pediments resulting from differences in tradition 
and culture of parties and immigrants. It could 
also point at discrimination and racism within the 
party. The next step would be the formulation of a 
strategy, the setting of clear targets and the moni-
toring of achievements and progress. Not many 
parties are used to working along those lines, al-
though there may be parties that have done a simi-
lar exercise in relation to the underrepresentation 
of women in the life of a political party. To pro-
mote the necessary organisational change, parties 
can use the same tools and techniques which other 
societal entities use.8
8.  For a diversity mainstreaming benchmarking tool, see: 
http://www.migpolgroup.org/benchmark/politicalpar-
ties_en.html.
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Franchise rights are the expression of citizenship 
(understood as equal membership in a self-gov-
ernment polity) insofar as the rules that define 
entitlement to franchise rights can be justified to 
all subject to them and are compatible with the re-
quirements of justice. Construed thus, considera-
tions of justice act as a filter, specifying rules that 
are required or forbidden, but also leaving consid-
erable scope within the range of permissible rules 
(as well as the institutional structuring of required 
rules) for the demos of the polity to shape its own 
political character. Such consideration of justice is 
practice-dependent.  That is, determinate specifi-
cation of the salient principle of justice depends 
on the character (point, purpose, and function) of 
the institution or practice with which one is con-
cerned.9 Given such a practice-dependent view, 
we cannot apply the rules of justice relevant for 
one kind of political entity, states, to a different 
kind of polity, the European Union.
I have argued elsewhere that, in the case of inde-
pendent states, external voting rights may be either 
required or permissible depending on the charac-
teristics of those to whom they apply.10   On the 
grounds of subjection to the coercively enforce-
able political authority of the state, fair opportuni-
ties for voting are required for transient absentees 
(short-term temporary workers and students) and 
also for those whose externality is a function of 
state roles (diplomats and members of the armed 
services).  On these same grounds, voting rights 
are ruled out for those who are merely transiently 
present (tourists, students, and short-term tempo-
rary workers). In the case of long-term expatriates 
who are not performing state roles, voting rights 
are permissible for national legislative and presi-
dential elections, and only required in the case of 
constitutional referenda. They are permissible in 
9.  For a clear specification of ‘practice-dependence,’ see 
Sangiovanni (2008).
10.  Owen (2011) provides a defence of these claims.
the former cases because inclusion in the demos 
is neither forbidden (residence is not a necessary 
condition of subjection to political authority) 
nor required (expatriates are not subject to the 
comprehensive subjection that characterises resi-
dents). In the latter case, they are required since 
constitutional referenda concern the character of 
one’s legal personality as a citizen or, more gener-
ally, the terms of the political association of which 
one is a member.  To give a dramatic example, if 
the United Kingdom held a referendum on with-
drawal from the EU, all UK citizens – no matter 
where they reside – would be bound by this de-
cision and (if this were their only Member State 
nationality) their entitlement to EU citizenship 
would hang on the outcome.
How do such applications of the principles of jus-
tice change when we consider not just sovereign 
states but also the EU and its Member States? In 
this essay, I consider voting rights and the Euro-
pean Union using a conceptual framework con-
cerned with the transnational European polity 
composed of the EU and its Member States in 
their various relations to one another. Such an 
approach is necessary because issues of external 
voting rights in national or EU elections gener-
ate interaction between EU citizenship and the 
national citizenship of Member States—a point 
demonstrated by the Aruba case.11  Likewise, the 
reasoning and decision of the European Court of 
Justice in the Rottman case suggest that clarifying 
the normative dimensions of membership in the 
European polity has become a more urgent task.12 
In what follows, I consider the relationship be-
tween EU citizenship and Member State citizen-
ship as a normatively important background issue 
before turning to focus on three specific issues: (a) 
11.  For discussion, see Shaw (2010), to which I am much 
indebted.
12.  Ibid.
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the tension between the EU’s constitutive commit-
ment to the norm of freedom of movement and 
the issue of national voting rights; (b) the broader 
terrain of expatriate voting rights in national elec-
tions, and (c) the issue of expatriate voting rights 
in EU elections.13 
European Union and Member 
State citizenship
As a background issue, I wish to consider the fol-
lowing questions: Which individuals are counted 
in the weighting of state representation in the Eu-
ropean Parliament and voting rights in the Euro-
pean Council, and where are they counted? These 
weightings have been organised in relation to 
population sizes (albeit not in a directly propor-
tional manner).14  But there is a prior normative 
question: why should population sizes be taken to 
be the relevant consideration? Remember that the 
distribution of seats in national and local elections 
is not typically a function of population sizes but 
of numbers of eligible voters. This practice is based 
on the idea that it is the demos and not the populos 
that is normatively relevant for electoral purposes. 
The Liberal Democrat MEP Andrew Duff has ar-
gued in favour of the use of a populous criterion:
13.  In this paper, I will use the term ‘emigrants’ to refer to 
1st and 2nd generation emigrants on the grounds that, 
as I have argued elsewhere (Owen, 2011) following 
Bauböck (2006), citizenship should not pass beyond 
the 2nd generation of emigrants (i.e., the 1st genera-
tion born abroad) without further qualifications such as 
residence in the presumptive state of nationality coming 
into play.
14.  There is lively debate about what would constitute a fair 
rule for the allocation of EU Council votes on this basis, 
especially when issues of fair decisional and transparent 
rules for the European Parliament are acknowledged.
The Madisonian approach suggests that the 
European Parliament represents not only de 
jure EU citizens (as formally established by 
the EU Treaty) but that it also represents, and 
has a duty of care towards, anyone else who 
abides in the territory of the Union, including 
minors and denizens. That being the case, the 
traditional method of distributing seats in the 
Parliament on the basis of total population – 
to say nothing of counting votes in the council 
– is the right one and should not be amended. 
(as cited in Shaw 2010)
But this claim misses the point entirely. The fact 
that representatives’ duties extend beyond those 
who can vote for or against them in no way im-
plies that persons other than voters should count 
in determining constituency and/or seat distribu-
tions.  Nevertheless, it may be an argument for the 
differential allocation of resources; a representa-
tive whose constituency contains a large vote-inel-
igible population can reasonably be given greater 
resources for his representative activities than one 
whose constituency is not so characterised. Imag-
ine two towns, Procreatia and Condominia, each 
with 60,000 eligible voters, but where households 
in Procreatia have an average of two adults and 
four children, in Condominia the household aver-
age is two adults and one child. There are grounds 
for arguing that Procreatia requires more schools 
and playgrounds than Condominia and that the 
elected representative for Procreatia be given ad-
ditional office staff and other resources to ensure 
he or she can effectively represent all his or her 
constituents. Does this provide any democratic 
grounds for arguing that Procreatia should have 
more MPs than Condominia? Independent of ar-
gument for the enfranchisement of children, it is 
hard to see why one should think so.15
15.  There is more to be said on this issue, but this will have 
to await another occasion.
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If it is the number of eligible voters that is the 
salient criterion, this immediately raises a set of 
further issues for the topic of this paper. Populos-
based criteria and demos-based criteria generate 
distinct normative dynamics between EU citizen-
ship and Member State citizenship. These distinct 
dynamics have implications not simply for the is-
sue of external voting, with which I am concerned 
in this essay, but also for the citizenship policies 
of Member States more generally.  Among these 
citizenship policies are the rules concerning the 
acquisition and loss of citizenship, dual national-
ity and the criteria of eligibility for voting (age and 
residence criteria, for example). Under a populos-
based system, due to the institutional design of 
representation within the EU, Member States have 
no political incentive to incorporate long-term 
resident migrants or to promote external voting 
rights for their own citizens like they do under a 
demos-based system.  Moreover, it is not simply 
a matter of the number of eligible voters who are 
citizens of a given Member State but also the ques-
tion of where they should be counted if they reside 
in another Member State or outside the EU. I re-
turn to this matter in the main discussion.
Freedom of movement and voting 
rights in the European Union
Consider then, in respect of independent states, a 
normatively plausible position might reasonably 
be construed thus:16
1. Lawful immigrants who reside within the state 
beyond a specified time-period (e.g., five years) 
should be entitled to access to national voting 
rights (whether directly or via naturalisation) 
on the basis of their subjection to the coercive 
legal authority of the state and/or social mem-
bership.
16.  See Owen (2011).
2. Lawful emigrants who reside outside the state 
beyond a specified time-period (e.g., five years) 
may be permitted to retain national voting 
rights in legislative (and, where applicable, pres-
idential) elections in virtue of their continuing 
subjection to the political authority of the state 
(even if much of its law is not currently applica-
ble to them) and/or the constitutive role of their 
relation to the home state for their autonomy 
and well-being.
This position could be defended on the basis of the 
social membership argument17 or the stakeholder 
principle18. However, once we shift to states within 
an EU-type polity, the normative context is trans-
formed. This is most obviously demonstrated by 
the fact that, given the institutional design of the 
EU, it is not compatible with the civic equality of 
EU citizens to have voting rights in national or EU 
elections in more than one Member State, whereas 
in the case of independent states, there is no breach 
of civic equality in a person exercising votes in two 
nationally distinct electoral contests because they 
are not related through a supranational political 
architecture. It is important to note that the sig-
nificance of the transformation depends on the 
political constitution of the EU, that is, the kind of 
polity that it is. We can explore this point by com-
paring the EU with purely intergovernmental and 
fully federalised systems that are also committed 
to free movement within the territorial area that 
they cover. 
In the case of a purely intergovernmental political 
structure, the norm of free movement is grounded 
on a joint commitment to a common aim or pur-
pose such as a free market area (as was the case 
in the EEC). In terms of the national citizenship 
of the states involved in this intergovernmental 
project, the normative context remains largely 
17.  See Rubio-Marin (2000) and (2006).
18.  See Bauböck (2007).
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equivalent to that of independent states who are 
not engaged in such a project, but not wholly. The 
shared purpose brings into play the principle of 
justice and necessitates that partners to this pro-
ject not act to frustrate this joint enterprise and, 
where compatible with their distinct national con-
texts and projects, aim to facilitate it. Such a prin-
ciple could be expressed by, for example, offering 
preferential treatment to the citizens of partner 
states for access to membership rights and for dual 
citizenship. 
In the contrasting case of a fully federalised sys-
tem, the norm of free movement may serve instru-
mental purposes but is, fundamentally, a basic lib-
erty of federal citizens.  As such, state citizenship is 
subordinate to federal citizenship in the sense that 
freedom of movement requires that anyone exer-
cising their right to cross state borders must not 
be disadvantaged at any level of citizenship within 
the federal structure. An obvious way to institute 
such a rule of justice is to adopt a residence-based 
rule for citizenship in the states that comprise the 
federal union. This is not the only possible way to 
institute such a rule but, given a territorial mode of 
governance, it has the advantage of aligning voting 
rights with primary contexts of governance. 
The EU is situated somewhere between these two 
examples.  Its commitment to freedom of move-
ment has moved from an economic model tied to 
a largely intergovernmental structure to a more 
civic model, which retains some features of the 
former and is commensurate with its development 
of federal as well as intergovernmental features. 
While the civic model now identifies freedom of 
movement as a right of citizens of Member States 
as EU citizens19 and not simply as workers,20 it 
19.  Although Article 21(1) TFEU specifies that this right 
may be subject to certain limitations and conditions.
20.  See, for instance, Cases C-413/99 Baumbast and R 
[2002] ECR I-7091, paragraph 84, and C-200/02, Zhu 
remains the case that the EU is a mixed type of 
governmental entity. Consequently, the relation-
ship between EU citizenship and Member State 
citizenship cannot be conceptualised simply in 
terms of the priority of the former or the latter but, 
rather, as engaging a form of interactive mediation 
between the two. 
In a recent report, the European Commission 
drew attention to this problematic view of the re-
lationship between EU citizenship and Member 
State citizenship:
Some EU citizens who move to and reside in 
another Member State may lose their right to 
take part in national elections in their Mem-
ber State of origin. According to the legisla-
tion of several Member States (Ireland, Hun-
gary, Denmark, Malta, Austria and United 
Kingdom), their nationals are disenfran-
chised if they live in another Member State 
for a certain period of time. Many EU citizens 
informed the Commission and the European 
Parliament that they are not able to partici-
pate in any national elections, neither in the 
Member State of origin nor in the Member 
State of residence (European Commission, 
2010). 
The issue here is not simply that Member States 
have different rules governing access to national 
voting rights for emigrant nationals in the EU and 
immigrant EU citizens but also that the author-
ity to determine these rules may remain largely at 
the discretion of the Member States. It is widely 
accepted, given their primary function, that resi-
dence is the appropriate criterion for participation 
in local and municipal elections; EU citizenship 
would hardly be meaningful if EU citizens resident 
and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, paragraph 26. Cited in 
COM (2010) 603.
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in the EU could not vote (or stand for election) 
in European Parliament elections. Still, in leaving 
national voting rights out of its requirements for 
mobile EU citizens, the EU and its Member States 
avoid having to make a choice between interfering 
with the national self-constitution of the national 
demos by requiring Member States either to in-
clude resident non-nationals who are EU citizens 
or to include expatriate nationals.  However, with 
the shift from an economic to a civic grounding 
of free movement, this position is no longer com-
patible with the requirements of political equal-
ity in the EU. It may be reasonable for there to be 
some limitations and restrictions on the freedom 
of movement of EU citizens. It is not reasonable, 
given this right as a civic right, that such restric-
tions undermine the point and purpose of civic 
rights in securing political equality. While it may 
be relatively straightforward to see that, as a mat-
ter of democratic justice, EU citizens resident in 
the EU should not be required to sacrifice national 
voting rights to secure the benefits of exercising 
their right of free movement, this point only raises 
the question of where EU citizens, who have exer-
cised this right, should be entitled to vote. 
There are four options available as simple general 
rules:
1. National voting rights in the state of residence;
2. National voting rights in the state of nationality;
3. Having a personal choice between (1) and (2);
4. A time-differentiated combination of (1) and 
(2) which starts with (2) and, after a period of 
residence, switches to (1).
We have already noted that (1) is the character-
istic feature of fully federal systems and has the 
advantage of ensuring that voting rights track the 
primary contexts of governance. The normative is-
sue raised by (1) is whether the political autonomy 
of citizens resident within a Member State is ad-
equately secured if they lack national voting rights 
in that Member State. This is a serious issue but 
it should also be noted that (1) has the disadvan-
tage of effectively severing the formal democratic 
relationship of such EU citizens with their Mem-
ber State of nationality. By contrast, (2) maintains 
that relationship but means that such EU citizens 
cannot vote in what, arguably, remains their pri-
mary context of rule. Acknowledging these com-
binations of advantages and disadvantages may 
incline us to (3), letting each individual decide for 
themselves, while (4) may be seen as an attempt to 
combine the advantages and minimize the disad-
vantages of (1) and (2) in a way that registers the 
salience of the ‘centre of gravity’ of one’s life as it 
changes over time.
In response to (1), insofar an EU citizen enjoys EU 
political rights, rights to join (or found) political 
parties or organisations in the state of residence, 
and other general rights of political participation 
in the state of residence, the conditions of their 
political autonomy are sufficiently secured. This 
is plausible only if such EU citizens also enjoy a 
right to acquire political membership of the state 
of residence within a reasonable timeframe. In the 
absence of such an entitlement they are forced to 
trade the good of political membership in their 
context of governance for the good of free move-
ment. This right of membership need not be pre-
sented on the same terms as for resident non-EU 
citizens. One could argue that a longer time-pe-
riod would be justified for resident non-EU citi-
zens who do not enjoy the same protections as EU 
citizens. My own preference21 would not be to vary 
the timeframe but to adopt an automatic confer-
ral (with opt-out) for non-EU citizens and an au-
tomatic entitlement (with opt-in) for EU citizens 
21.  See Owen (2011).
Inclusive Democracy in Europe34
as a way of registering the relevant normative dis-
tinction between their positions. 
The important point here is that this form of ob-
jection to (1) entails that (2), if it is appropriately 
linked to rights of naturalisation for EU citizens 
in other Member States, effectively accommodates 
what is valuable in (3) and (4) while ruling out the 
possible strategic voting complications that an un-
qualified version of (3) could introduce. Let us call 
this complex rule composed of (2) plus the right to 
naturalisation (2+).  Notice that whereas (1) argu-
ably both devalues national citizenship in a way 
that is not consonant with the institutional char-
acter of the EU and pre-emptively pushes towards 
a fully federal conception of the EU, (2+) acknowl-
edges the mixed character of the EU and the me-
diated character of citizenship in the Euro-polity. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, (2+) rather than 
(1) gets the distribution of political responsibil-
ity right. Since EU citizenship is acquired through 
citizenship of a Member State, the primary re-
sponsibility for ensuring that an EU citizen is not 
politically disadvantaged by exercising the right 
of free movement lies with the Member State of 
origin rather than the Member State of residence.
If (2+) allows all competent adults to have a fair 
opportunity to acquire political membership or 
nationality in the Member State of residence, and 
also allows all emigrant nationals who are resident 
in the EU and do not have political membership 
or nationality in their Member State of residence 
to be eligible to vote in national elections of their 
Member State of nationality, does this justify re-
quiring that all Member States institute (2+)?  I do 
not think so, or only as a minimal criterion. For 
example, a Member State might take a more maxi-
malist position granting voting rights to resident 
non-national EU citizens and to emigrant national 
EU residents. Such a rule cannot be generalised (at 
least not without turning it into (3) above).  But 
the requirement to ensure political equality can-
not, in and of itself, mandate the requirement of 
a single generalizable rule to be adopted by all 
Member States. It can only require that Member 
States ensure that their nationals are not politically 
disenfranchised.
Almost 12 million EU citizens reside in Member 
States that are not their Member State of national-
ity. Approaching 20 per cent of EU citizens report 
that they consider the option of moving to anoth-
er Member State to be a real possibility over the 
course of their lives. While a populos-based crite-
ria for the distribution of Council voting weights 
provide no incentive for Member States to deal 
with this problem of political equality, a demos-
based criterion provides an incentive to endorse 
(2+) and, indeed, even to adopt a more maximalist 
policy. 
Expatriate voting rights in 
national elections 
The issue of external voting rights for emigrant 
nationals, however, is not simply limited to the 
case of those nationals resident within the EU. It 
also concerns the issue of nationals resident out-
side the EU. The question that now arises, howev-
er, is whether the argument of the preceding sec-
tion has any implications in relation to expatriate 
voting by EU citizens who are not resident in the 
EU. To put it more explicitly, does the requirement 
that otherwise disenfranchised emigrant nation-
als resident in the EU be granted external voting 
rights support the extension of external voting 
rights to emigrant nationals resident outside the 
EU? Or is the discrimination between these types 
of emigrant national justified? Not directly. Since 
the relevant considerations governing the right 
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to freedom of movement do not apply to Mem-
ber State citizens resident outside the EU, there is 
no similarly legitimate basis for the requirement 
that the relevant class of emigrant nationals enjoy 
external voting rights. Nor does it appear that the 
EU has a prima facie legitimate interest in inter-
vening with respect to Member State practices in 
this area. Yet, since voting by emigrant nationals 
is, at the least, normatively permissible, Member 
States may legitimately choose to extend external 
voting practices to emigrant nationals. 
A demos-based criterion for Council voting 
weighting provides incentives for the extension of 
emigrant voting rights but a populos-based crite-
rion does not. Notice also that if a demos-based 
criterion were instituted, it would introduce one 
ground on which the EU could have a legitimate 
interest in Member State policies: the transmis-
sion of voting rights across generations. Such a 
rule would have implications for the relative vot-
ing power of states in the Council, and the EU 
would have a legitimate interest in ensuring the 
limitations on the transmission of voting rights 
(for example, to the first generation born abroad).
Expatriate voting rights in 
European Union elections
Should EU citizens who are resident outside the 
EU be entitled to vote in EU elections? And if 
so, through what kind of electoral mechanism? 
Should this be a matter for Member States or does 
the EU have a legitimate interest or role in deter-
mining these rules?
Let me return to the social membership and stake-
holder principles in relation to this issue.  Devel-
oping the social membership argument, Rubio-
Marin has argued for the permissibility of expatri-
ate voting:
A country may democratically decide to al-
low for absentee voting of the first generation, 
thereby including expatriates in the political 
process … in recognition of the fact that it 
is now easier than ever to remain connected 
to home state politics from abroad, and thus 
easier to understand the set of concrete policy 
options that a country may face … [and also] 
in recognition of the fact many emigrants live 
between two countries, as well as the fact that 
their return is increasingly becoming a real 
option because being abroad no longer re-
quires the definite severing of ties that it did 
in the past. (2006, p. 134)
The basic normative ground for such permissibil-
ity following from this account is the presump-
tion that political membership in home states is 
a source of non-instrumental value for expatri-
ates. Notice, though, that such an argument can-
not support expatriate voting rights in relation to 
the EU since EU citizenship does not appear (as 
yet) to serve as such a source of non-instrumental 
value. However, an alternative ground is offered by 
Bauböck’s stakeholder principle:
The notion of stakeholding expresses, first, the 
idea that citizens have not merely fundamen-
tal interests in the outcomes of the political 
process, but a claim to be represented as par-
ticipants in that process. Second, stakehold-
ing serves as a criterion for assessing claims 
to membership and voting rights. Individuals 
whose circumstances of life link their future 
well-being to the flourishing of a particular 
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polity should be recognized as stakeholders in 
that polity with a claim to participate in col-
lective decision-making processes that shape 
the shared future of this political community. 
(2007, p. 2422)
This passage suggests that stakeholders have a le-
gitimate claim to participate.  Still, the reach of 
this claim (i.e., the extent of participation it legiti-
mates) may vary or it may be defeated by other 
legitimate concerns. In a second set of remarks, 
Bauböck comments:
In a stakeholder conception of democratic 
community, persons with multiple stakes need 
multiple votes to control each of the govern-
ments whose decisions will affect their future 
as members of several demoi. This applies, on 
the one hand, to federally nested demoi where 
citizens can cast multiple vertical votes on 
several levels and, on the other hand, to the 
demoi of independent states with overlapping 
membership. (2007, p. 2428)
This suggests the stronger view that the stakehold-
er principle supports a requirement of inclusion in 
the demos for stakeholders. We may surmise this 
requirement would be legitimately subject only to 
(a) the basic constraint that such inclusion does 
not threaten the stability of the state (i.e., its ca-
pacity to reproduce itself as a self-governing pol-
ity over time) and (b) feasibility constraints. More 
particularly, Bauböck’s argument has the right 
shape to address governmental entities such as the 
EU in a way that Rubio-Marin’s does not.  
Let us suppose that, on stakeholder grounds, ex-
patriate voting rights are permissible in relation 
to EU elections for EU citizens resident outside 
the EU. The next question then is whether the de-
cision to institute such rights is a matter for the 
EU and/or Member States? We might note here 
that currently EU elections are conducted on a 
national basis through votes for nationally-based 
parties who then engage in coalitions with other 
nationally-based parties in the European Parlia-
ment and that seat allocations are made on the 
basis of the resident population of each Member 
State (although the introduction of some element 
of transnational lists appears probable). In light of 
these factors, we might claim that the granting of 
expatriate voting rights in EU elections should be 
a matter solely for Member States. There are two 
problems with this claim. First and foremost, it 
exposes the enjoyment of political equality of EU 
citizens resident outside the EU to national arbi-
trariness in a way directly analogous to the arbi-
trariness confronted by third-country nationals in 
different Member States which the EU is seeking 
(non-coercively) to reduce. Second, insofar as we 
reject a populos-based criterion of seat allocation, 
common rules concerning the limitations on con-
struction of the demos are needed. Imagine, for 
example, that in parallel with the introduction of a 
demos-based criterion of seat allocation, Belgium 
decides to adopt a rule stating that any EU citizen 
resident outside of the EU who does not have EU 
voting rights via their Member State of nationality 
will be permitted to exercise their vote in Belgium. 
This would be likely, in the short-term, to increase 
significantly the number of seats awarded to, and 
the relative power of, Belgium’s political parties in 
the European Parliament. Should such a rule be 
permitted? My point here is simply that adopting a 
demos-based criterion of allocation would require 
that the EU play a role in determining the legiti-
mate range of rules governing the enfranchise-
ment of EU citizens resident outside of the EU.
Inclusive Democracy in Europe37
Conclusion
In this essay I have argued that external voting 
rights in national elections for emigrant nation-
als resident in the EU are required for those ex-
patriates that do not have political membership 
or nationality of the Member State in which they 
reside. I have also argued that the EU ought to 
be legitimately entitled to require that Member 
States adopt such a minimal criterion.  Still, the 
EU should not be entitled to prevent Member 
States from adopting more maximalist criteria. 
In the case of expatriate voting rights in national 
elections for non-EU residents, I have argued that 
such rights are permissible rather than required 
and there is no injustice in differentiating between 
EU-resident and non-EU resident emigrants in 
this context. I have also suggested that the EU 
would have legitimate grounds on which to regu-
late Member State rules in this area insofar as a 
demos-based criterion replaces a populos-based 
criterion for the distribution of European Parlia-
ment seats and Council voting weights in the EU. 
I have argued that expatriate voting rights for EU 
citizens resident outside the EU are permissible 
and that political equality supports their general 
introduction. I have also tried to draw attention 
to the point that the basis of the criteria governing 
the institutional distribution of power to Member 
States also makes a difference to the relationship 
of the EU and Member States on these issues as 
well as the dynamic between them – suggesting 
that a demos-based criteria would offer incentives 
supporting more inclusive politics in Member 
States and a more significant role for the EU in the 
articulation of the citizenship of the Euro-polity.
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Voting as a central element of 
representative democracy
Electoral participation is an interesting subject to 
research, especially since there are so many conse-
quences that can be tied to it. Turnout can be seen 
as an indication of trust in government or poli-
tics, and for the individual parties it shows how 
popular they are with the electorate. Representa-
tive democracy is based on the ideal notion that 
all people in the country are represented equally 
in parliament. Different types of electoral systems 
make it harder or easier to accomplish this goal 
(Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). In a majoritar-
ian system like the United Kingdom, representa-
tiveness of all people is lower than in a country 
with just one electoral district and a representative 
parliament like the Netherlands. The difference 
between the votes cast and the votes that are trans-
ferred into seats is called the lost vote syndrome 
(Franklin, 2004). When more votes are transferred 
into seats, it is easier for new parties to enter par-
liament and thus for new groups in society to be 
represented in parliament. If people have the feel-
ing that their vote does not count, they have a low-
er propensity to vote (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). 
This makes elections central to representative 
government and voting an important democratic 
act for citizens (Gallagher et al., 2006).  The im-
portance of high electoral turnout for democra-
cies continues to be a source of debate.  Seymour 
Lipset, writing in 1950s, suggests that non-voting 
shows that people are content with their situa-
tion—they do not need change and thus do not 
need to vote (1959). Today, the general opinion 
is that high turnout is essential for representative 
democracy because it shows the legitimacy and 
stability of the democracy (Bennet & Resnick, 
1990). If people do not vote it is because they are 
so dissatisfied with the current political parties or 
government that they feel voting does not make a 
difference. 
Thus, voting and elections are important to de-
mocracy. Yet turnout in national elections has 
continued to drop in most European democracies 
since the 1970s. In the Netherlands, for example, 
electoral participation in national elections has 
dropped from 83.5 per cent in 1972 to 75.4 per 
cent in 2010 (International Institute for Democra-
cy and Electoral Assistance, 2012). That turnout in 
most European democracies has decreased while 
characteristics that encourage voting (higher edu-
cational attainment and higher political trust) have 
become more common in the population is called 
the turnout puzzle (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; 
Franklin, 2004; Plutzer, 2002). One explanation of 
this phenomenon is the increase in the number of 
non-voters in the lower socio-economic classes.
The democracies in the European Union have 
been, and will always be, subject to change. One 
of these changes is the influx of immigrants into 
many Member States. For a number of years, poli-
ticians thought that these labour migrants would 
eventually return to their countries of origin. We 
now know that this is not the case. The diversi-
fication of the electorate has become a fact. Im-
migrants, people who are foreign-born and people 
with foreign-born parents, are overrepresented in 
the lower social-economic classes. Immigrants in 
Europe vote less often than natives, which might 
cause turnout to drop even further and create le-
gitimacy problems for European democracies. 
That is why we should ask ourselves the question: 
do immigrants in Europe vote less often in elec-
tions than (otherwise comparable) natives? 
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Voting as political 
integration
Brady and Leicht (2008) pose the important ques-
tion, ‘who will be able to participate in the deci-
sions that govern markets and states?’ Migrants 
will be excluded from these decision-making pro-
cesses if they do not participate in politics. Vot-
ing in national elections, just like other forms of 
political participation, can be seen as an act of po-
litical integration of migrants into their country of 
destination (Tillie, 2000). We expect that political 
integration is connected with other forms of in-
tegration, like social and economic integration. 
Unfortunately, immigrants have lower levels of 
electoral participation than natives (van Londen, 
Phalet & Hagendoorn, 2004). 
Most research on the electoral participation of 
immigrants comes from the United States (Cho, 
1999; Chong & Rogers, 2005; DeFransceco, Soto & 
Merolla, 2006; Jackson, 2003) and focuses on the 
difference in voting rates between African Ameri-
cans, Asian Americans, Latinos and European 
Americans. In general, this research finds that the 
explanations that are used to explain majority vot-
ing behaviour have only limited value in explain-
ing the voting behaviour of minority groups. This 
difference between majority and minority voting 
cannot be explained completely by a composi-
tional effect of socio-economic status. Thus, more 
immigrant-related explanations should be devel-
oped. 
Research in Europe concerning migrant voting 
behaviour has concentrated on the role of social 
capital of minority groups. As well as migrant so-
cial capital (intra-ethnic social capital), contact 
with natives (inter-ethnic social capital) can fos-
ter electoral participation. If you meet with other 
people, you will likely talk about politics. If you 
have more native friends who vote, the chance 
of voting yourself is higher. In the same fashion, 
if you are part of an ethnic group that has a high 
propensity of voting, contact with that group will 
foster electoral participation. Most of this research 
examines specific immigrant groups in one or few 
cities in Western Europe. For example, Jacobs, 
Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2004) find that Moroc-
cans have higher participation rates than Turk-
ish immigrants in Brussels. This can be explained 
by familiarity with one of the main languages in 
Belgium, French, which is an unofficial second 
language in Morocco. Fennema and Tillie (1999) 
hypothesise that differences in ethnic social capi-
tal lead to differences in the political participation 
of different ethnic groups. There is some evidence 
that corroborates this hypothesis (London et al., 
2004; Tillie, 2004). 
In this research we are interested in determining 
if explanations for the electoral participation of 
natives apply to immigrants as well. We consid-
er three indicators that are often used to explain 
political participation: gender, educational attain-
ment and political efficacy. Political efficacy is the 
extent to which people feel they can grasp politics. 
We expect to find that men vote more often than 
women, that more highly educated people vote 
more often than people with lower levels of edu-
cational attainment, and that people with higher 
political efficacy vote more often than people with 
low political efficacy. We hypothesize that the ef-
fects of gender, educational attainment and politi-
cal efficacy on electoral participation are different 
for natives than they are for immigrants. 
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Data and methods
We use the combined data of the second 
(2004/2005) and third waves (2006/2007) of the 
European Social Survey for a sample of 8132 im-
migrants and 66282 natives in 24 European coun-
tries.22  We selected those countries whose data 
22.  For more information on the European Social Survey, 
see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
were available in spring 2008 and had a mini-
mum of 25 immigrants in the sample. We define 
first generation immigrants as those people born 
outside of the country of interview. Second gen-
eration immigrants are individuals born in the 
country of interview with at least one of foreign-
born parent. Both groups are collapsed into the 
immigrant variable. We selected respondents who 
Table 1: Self-reported turnout in national elections
Turnout natives Turnout immigrants Difference
Country N % N % %
Austria 2922 84.5 427 80.4 -4.0
Belgium 2605 95.9 333 89.8 -6.2
Cyprus 832 94.8 24 75.0 -19.8
Czech Republic 1368 56.4 147 51.2 -5.2
Denmark 2368 94.0 201 88.5 -5.5
Estonia 1312 68.8 442 62.9 -6.0
Finland 2833 81.7 68 79.1 -2.6
France 2169 79.0 383 73.4 -5.7
Germany 3715 81.8 401 73.2 -8.6
Greece 1833 93.6 211 88.3 -5.3
Hungary 2082 78.2 148 82.7 4.5
Ireland 2769 82.3 153 68.3 -14.0
Italy 1200 88.8 32 84.2 -4.5
Luxemburg 739 94.9 262 94.9 0.0
Norway 2549 87.1 184 79.7 -7.4
Poland 1979 66.8 87 64.0 -2.8
Portugal 2863 75.5 79 64.8 -10.7
Slovakia 1940 72.1 188 74.0 2.0
Slovenia 1628 75.5 322 66.7 -8.9
Spain 2471 83.3 67 70.5 -12.8
Sweden 2718 91.2 440 82.7 -8.5
Switzerland 1725 68.7 404 61.8 -6.9
Netherlands 2609 85.0 317 72.9 -12.2
United Kingdom 2466 72.7 351 68.0 -4.7
Total 51695 81.4 5671 74.9 -6.5
Source: European Social Survey 2004/2005 and 2006/2007
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were 18 at the time of the survey and who did not 
indicate that they were not allowed to vote in the 
last election. Since only immigrants who have ob-
tained citizenship are allowed to vote in national 
elections, we included only immigrant citizens in 
our analysis.
As a dependent variable we examine self-reported 
turnout in national elections, measured with the 
question ‘Did you vote in the last [country] nation-
al election in [month/year]?’ In order to explore the 
factors that influence the voting propensity of im-
migrants and natives, we use the education, gender, 
and political efficacy23 as independent variables. 
23.  Political efficacy is operationalised as the respondents’ 
response to the question ‘making my mind up about 
politics is…?’ (very difficult, difficult, neither difficult 
nor easy, easy, very easy). 
In our descriptive analysis, we derive voter turn-
out rates for natives and immigrants (see table 
1). We also conduct t-tests and ANOVA tests to 
determine if the independent variables have a sig-
nificant influence on the propensity to vote and if 
this effect is the same for natives and immigrants. 
If the interaction variable between native and (for 
example) gender is not significant, this means that 
there is not a significantly different effect of the 
independent variable on voting propensity for im-
migrants compared to natives. 
Table 2. Propensity to vote by immigrant status, gender, education and political efficacy
Natives (%) Immigrants (%) Difference (%)
Immigrant status
Immigrant status 81 % 73 % 4%
Gender
Male 81 % 75 % 6 %
Female 80 % 72 % 8 %
Education
Low 77 % 70 % 7 %
Middle 79 % 71 % 8 %
High 89 % 83 % 6 %
Political efficacy
Very low 66 % 61 % 5 %
Low 78 % 69 % 9 %
Not high, not low 81 % 75 % 6 %
High 87 % 81 % 6 %
Very high 87 % 80 % 7 %
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Results
In table 1 we present turnout rates for natives and 
immigrants in national elections in the selected 
European countries. Turnout among natives is 
highest in Belgium (95.9 per cent) and among 
immigrants in Luxembourg (94.4 per cent), most 
likely due to compulsory voting systems in those 
countries. Turnout among natives is lowest in the 
Czech Republic (56.4 per cent); turnout of immi-
grants is also lowest in the Czech Republic (51.2 
per cent). In the last column of table 1 we see the 
difference in turnout between natives and immi-
grants. The difference is negative in 21 of the 24 
countries and largest in Cyprus (-19.8 per cent). 
Immigrants vote more often than natives in two 
countries, Slovakia and Hungary, and there is no 
difference between the two groups in Luxem-
bourg. 
Table 2 presents the propensity to vote by immi-
grant status, gender, education and political ef-
ficacy. On average the percentage of natives that 
vote (81 per cent) is higher than the percentage of 
immigrants that vote (73 per cent). This is a sig-
nificant difference (t = -14.6, p < 0.001). 
Our results indicate that men have a higher pro-
pensity to vote than women, and that this is true 
for native as well as immigrant respondents. The 
effect of gender is significant (F = 10.6, p <0.01) 
and the effect of gender on voting is the same for 
natives and immigrants. 
For native respondents, we find a positive rela-
tionship between voting propensity and educa-
tion. Seventy-seven per cent of respondents in the 
lowest educational bracket vote compared to 89 
per cent of the most highly educated respondents. 
We find the same pattern for immigrant respon-
dents, although the percentages are lower. Of im-
migrants with only primary or lower secondary 
education, 70 per cent vote. Of immigrants with a 
tertiary education, 83 per cent vote. Although the 
effect of education on voting propensity is signifi-
cant (F = 222.2, p < 0.001), the effect of education 
on voting propensity is not significantly different 
between natives and immigrants (F = 1.270, p > 
0.05). The ANOVA results also show that educa-
tion (eta = 0.06) is a far more important determi-
nant of voting than immigrant status (eta = 0.03). 
Political efficacy has a significant effect on the pro-
pensity to vote (F = 144.1, p < 0.001) and this ef-
fect is the same for natives and immigrants (F = 
1.8, p > 0.05). This means that the higher the level 
of political efficacy is, the higher the propensity 
to vote is. It is also interesting to see that there is 
no difference in effect between the highest level of 
political efficacy and the level below the highest 
level in both categories. In Table 3 we present the 
ANOVA results for the model by immigrant sta-
tus, gender, education and political efficacy with-
out the (non-significant) interactions.
Table 3: ANOVA results for propensity to vote 
F P Partial η²
Immigrant status 199.4 0.000 0.003
Gender 3.0 0.082 0.000
Educational level 299.4 0.000 0.009
Political efficacy 252.1 0.000 0.015
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Table 3 shows that gender is not significant when 
we control for immigrant status, educational level 
and political efficacy. From the latter three vari-
ables we can assess the relative importance based 
on the partial eta squared. Political efficacy is the 
most important indicator of voting propensity, 
followed by educational level and immigrant sta-
tus. Thus, educational level is a more important 
predictor of voting than immigrant status. 
As indicated in table 2, the percentage of immi-
grants that vote is on average four per cent lower 
than the percentage of natives that vote. If we split 
our data into different groups, we find that these 
differences are larger for some groups than for 
others. For example, the difference between the 
number of native men and immigrant men that 
vote is six per cent, while for women the difference 
in eight per cent. 
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we wanted to answer the question: do 
immigrants in Europe vote less often in elections 
than (otherwise comparable) natives? Our results 
suggest that this is indeed the case. We find that 
immigrants vote less often than comparable na-
tives if we compare them on gender, educational 
attainment and political efficacy. We find for these 
three variables that the effects on immigrants and 
the effects on natives do not significantly differ. 
Therefore we reject our hypothesis that the effects 
of gender, educational attainment and political ef-
ficacy on electoral participation are different for 
natives than they are for immigrants. 
This means that in future research we can use the 
same explanatory mechanisms for the voting be-
haviour of immigrants as we do for natives. How-
ever, these mechanisms should be expanded to 
include other variables associated with immigrant 
status, such as the use of a minority language at 
home or perceived discrimination. This is neces-
sary because the explanatory power of the vari-
ables used in our analysis is lower for immigrants 
than for natives. 
There are some limitations that we should address. 
Earlier research found larger effects of, among 
others, educational attainment. However, these re-
searchers used local elections to measure political 
integration. This is a better measurement of po-
litical participation because non-citizens can vote 
in local elections.  If comparable cross-national 
European data on local elections would become 
available, it would be interesting to repeat this 
study using the alternative data. Another problem 
concerns bias in the selection of the sample. Only 
people who speak the language of the destination 
country well are interviewed unless a minority 
group consists of 10 per cent of the population, in 
which case the survey is also available in the lan-
guage of that minority. In practice, this only hap-
pens in certain Eastern-European countries where 
Russian versions of the survey are available in ad-
dition to the version in the official language(s) of 
the country. As we progress in the collection of 
representative comparative data, these and more 
questions can be answered. For now, we can con-
clude that governments should invest in the edu-
cational attainment of non-natives and minorities, 
because this is the most powerful way to include 
non-natives in political processes and legitimise 
democracy. 
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In 2012, the struggle that has lasted for more than 
30 years to guarantee foreign residents the right to 
vote and to stand in municipal elections in France 
has come to an end.  This short paper reviews the 
crucial events of this campaign24. 
Although there were earlier motions put forth in 
the congress from left-leaning political parties and 
human rights and immigrant groups, 1981 can be 
considered the beginning of the campaign for ac-
cess to voting rights for resident non-nationals in 
France.  At this time, the presidential candidate, 
François Mitterrand, included this initiative in his 
platform of policy proposals.  A few months after 
his election, however, the president came to realise 
that the current political climate did not allow 
for the implementation of this proposal.  At the 
time the polls were not favourable; in 1981, 32 per 
cent of those polled were in favour of extending 
the right to vote to foreigners; by 1984, the figure 
had fallen to 21 per cent. Still, many organisations 
were sympathetic with the issue and from that 
time on started to campaign for extended voting 
rights.  Indeed, the 1983 March for Equality and 
Against Racism —one of the most significant pro-
immigrant events during that decade—focused on 
this issue.  Finishing in Paris with nearly 100,000 
participants, the march is seen to have been in an 
important factor in the creation of the ten-year 
residence permit.  
In 1985, at Mons en Baroeul, near Lille, in 1987 
in Amiens and then in five other cities, munici-
palities chose to involve foreign residents in their 
municipal bodies, even before they had the right 
to vote. In these locations, associated counsellors 
were elected to participate in an advisory role in 
meetings of the municipal councils and commit-
tees.  The participation of foreign residents was 
significant.  Nearly 1000 of the 4000 foreign resi-
24.  Translated from French
dents of voting age voted in the elections of these 
counsellors.  The media coverage was effective and 
these experiments were highly contested by the 
extreme right who organised protests on the day 
of the vote and attempted to overturn municipal 
decisions. The voting experiments were mostly of 
short duration, the last ending in 2001 when for-
eigners of European origin were granted the right 
to vote in municipal elections. Still, these initia-
tives highlighted the democratic anomaly of deny-
ing voting rights to foreign residents, particularly 
when this group makes up a significant portion of 
the population of certain municipalities.
In the early 1990s, thanks to the initiative of the 
League of Human Rights, nearly 100 organisa-
tions, parties, unions and associations joined to-
gether to create the collective j’y suis, j’y vote. The 
resulting meetings, petitions, and interventions 
with elected officials once again captured the at-
tention of the media. The legal experts started 
to wonder whether the Constitution should be 
amended, but there was not the necessary major-
ity in Parliament to achieve these changes.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 1993 Direc-
tive on European Elections,25 and the 1994 Direc-
tives on Municipal Elections26 greatly impacted 
the debate in France surrounding voting rights 
for foreign residents. The legal question was set-
tled: France must change its Constitution. The link 
between nationality and citizenship, an idea pre-
sent in France since the Revolution of 1789, was 
no longer relevant for European citizens.  Not-
withstanding this shift, the parliamentary right 
resisted access to citizenship for foreigners, even 
for those of European origin. Its European part-
ners allowed the French government to delay im-
25.  Council Directive 93/109/EC
26.  Council Directive 94/80/EC 
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plementation of the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty until after the 1995 municipal elections. As 
a result, Europeans living in France did not exer-
cise their right to vote in municipal elections until 
2001, being the last in the EU to benefit from the 
rights recognized in the Maastricht Treaty. 
In 1993, the Strasbourg municipality installed a 
council of foreign residents.  This initiative would 
later be replicated by several major cities, includ-
ing Paris, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Lille, and Tou-
louse.  These boards consisted of representatives 
of various associations of foreign residents.  These 
associations made the enfranchisement of foreign 
residents a priority and played an important role 
in the movement during the following years.
In 1994, La lettre de la Citoyenneté, a French pub-
lication concerned with nationality and citizen-
ship, conducted its first survey regarding extend-
ing the rights given to European non-nationals 
to non-European residents.  Only 32 per cent of 
respondents were in favour of such an extension. 
Annual surveys provided insight into the chang-
ing attitudes of the public towards voting rights 
for foreign residents.  After 1997, public opinion 
shifted in a more favourable direction.  The results 
of a poll from the autumn of 2011 indicate that 
59 per cent of the respondents supported the right 
to vote for non-European residents in local and 
European elections at the time.  It is worth not-
ing that although there was an initial difference of 
more than 20 points between respondents on the 
left and right, both groups moved towards a more 
positive standpoint on granting the right to vote to 
foreign residents. As for supporters of MoDem, the 
centre party, 61 per cent of respondents favoured 
the extension of voting rights to non-nationals. 
Between 1999 and 2001, three congressional com-
mittees worked together to change French leg-
islation. The committees focused on the right to 
vote in municipal elections, the right to residence 
linked to European citizenship, and the mobilisa-
tion of immigrants.  On May 3, 2000, the National 
Assembly passed a bill that provided the right to 
vote in municipal elections to foreign residents 
in France. To amend the French Constitution to 
allow foreign residents to vote, a simple majority 
vote is required in both the National Assembly 
and the Senate. The bill failed to come to a vote in 
the Senate.  
In 2002, the League of Human Rights took the ini-
tiative to encourage the practice known in Swit-
zerland as votation, a new collective made up of 
parties, unions and organisations.   Votations 
Citoyenes were organised in hundreds of cities 
throughout the country between 2002 and 2011, 
each involving several thousand voters.  These 
collectives were highly publicized and brought the 
debate surrounding voting rights for foreign resi-
dents once again to a place of prominence. 
Mayors and councils of foreign residents contrib-
uted to this mobilisation.  At the initiative of the 
mayor of Strasbourg, a petition made by mayors 
for foreign residents’ right to vote in local elections 
was published in early 2011.  Approximately one 
hundred mayors, including those of most large 
cities in France, signed this petition.  Similarly, ten 
councils of foreign residents formed a network, Le 
Conseil Français de la Citoyenneté de Résidence, 
and also lobbied for voting rights for foreign resi-
dents in local elections. 
In response, the populist right, bringing together 
parliamentarians from the majority party, Union 
pour un Mouvement Populaire, launched a petition 
on the internet opposing voting rights for foreign 
residents, quickly collecting nearly 30,000 signa-
tures.  Those in opposition raised the unfounded 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe49
argument that countries that grant voting rights to 
foreign residents are typically ungenerous in their 
naturalisation policies, unlike France.  Others be-
lieved that voting rights should only be granted in 
cases of reciprocity.  Of course, this would require 
that all countries in the world become democra-
cies before France could extend voting rights to 
foreign residents. The risk of a communitarian 
vote—when all members of an ethnic group vote 
for the same party—was also discussed, despite 
foreign examples showing little risk of this. 
Le groupe socialiste, the socialist party parliamen-
tary group, voted in the Senate on December 8 
[2011] to approve the bill passed by the National 
Assembly in 2000 that provided the right to vote in 
municipal elections to foreign residents in France. 
The presidential and legislative elections in the 
spring of 2012 brought to power a president and 
majority of MPs that support the constitutional 
amendment to give the right to vote to foreign 
residents. President Hollande and Prime Minister 
Ayrault have promised to prioritise the parliamen-
tary work needed to ensure that the reforms are 
implemented at the beginning of 2013.  
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‘Integration and civic participation are sym-
biotic, mutually reinforcing, and a necessary 
condition and by-product of the other’ 
(Farris, 2003, p.17).
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Introduction27
This paper examines the debates and practices 
in the area of migrants’ political participation in 
Ireland over the last 16 years. The content of this 
article is informed by the author’s research for his 
doctorate, his involvement in the establishment of 
the Africa Centre,28 and his work with the African 
Cultural Project,29 the Canal Communities Part-
nership30 and the Immigrant Council of Ireland.31
All foreigners legally residing in Ireland have the 
right to vote and be elected in local elections. As 
most immigrants were eligible to vote, migrant-
led organisations as well as mainstream migration 
NGOs worked hard to promote migrant partici-
pation during the run up to the 2004 local elec-
tions. As a result, Nigerian candidates, after only 
four years of residence in Ireland, were elected to 
the town councils of Ennis and Portlaoise. Rotimi 
27.  The author’s social practices and interest in politics 
stem from his upbringing, his formative years and in-
teractions with his paternal grandmother. He believes 
his interest in politics stems from his grandmother’s 
understanding of active participation in society as a 
way of exercising one’s citizenship based on presence. 
She believed that home is where one finds him/herself 
at any particular moment in time. She urged the author 
to look out for brothers and sisters anywhere he might 
find himself on his life journey. In this this spirit, active 
involvement in society has been the hallmark of his life 
story so far, irrespective of where he happened to be. 
This philosophy underpins what the author intends to 
share in this article. 
28.  The Africa Centre is an organisation of Africans and of 
people interested in issues pertaining to Africa in Dub-
lin concerned with community empowerment, develop-
ment education, and policy and research.
29.   The African Cultural Project is a network of Africans 
and others interested in celebrating culture through mu-
sic and arts.
30. The Canal Communities Partnership is a development 
NGO working in one of the socially disadvantaged areas 
of south Dublin.
31. The Immigrant Council of Ireland is an immigrant hu-
man rights organisation.
Adebari went on to become mayor of Portlaoise 
in 2007. His election to the position of mayor re-
ceived media coverage in Ireland and far beyond. 
By the time the 2009 local elections came, there 
were more targeted initiatives aimed at encourag-
ing migrants’ participation in the electoral process. 
Still, only four migrant candidates were elected 
among the over 40 migrant candidates who stood, 
notwithstanding the fact that some migrant can-
didates ran on mainstream political party tickets.
The centralised nature of Irish politics and the re-
stricted power of the local government place clear 
limitations on what can be achieved through mi-
grants’ participation in local elections in Ireland. 
To date, only two naturalised citizens have served 
in the Irish parliament: Moosagee Bhamjee of 
South Africa elected to the Dáil (Parliament) as 
a Labour candidate in 1992, and Katherine Zap-
pone of the United States nominated by Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister) Enda Kenny to the Seanad (Sen-
ate) in 2011. In the 2011 general elections, there 
were four candidates of migrant backgrounds. 
They all stood as independent candidates and 
none of them were successful. This paper will look 
at migrants’ political integration in Ireland. It will 
also explore how Ireland can harness the voting 
rights of migrants in the local elections and foster 
political representation of migrants and their de-
scendants in political institutions beyond the local 
level. The latter objective is particularly relevant 
for centralised countries like Ireland where the 
role of the local government is limited. 
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The case for migrants’ 
political participation
There are a number of international instruments 
that highlight the need for migrants’ political in-
clusion and representation. These include the 
1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
Article 21(1) states that ‘every one has the right 
to take part in the government of his/her country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives’. 
The civil and political rights of migrant workers 
are also covered in Articles 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16.1, 
2, 4, 8; 17; 18; 22; 25; 27; and article 31 of the Inter-
national Convention on the Protection of All the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families. In 1992, the Council of Europe adopted 
the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners 
in Public Life at the Local Level with the aim of 
encouraging active participation of foreign resi-
dents in the life of the local community.  Article 
6 grants foreign residents the right to vote and 
stand for election in local authority elections after 
five years of residency. However, Member States 
can restrict voting rights and can stipulate shorter 
periods of residence. As of 19 May 2006, only 11 
Member States had signed and only eight had rati-
fied the Convention (NGO Network of Integra-
tion Focal Points, 2007). Furthermore, the ninth 
European Union Common Basic Principle on In-
tegration states, ‘the participation of immigrants 
in democratic process and in the formulation of 
the integration policies and measures, especially at 
the local level, supports their integration’ (Council 
of the European Union, 2004).
Although the provision to allow migrants to vote 
and stand in local elections in Ireland pre-dated 
the significant immigration waves from the mid-
1990s onwards, researchers and policy-makers in 
other jurisdictions have been making a case for 
migrants’ political participation for sometime. In 
some European countries the political elites have 
welcomed migrants to the political system because 
political integration ensures ‘better information 
about the policy preferences of ethnic groups’ 
(Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p. 704). It is argued that 
‘early and active participation of migrants in deci-
sions concerning their lives is critical; a well-estab-
lished dialogue with authorities and civil society 
at all levels will ensure mutual respect and under-
standing and help all concerned to live up to their 
responsibilities’ (Society for International Devel-
opment-Netherlands Chapter, 2002, p. 7).  There 
is no doubt that migrants’ participation in local 
elections helps to strengthen migrants’ trust and 
confidence in the political system of their coun-
try of residence. The extension of voting rights in 
local elections to migrants offers an incentive for 
involvement in local communities, and also pro-
motes inclusiveness among the wider society.  It is 
argued that ‘participation in the political process-
es is one of the most important elements of active 
citizenship. Political participation of immigrants 
provides opportunities for integration and should 
be supported in its different forms, including ac-
quisition of nationality, local electoral rights and 
consultative structures’ (Niessen & Huddleston, 
2004, p. 40). Integration is about learning how to 
deal with competing interests; it requires a frame-
work that allows all voices to be heard, not only 
the loudest ones. 
The European Inclusion Index suggests that insti-
tutions across Europe have failed to keep up with 
the growing diversity of their societies (Leonard & 
Griffith, 2003). According to Rudiger and Spencer 
(2003), special consultation mechanisms for mi-
norities ranging from engaging the minority eth-
nic voluntary sector to electing or appointing indi-
viduals as community representatives to advisory 
or decision-making roles have been put in place 
across the EU. Many of these consultative bodies 
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have held only advisory roles and this has proved 
to be somewhat frustrating to the participants.  In 
order to move forward, consultations must ad-
dress the needs of minorities and not merely those 
of decision-makers. In some countries, ‘advisory 
councils have been established in which repre-
sentatives of various ethnic minorities participate 
and in which an attempt is made to register the 
preferences of ethnic groups’ (Finnema & Tillie, 
1999, p. 704). In multi-ethnic societies it is appro-
priate to give all members of society say in how 
the country is run. Migrant networks and main-
stream NGOs providing services to migrants ‘are 
important for the individuals within the groups 
and for integration activities, bridging the gap be-
tween immigrants and wider society’ (Penninx, 
2006, p. 129). Ethnic minorities can work directly 
with politicians; they can do so through interme-
diaries or so-called alternative facilitators (Zap-
pala 1998). Alternative facilitators are ‘people who 
emerge from the ‘natural processes of ethnic com-
munities’, and generally play a type of leadership 
role within their communities because of business 
or professional success’ (Zappala, 1998, p. 693 as 
cited in Jupp et al., 1989, p. 5). Historically, trade 
unions have also been active in advocating the 
rights of migrants. According to Martiniello, ‘im-
migrant presence in unions is an older and bet-
ter-known phenomenon’ (2005, p. 12).  Migrant 
interests have been represented in civil society in 
Ireland since the late 1990s.  Non-electoral politi-
cal participation and representation is important, 
but political participation through the electoral 
process brings migrants into mainstream political 
institutions and decision-making circles.  
Voting Rights in Ireland
In Ireland, the provision of voting rights for non-
nationals reflects a belief in the importance of local 
integration. According to the Electoral Act of 1992 
(part II, section 10), ‘a person shall be entitled to 
be registered as a local government elector in a lo-
cal electoral area if he/she has reached the age of 
eighteen years and he/she was, on the qualifying 
date, ordinarily resident in that area’ (see Table 1). 
It should be noted that provisions for the partici-
pation of foreign nationals in local elections have 
existed in Ireland since 1963. 
Table 1: Voting Rights in the Republic of Ireland 
Election Eligibility
General Elections Irish and UK Citizens
Seanad Elections Graduates of Trinity College Dublin and the National University of 
Ireland (NUI), Outgoing Seanad, Incoming Dáil, Members of Coun-
ty Councils
Local Elections All those who are ordinarily resident in the Irish State of any Na-
tionality
Referenda and Presidential 
Elections
Irish Citizens only
European Elections EU Nationals
Source: Mutwarasibo & McCarthy (2002); Kenny (2003)
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Fifteen European Union Member States allow for-
eign nationals to vote in the local elections. These 
are: Belgium, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. Seven of these (Den-
mark, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom) allow non-nationals (EU 
and third-country nationals) to vote in regional 
elections. Some of the countries allowing partici-
pation in local elections impose a residency condi-
tion. In Denmark, Estonia, Portugal and Sweden, 
migrants are required to fulfil a three-year resi-
dence condition. In Belgium, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands the residency condition is five years. 
The United Kingdom and Ireland do not impose 
a residency condition. Moreover, the Irish, EU 
and Commonwealth Citizens living in the United 
Kingdom are specifically named as eligible voters. 
Similarly, the Czech Republic, Malta, Portugal and 
Spain apply a reciprocity condition. In terms of the 
right to stand as candidates in elections, Belgium, 
Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovenia do 
not allow third-country nationals to stand in mu-
nicipal elections. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta, Poland and Romania do not allow migrants 
to participate in local elections. The constitutional 
law of the Czech Republic, Italy and Malta permits 
non-nationals to vote, but the necessary national 
legislation or international agreements have yet to 
be adopted, preventing migrants from participat-
ing in local elections (Groenendijk, 2008, pp. 3-5). 
The participation of 
minorities in Irish politics – 
a historic perspective
The political participation and representation of 
the Jewish community in Ireland provides an idea 
of what might lie ahead for 21st century multi-faith 
and multicultural Ireland. Katrina Goldstone, a 
writer on Jewish culture and history in Ireland, 
suggests that members of the Jewish community 
have been involved in the Irish civic and politi-
cal life for some time (personal communication 
2004). In the 1981 general election, three mem-
bers of the Jewish community were elected, each 
belonging to a different mainstream political par-
Table 2: Usual residents by ethnic or cultural background
Category 2006 2011 Per cent change 
White Irish 3,645,199 3,821,995 4.9
Irish Travellers 22,369 29,495 42.9
Black Irish or Black African 40,525 58,697 44.8
Other Black 3,793 6,381 68.2
Chinese 16,533 17,832 7.9
Other Asian 35,812 66,858 86.7
Other 46,438 40,724 -12.3
Not Stated 72,303 70,324 -2.7
Total 4,172,013 4,525,281 8.5
Source: Central Statistics Office Ireland (2012)
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ty: Mervyn Taylor, who was the first Minister for 
Equality and Law Reform and who enacted the 
Incitement to Hatred Act in 1989, was a member 
of the Labour Party; Alan Shatter was a member 
of Fine Gael; and Ben Briscoe was a member of 
Fianna Fáil. The three largest cities on the island 
of Ireland, Dublin, Belfast and Cork have had Jew-
ish mayors in the last century. The honour of hav-
ing the first Jewish mayor in Ireland goes to the 
town of Youghal in Co. Cork, where Mr. William 
Annyas was elected in 1555. Since then, Robert 
Briscoe was elected mayor of Dublin in 1956 and 
1961, his son Ben Briscoe became mayor in 1988, 
and Mr. Gerald Goldberg became mayor of Cork 
in 1977. According to Carol Briscoe, researcher 
and spouse of Ben Briscoe, Robert Briscoe was an 
international activist, being involved in fighting 
for freedom in India and Israel (personal com-
munication, June 2004). Still, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that political activism was not 
encouraged within the Jewish community. Most 
of the pioneer politicians of Jewish background 
in Ireland became involved by accident; many 
immigrated to Ireland from Russia and were de-
termined to keep their heads down. Although the 
Jewish community has been present in Ireland 
for many years, they constitute a minority com-
munity along with Protestants, members of the 
Travelling community, and members of the Gay 
and Lesbian communities. That members of the 
Jewish community have been successful in Irish 
politics in spite of the dominance of the Catholic 
Church is a sign of openness in the Irish politi-
cal system. Political representation of the Jewish 
community will inspire migrants who have made 
Ireland their home to participate.  Still, most mi-
grants in Ireland have not naturalised, preventing 
their electoral participation at the national level. 
Immigration is new to Ireland. It will take time for 
the new migrants to settle and create the necessary 
foundations for effective involvement in politics at 
national level.   
There have been other prominent people of mi-
grant backgrounds elected to political office in 
Ireland. Eamonn de Valera, born in New York to 
an Irish emigrant and a Cuban settler of Span-
ish descent is a well-known politician who was 
involved in the war of independence and subse-
quently served as Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and 
President. Other historic figures of migrant back-
ground in Irish politics include Constance Marki-
evicz, the first female TD (Teachta Dála or mem-
ber of parliament) who was born in London to an 
Anglo-Irish father and later married to a Polish 
husband; James Connolly, born in Edinburgh to 
Irish emigrant parents and socialist leader at the 
origin of the Labour Party; and Erskine Hamilton 
Childers, born in England to Protestant parents 
from Glendalough. Most recently, a number of 
politicians of migrant backgrounds have emerged. 
These include: Senator Ivana Bacik, whose grand-
father moved to Ireland from communist Czech 
Republic; Senator David Norris was born in the 
Congo; Dan Boyle, former Green party TD was 
born in Chicago; and Leo Varadker, current Fine 
Gael TD and Minister who was born to an Indian 
father. In terms of naturalized citizens, the most 
prominent political representatives are Moosa-
jee Bhamjee and Katherine Zapone. Moosajee 
Bhamjee served as a Labour TD from 1992 to 
1997.  Doctor Bhamjee’s case was unusual and re-
flected a specific conjuncture in which the Labour 
Party made a major breakthrough on numbers. 
Although he was involved in the community in 
Ennis through sports and media work, he gained 
prominence when he stood against the closure of 
Ennis General Hospital. He had been involved in 
other campaigns but his resistance of the closure 
of the hospital attracted the attention of the La-
bour Party. He was eventually persuaded to stand 
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for the party and in 1992 he won a seat in the Dail 
(Irish Parliament). 
These successes mask on-going challenges in 
terms of the political representation of members 
of the Travelling Community in Ireland. Accord-
ing to the 2011 census, there are 29,495 Travellers 
in Ireland (Central Statistics Office, 2012). Their 
struggle to be acknowledged as an ethnic group 
continues. Travellers have never been represented 
by election to the Oireachtas House (Irish parlia-
ment and senate).  Moreover, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right of Persons belonging to 
National, Ethnic or Religious Minorities suggests 
that minorities should participate in ‘cultural, so-
cial, religious, economic and public life’ and in 
decision-making processes on issues that affect 
them (articles 2(2)-(3)) (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1992). Furthermore, the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities suggests that 
States should ‘create the conditions necessary 
for the effective participation of persons belong-
ing to national minorities in cultural, social and 
economic life and in public affairs, in particular 
those affecting them’ (article 15) (Council of Eu-
rope, 1995). In the 2011 Programme for Govern-
ment there is a commitment to a consultation 
process on political reform, which might help to 
address the issues of representation of minorities 
in Ireland (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011). 
Public institutions that mirror the wider ethnic 
and religious make-up of society promote integra-
tion and inclusion by providing role models for 
all members of the society. Representation in 21st 
century multi-ethnic Ireland is a pertinent issue in 
light of the findings of the 2011 census (see table 
2). Furthermore, the fact that 17 per cent of the 
population of Ireland was born outside the coun-
try strengthens the case for developing political 
processes that result in institutions with which all 
members of society can identify.
The figures displayed in table 2 highlight a signif-
icant increase in the number of members of the 
ethnic minority communities in Ireland between 
2006 and 2011. This increase is notable in the con-
text of a recession that has affected sectors of the 
labour market where the migrant community is 
over-represented, such as the construction and 
service industries.  According to the 2011 census, 
nearly 17 per cent of the Irish population was born 
overseas and around 12 per cent of the population 
is foreign. Representing the interest of minority 
communities in Ireland is paramount at this point 
in time as the society recovers from the economic 
crisis. Political participation and representation of 
migrants is an important vehicle to promote har-
mony within its diverse population. 
The political participation 
of migrants in Ireland in the 
recent past
The political participation of migrants in Ireland 
became part of the public dialogue during the run 
up to the 2004 local elections thanks to the work 
of the Africa Centre and other local organisations. 
The National Consultative Committee on Racism 
and Interculturalism (NCCRI) and Integrating Ire-
land played important roles, creating an informa-
tion pack on voting rights and registration proce-
dures to encourage migrants’ participation.32  The 
Immigrant Council of Ireland, the Irish Refugee 
Council and Integrating Ireland co-hosted brief-
ing and training sessions for the migrants who 
expressed an interest in running for office in the 
2004 local elections. The publication of the Africa 
Centre’s report ‘Positive Politics’ in 2003 captured 
the attention of the media.  The research revealed 
that at the time, no political party had made spe-
32.  See National Consultative Committee on Racism & In-
tegrating Ireland (2004).
Inclusive Democracy in Europe57
cific efforts to engage with migrants.  With the ex-
ception of the Progressive Democrats33, all parties 
were, in theory, open to migrants’ membership. 
Still, there was no evidence of a recruitment drive 
targeting migrants. One consequence of the publi-
cation was the calling of an Extraordinary General 
Meeting by the Progressive Democrats to change 
the membership criteria of the party, which, up 
until the time of the publication, excluded non-
EU nationals.
Between the 2004 and 2009 local elections, other 
actors joined the campaign to encourage the po-
litical participation of migrants. The Migrant Vot-
ers Campaign initiated by the Integration Office of 
Dublin City Council, launched in 2008, was aimed 
at raising awareness among migrants of their vot-
ing rights, the need to register to vote and how to 
vote on the day of elections (Dublin City Council, 
2008). In the run-up to the 2009 local elections, 
the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker of the Parliament), 
John O’Donoghue, and the Minister for Integra-
tion, John Curran, hosted fourteen candidates 
from nine countries, including Nigeria, Russia, 
Colombia, South Africa and Zimbabwe for a semi-
nar on the importance of immigrant participation 
in politics (MacCormaic, 2009).  In his address, 
John O’Donoghue argued, ‘it is also important 
that … [ethnic minorities’] views and opinions are 
aired and their needs addressed’ and commended 
the fact that migrants were taking an active role in 
politics in Ireland. He went on to say, ‘the decision 
… to stand for election should serve as an example 
and encouragement to those from other countries 
who come to live in Ireland’ (MacCormaic, 2009).
Over 40 candidates of migrant backgrounds stood 
in the 2009 local elections. The majority stood as 
political party candidates: Fianna Fáil (9); Fine 
Gael (8); Labour (4) and the Green Party (8). Eight 
33.  The Progressive Democrats’ membership was at the 
time limited to Irish and EU nationals.   
candidates stood independent of political parties. 
Migrant candidates came from a wide range of 
countries of origin including: Nigeria (14), India 
(1), Poland (8), Russia (2), Colombia (1), Pakistan 
(1), Lithuania (2), Latvia (2), Zimbabwe (1), USA 
(1), Moldova (1), Netherlands (1), Congo DRC 
(1) and South Africa (1). Only one in ten migrant 
candidates was successful compared to one in 
three for the established population candidates.34 
In one constituency in West Dublin, three Nige-
rian candidates ran, preventing any of the migrant 
candidates from receiving enough votes for vic-
tory. Idowu Sulyman Olafimihan stood for Fianna 
Fáil, Adeola Ogunsina for Fine Gael and Ingatius 
Okafor stood as an independent candidate. It is 
reasonable to assume that Nigerians who voted for 
candidates of Nigerian backgrounds as their first 
preference gave second priority to the candidates 
of their preferred candidate’s political affiliation. 
Proportional representation means that in a mul-
tiple seat constituency, a voter can indicate her/his 
first and subsequent choices. Those who reach the 
quota are elected automatically and the votes of 
those who score lowest are distributed to the re-
maining candidates until the quota is reached. The 
cross-transfer of votes helps those with reasonable 
scores in the first preference count. In the case of 
the three candidates of Nigerian extraction, their 
first preference vote did not give them the oppor-
tunity to benefit from the tally of second, third 
and subsequent preferences. 
The work of immigrant organisations between 
the 2004 and 2009 local elections was effective at 
encouraging political parties to engage with mi-
grants in preparation to the 2009 local elections. 
As a result, most of the migrant candidates ran as 
members of political parties in the 2009 local elec-
tions. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil went as far as re-
34.  See Mutwarasibo (2009). 
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cruiting Polish migrants to help them reach out to 
migrant communities. 
Migrants have been involved in a continuum of 
civic and political participation that involves elec-
toral and non-electoral political practices.35 Con-
ventional (electoral) politics includes involvement 
in political parties’ activities, voting, canvassing, 
distributing campaign material, standing for elec-
tions and so forth. Infra-politics (non-electoral), 
on the other hand, include protests, demonstra-
tions, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, trade union 
politics, pressure groups, the direct mobilisation 
of ethnic communities, humanitarian movements, 
environmentalist movements, neighbourhood 
committees and customers’ associations among 
others. Infra-politics are particularly relevant 
in Ireland because politics is dominated by lo-
cal politics and clientelism. Local politics under-
pins politics both at the local level and at national 
level. The use of proportional representation en-
sures that even within the political parties there is 
competition at local level. The uniqueness of the 
Irish political scene may explain why Taiwo Mat-
thew and Rotimi Adebari were elected to the local 
town council in Ennis and Portlaoise respectively 
in 2004, having lived in Ireland for four years. In 
June 2007, his fellow town councillors election 
Rotimi Adebari to the position of mayor long be-
fore he acquired Irish citizenship. His election did 
not follow the model of migrant political partici-
pation observed by Zappala (1999) in Australia. 
His research revealed that political representation 
of migrants in mainstream institutions can take 
up to twenty years due to the challenges of initial 
survival and settlement, and the amount of time 
it takes to fulfil the requirements to apply and ac-
quire citizenship through naturalisation.
35.  See Mutwarasibo (2010). 
While we should celebrate the achievements of the 
last decades, we need to continue to ask ourselves 
the hard questions. Ireland is a multicultural 
country and we need to ensure that the channels 
for political claims-making are open in order to 
achieve a cohesive society in the next decades. We 
can look to the riots in London in 2011 to see the 
consequences of excluding sections of the popula-
tion from mainstream society. The value of eco-
nomic integration—the focus of Ireland’s integra-
tion program—should not be overlooked, but it 
is equally important to remember the social, cul-
tural and political dimensions of the integration 
process. 
Concluding Remarks
As the political euphemism goes, ‘a lot done, more 
to do.’ Ireland has made progress in the area of 
political integration of migrants. The significance 
of extending voting rights in local elections to 
migrants should not be overlooked. To exclude 
long-term residents from voting would not only 
violate principles of representative democracy, but 
also would ‘foster divisions between natives and 
migrants and encourage the neglect of migrants’ 
grievances, thus fostering alienation and bitter-
ness’ (Layton-Henry, 1991, p. 120). In Ireland, the 
extension of rights has also had a symbolic impact 
judging by the publicity that surrounded the elec-
tion of Rotimi Adebari to the position of Mayor 
of Portlaoise in 2007. The Immigrant Council of 
Ireland continues to advocate for the expansion of 
voting rights for migrants. In the autumn of 2009, 
the Immigrant Council of Ireland appealed to the 
parliamentary Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tion to continue to examine ways to expand voting 
rights for migrants who are established residents 
in the State.36
36.  See Immigrant Council of Ireland (2009). 
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Likewise, the appointment of foreign-born Kath-
erine Zappone to the Senate is an important devel-
opment. However, if we are to achieve a truly rep-
resentative democracy, a democracy that includes 
the 17 per cent of the population born outside the 
country in the Irish nation, there is more work to 
be done. Ireland’s political powers are centralised 
and dominated by the mainstream political par-
ties, certain professions (medical doctors, teach-
ers, legal profession, trade unionists, to name just 
a few) and a number of political families.  Effec-
tive representation takes place in the Oireachtas 
(Parliament), and the representation of people of 
migrant backgrounds in the parliament is limited. 
Furthermore, the four first-generation migrant 
candidates who ran during the 2011 general elec-
tions stood independent of the mainstream politi-
cal parties, suggesting that migrants continue to 
work to acquire the cultural and social capital they 
need to become effective politicians at national 
level. Irish politics continues to be dominated by 
the pre-independence and post-independence po-
litical conflicts and migrant political activists have 
to grasp these dynamics in order to develop strate-
gies that suit the Irish culture and political system, 
particularly at the national level. 
Unfamiliarity with the electoral system among 
migrants also creates a need for increased aware-
ness and voter education. Many promising initia-
tives have contributed to and continue to work for 
change such as the voter registration campaign by 
Dublin City Council and other stakeholders; the 
recruitment of migrant organisers by political par-
ties (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael); the recruitment 
of migrant organisers by trade unions; the cam-
paign for the spousal work permit – initiated by 
the League of Filipino Nurses and supported by 
other actors from a wide range of sectors; the voter 
mobilisation campaign by the Africa Centre and 
New Communities Partnership in the run up to 
the 2009 local elections and the Count Us In cam-
paign run by the Immigrant Council of Ireland in 
response to complaints by citizens who felt over-
looked by political parties and canvassers in the 
2011 general elections.37
Above all, there is need for political leadership on 
the issues of immigration, integration, diversity, 
discrimination, and anti-racism. It is important to 
acknowledge the role that migrant activists played 
in raising awareness on voting rights and encour-
aging their peers to avail of the political oppor-
tunities provided. Considering what is perceived 
to have happened in Blanchardstown in the 2009 
local elections, it is important to remember that 
political opportunity can also opens door for ex-
ploitation and dilution of the migrant vote by the 
political establishment. Politics in Ireland is based 
on local issues and, by extension, local credentials. 
Local political integration of migrants does not 
necessarily lead to political integration at national 
level. Involvement in national politics is critical in 
countries like Ireland where power is highly cen-
tralised, and migrants need to continue to work 
towards representation at this level. As Samora 
Machel, former Mozambican president would say 
during Mozambique’s war for independence, ‘a lu-
tta continua’ (the struggle continues). 
37.  See Cities of Migration (2011) for details of the cam-
paign.
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Imagine being a law-abiding EU citizen, living in 
the EU, and having no right to vote for the gov-
ernment whose decisions will impact on your 
daily life. Does this sound like an Orwellian 
nightmare?38 Think again. It is the fate of large 
numbers of your neighbours or friends. Let us 
take the case of Alex, a British journalist living in 
France. He can vote for the local mayor in Paris 
and for members of the European parliament. 
He cannot, however, elect the president of France 
whose policies could influence his tax situation or 
decide whether a high-speed train station is lo-
cated in his town. In the same way, Kirsten, who 
is a Danish teacher residing in Spain has no say 
in the election of a government whose decisions 
will impact on her retirement pension and on the 
educational system in which she works. Surely this 
is regrettable, to say the least. Should being Euro-
pean in Europe not entitle you to have a say in the 
way the part of Europe in which you live, work 
and pay taxes is governed? EU nationals have 
the right to vote in European and local elections, 
wherever they live within the EU. Should they not 
also be entitled to vote in national elections even if 
they reside in an EU nation other than their home 
country? Should their lack of a possibility to use 
the democratic process in order to influence poli-
cies by which they will be directly affected not be 
construed as a potential obstruction to mobility? 
Who wants to go and live in a country without be-
ing able to exercise full democratic rights? Surely 
it is time for the EU to extend EU citizens’ voting 
rights to national elections: this form of residential 
right would help integration, encourage mobility 
and enhance the value of EU citizenship. We feel 
a European Citizens’ Initiative might be a way to 
achieve this.39
38.  Contribution published online on 24 February 2012
39.  See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/ini-
tiatives/ongoing/details/2012/000006 for more infor-
mation on the Let Me Vote Initiative. 
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I will be happy if Philippe Cayla’s and Catriona 
Seth’s proposal for a European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI) on national voting rights for EU citizens is 
successful40. But I will not sign it myself. I agree 
that there is a serious democratic deficit in the 
current regulation of voting rights. It is contrary to 
the spirit of EU law if EU citizens who take up res-
idence in another Member State lose fundamental 
rights as a consequence of exercising their right 
of free movement. And it seems particularly per-
verse that they retain their rights to vote in local 
and European Parliament elections but can lose 
the more significant franchise in national elec-
tions. The question is: which country should be 
responsible for letting them vote and under which 
conditions? 
Philippe Cayla and Catriona Seth argue that this 
should be the country of residence, where citi-
zens pay their taxes and are most comprehen-
sively affected by political decisions. I agree that 
all long-term residents, and not only EU migrants, 
should have access to the franchise for these rea-
sons. However, it is not unfair to ask immigrants 
to apply for their host country’s citizenship if 
they want to fully participate. This will not only 
provide them with all democratic rights but will 
also send a signal to the sedentary native citizens 
that these immigrants have a long-term commit-
ment to their country of residence. After all, na-
tional parliaments make laws that affect not only 
current residents but also future generations. Of 
course, neither native citizens nor immigrants can 
be forced to stay for the rest of their lives. But citi-
zenship is generally a life-long status that is nei-
ther automatically acquired nor automatically lost 
when moving to another country. And therefore, 
acquiring it through a public declaration of con-
sent sends a signal of long-term commitment that 
residence alone cannot convey. 
40.  Contribution published online on 24 February 2012.
Let me emphasize that this is not an argument for 
citizenship tests that punish the less educated im-
migrants, nor an argument that immigrants must 
show exclusive loyalties towards their host coun-
try by abandoning their citizenship of origin. All 
immigrants should be offered opportunities to 
naturalise after they have become long-term resi-
dents – which in the EU means after five years – 
and dual citizenship should be broadly tolerated. 
Under such conditions, why could EU citizens still 
claim national voting rights without applying first 
for citizenship? 
One could object to my proposal that it is not 
realistic that European states will reform their 
citizenship laws along these lines. But is it really 
more realistic that they will waive the condition 
of naturalisation for one large group of migrants 
altogether? And what if they were forced to do so 
by some daring judgment of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union? Would Member States 
then not react by raising even higher the hurdles 
for naturalisation, which would in turn mean that 
fewer migrants get access to EU citizenship in the 
first place? 
If for these normative and pragmatic reasons vot-
ing rights in countries of immigration remain at-
tached to citizenship status, what can we then do 
about the democratic deficit? The obvious answer 
is: make sure that EU citizens who move to an-
other Member State do not lose their voting rights 
in national elections in their countries of origin. 
In fact, most EU states do allow their expatriates 
to vote in national elections. The regulations are, 
however, very different. Ireland still does not grant 
an external franchise. The Greek constitution 
guarantees voting rights to Greeks living abroad, 
but the Greek parliament has never adopted the 
implementing legislation. Britain withdraws vot-
ing rights after fifteen years of residence outside 
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the country. Italy allows those born abroad who 
have inherited their citizenship from Italian an-
cestors to vote in Italian elections but not those 
who have kept their residence in Italy and are 
merely temporarily absent on election day. Con-
versely, Denmark has a residence requirement for 
voting, but has successively extended the franchise 
to state employees, employees of private Dan-
ish companies, Danes working for international 
organisations, Danish students and others living 
abroad for health reasons as well as to their Dan-
ish spouses, as long as they are presumed to be 
only temporarily absent. By contrast, Belgium has 
mandatory voting and applies this duty even to 
Belgium citizens living abroad, although they are 
not forced to register as voters. 
In its judgement in the 2010 Rottmann case,41 the 
Court of Justice of the EU has asserted that Mem-
ber States have to take EU law into account when 
a decision to withdraw nationality implies a loss 
of EU citizenship. Should the same logic not also 
apply to a withdrawal of national voting rights in 
case of exercise of free movement rights? 
The promoters of the ‘Let me vote’ ECI will object 
that long-term residents abroad are more strong-
ly affected by the laws of their host country than 
by those of the state whose citizens they are. But 
voting rights cannot be determined by a princi-
ple of affected interests alone, or else the whole 
world should have a right to vote in the next US 
presidential election. We need instead a criterion 
of genuine ties between voters and the political 
community where they cast their vote. Migrants 
often maintain genuine ties to their country of 
origin while developing at the same time such ties 
to their country of residence. If they want to fully 
41.  See the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate: Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State 
Sovereignty in Nationality Law?
participate in the latter, they should be able to do 
so by applying for naturalisation. And if they no 
longer care about participating in the former, they 
should be free not to vote in homeland elections 
or also to renounce their citizenship. 
Although there is a strong global trend to grant 
voting rights to expatriates, I do not think that 
all citizens who live abroad should have a right to 
vote. If we care about genuine ties, then those who 
have inherited their citizenship by birth abroad 
should not have a say in decisions about the fu-
ture of a country where they have never lived and 
are unlikely to ever live. The current Hungarian 
government’s policy to offer first dual citizenship 
and now also voting rights in national elections to 
ethnic Hungarian citizens of neighbouring coun-
tries is a clear example how external voting rights 
can be abused by nationalists in power.42 However, 
second and third generations of immigrant origin 
as well as native ethnic minorities with neigh-
bouring kin states can be excluded by limiting the 
external franchise to first generation migrants. 
The case for external voting rights is particularly 
strong in the EU for three reasons. First, because it 
can be linked to the core of EU citizenship, which 
is right of free movement; second, because it re-
spects the principle that EU citizenship is derived 
from Member State nationality rather than from 
residence; and third because it secures that free 
movers will not lose their indirect representation 
in EU legislation through the vote of their national 
government in the Council. 
I would therefore make a case for common Euro-
pean standards of access to national and EU citi-
42.  See our EUDO CITIZENSHIP forum debate: Dual citi-
zenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to 
the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat
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zenship for all immigrants as well as for common 
standards of external voting rights of EU citizens. 
Why will I still be happy if the ‘Let me vote’ initia-
tive succeeds in collecting one million signatures 
for national voting rights derived from residence? 
Because this would finally provide the Commission 
with a reason to address a serious democratic defi-
cit and to open the debate on how to overcome it.
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I agree with Rainer Bauböck on his starting point43. 
It is indeed contrary to European Union law if EU 
citizens who take up residence in another Member 
State lose fundamental rights as a consequence of 
exercising their right of free movement.
But I fully disagree both with his argumentation 
and his proposed conclusion, which are, in my 
views, rather disproportionate with the problem 
to solve.
There are the two ways to solve the problem, the 
European and the national ones.
As shown by Rainer Bauböck’s comments, the na-
tional way would lead towards difficult and tricky 
considerations, like acquisition and loss of nation-
ality both by EU citizens and third-country na-
tionals. I agree that those topics will probably have 
to be considered at EU level sooner or later. I also 
agree with Rainer Bauböck that all immigrants 
should be offered opportunities to naturalise after 
they have become long-term residents, at least if 
they so wish. Nevertheless for the time being and 
since the conclusions of the Edinburgh European 
Council of December 1992, such topics are explic-
itly considered as outside the EU’s competences 
and no legal basis can be found for them in the 
present Treaties. I have strong doubts that the case 
law of the European Court could by itself reverse 
this consensus and the taboo.
The European way suggested by the ‘Let me vote’ 
initiative offers a much lighter solution, much 
more in line with what European citizenship re-
ally is.
I leave the interpretation of the somewhat abstract 
definition given by the Treaty to lawyers. For me, 
as a European citizen, I understand European citi-
43.  Contribution published online on 6 March 2012.
zenship as the right to be considered as a national 
by any Member State other than the one whose 
nationality I hold, as soon as I am in relation with 
its authorities, in one way or another. If, as a Ger-
man, I drive through the Belgian territory by car 
at a speed exceeding Belgian limitations, I can of 
course be fined, but under the same conditions as 
the nationals of Belgium; if, as a Dane, I reside in 
France, I have to have the same rights as French 
nationals and this from the first day of my stay.   
Even outside the EU, any Member State has to give 
me consular protection, under the same condi-
tions as those applied to its nationals. And, if I re-
ceive the rights to vote in municipal and European 
elections, it is always under the same conditions as 
the nationals of the state where I reside. 
Being considered as if I were a national in my 
country of residence, where is the need for ask-
ing for the nationality of that country, as long as 
the EU respects diversity? One of my obligations 
as an EU citizen is to respect my host country and 
to participate fairly in its social and political life. 
But why should I ask for its nationality, if I still feel 
French, German or Polish?
Of course, there is a well-known limited number 
of exceptions to this national treatment and some 
discriminations remain.
The purpose of the ‘Let me vote’ initiative is to 
abolish one of them. 
It is ambitious in its scope, by covering all ‘politi-
cal’ elections, regional, legislative, referenda, pres-
idential, etc. Due to the diversity of elections in 
Member States, it would of course not be possible 
to enter into a precise enumeration. I understand 
also that the initiative suggests giving the rights 
to all EU residents, not only to long-term or per-
manent ones. This is in line with existing rights to 
vote in municipal and European elections. 
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Nevertheless, it can be useful to recall that the 
number of citizens concerned is rather limited. In 
official documents from the European Commis-
sion, the figure of 12 million people is frequently 
quoted to measure the total number of EU citizens 
residing in a Member State other than their own. 
This figure covers those citizens, like children, 
who do not have the right to vote and it can there-
fore be compared to the total number of the EU 
population, which is more than 500 million. 
Granting the right to vote to EU citizens will 
therefore hardly modify the political landscape in 
any Member State, while it will contribute to the 
respect of EU citizens’ fundamental rights, in par-
ticular the right to participate in regular elections 
in the country where they reside as laid down in 
Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It will also contrib-
ute to reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ 
by fully guaranteeing their representation in EU 
legislation through the vote of their host country 
government in the Council and the position taken 
by national parliaments in EU procedures accord-
ing to the rules laid down by the Treaty.
Obviously, this representation is not guaranteed in 
the situation mentioned by Rainer Bauböck where 
EU citizens lose their voting rights in national 
elections in their countries of origin. 
Probably, mechanisms will have to be considered 
to prevent EU citizens from having double rep-
resentation in EU legislation. In the same vein as 
for the European elections, EU citizens should be 
given the choice to vote either in their host coun-
try or in their Member State of origin.
The idea proposed by the ‘Let me vote’ initiative 
is not a new one. It has already been discussed in 
many forums and was even flagged by the Euro-
pean Commission in its 5th Report on European 
Citizenship in 2004. 
As required by Article 25 of the Treaty, ‘This re-
port shall take account of the development of the 
Union.’ It is clear that, in the light of developments 
sustained in fields like the areas of freedom, justice 
and security, the representation in EU legislation 
through the Council, as well as through the Euro-
pean Parliament, has to be fully ensured if the Un-
ion is to be a democracy. We can simply hope that 
the Commission will take this proposal on board 
in its next Report to be submitted in 2013. It is 
probably the least that can be done for the Euro-
pean year of citizenship.
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EU ACCESSION 
TO THE ECHR 
REQUIRES 
ENSURING THE 
FRANCHISE FOR 
EU CITIZENS 
IN NATIONAL 
ELECTIONS
ANDREW DUFF
Andrew Duff is a Liberal 
Democrat Member of the 
European Parliament, 
representing the East of 
England region in the UK.  He 
is also president of the Union 
of European Federalists.
As rapporteur of the European Parliament on 
electoral reform, I strongly support the launching 
of this ECI, and will sign it44.
Another hopeful event is the prospect of the EU 
signing up to the ECHR (and its First Protocol). 
This will, in my view, allow disenfranchised citi-
zens to seek a remedy at the European Court of 
Justice at Luxembourg and/or the European Court 
of Human Rights at Strasbourg by demanding that 
the EU now has a duty to act to guarantee ‘condi-
tions which will ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legisla-
ture’. 
With that in mind, I recently asked a written ques-
tion of the European Commission as follows:
All Member States have adopted the first Pro-
tocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), Article 3 of which states that: 
‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by se-
44.  Contribution first published on 7 March 2012.
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cret ballot, under conditions which will ensure 
the free expression of the opinion of the people 
in the choice of the legislature’.
In view of the imminent likely accession of the 
European Union to the ECHR and to its first 
Protocol, what does the Commission intend to 
do about Member States who disenfranchise 
their own nationals who choose to live in an-
other EU state for an extended period?
Likewise, what does it intend to do to en-
courage EU states to extend the right to vote 
in national elections to their long-term resi-
dent EU citizens of another nationality? 
Does the Commission agree that it is unaccep-
table that a very large number of EU citizens 
are deprived of their basic civic right to choose 
the legislature either of the state in which they 
live or in their original state?Will the Commis-
sion be ready to take action to ensure that all 
EU states comply with the provisions of the 
ECHR which guarantee the right to vote?
The answer of Commission Vice-President Red-
ing (E-9269/2011, 2 February 2011) was some-
what disappointing. Here it is: 
As already highlighted in its reply to written 
question E-7910/2010 by Mr. Jim Higgins and 
E-8488/2011 by Mr. Morten Løkkegaard, the 
Commission is aware that national provisions 
in a number of Member States disenfranchise 
their nationals due to their residence abroad. 
Consequently, EU citizens of the Member 
States concerned cannot participate in any na-
tional elections.
The Commission announced in the EU Citizen-
ship report 2010 report (COM(2010)603) that 
it would launch a discussion to identify politi-
cal options to prevent EU citizens from losing 
their political rights, and namely the right to 
vote in national elections, as a consequence of 
exercising their right to free movement. The 
Commission has recently contacted the con-
cerned Member States to launch this debate 
and to explore the possible political solutions. 
The Commission has raised at this occasion 
that, while organisation of national elections 
falls within the responsibilities of Member 
States, if citizens cannot participate in elect-
ing Member States government, nor in their 
Member State of origin or the Member State of 
residence, and thus are not represented in the 
Council of Ministers, these citizens cannot fully 
participate in the democratic life of the Union.
The Commission would like to inform that the 
accession to the ECHR will not extend the Eu-
ropean Union competences as defined  in the 
Treaties. In particular, the accession to the First 
Protocol of the Convention neither will extend 
the right to vote of EU citizens residing outside 
their Member State to national parliamentary 
elections, nor enable Commission to take ac-
tions against Member states’ violations of Arti-
cle 3 of this Protocol.
The point about citizens not being able to vote for 
their representatives in the Council of Ministers 
is interesting enough. Furthermore, although the 
Commission is bound to stick to the letter of the 
law, the fact is that once the EU signs up to the 
ECHR the rights prescribed in Articles 39 and 40 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights con-
cerning voting and standing in local and Euro-
pean elections will not be as comprehensive as the 
citizen rightly demands. So wider legal and politi-
cal action will surely be necessary at the EU level. 
And changes to both the primary and secondary 
law of the EU cannot be obstructed forever.
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HOW TO 
ENFRANCHISE 
SECOND-COUNTRY 
NATIONALS? 
TEST THE OPTIONS 
FOR BEST FIT, 
EASIEST ADOPTION 
AND LOWEST COSTS
DAVID OWEN45
45.  For David Owen’s biography see p. 28
The proposal of this ECI by Philippe Cayla and 
Catriona Seth is a welcome initiative addressing a 
problem that has already been highlighted by the 
European Commission (COM(2010)603), name-
ly, that some ‘second-country nationals’ (SCNs) 
lose their entitlement to vote in the national elec-
tions of their state of nationality without having 
acquired the right to vote at this level in their state 
of residence46. This is a democratic wrong since 
it is not democratically legitimate that a person 
lawfully exercising a civil right shall in virtue of 
such exercise be deprived of a political right. The 
democratic harm that results is, given the political 
constitution of the EU, not simply that the disen-
franchised individual has no say in who represents 
them in the national legislature or executive but 
also, consequently, that they have no say in re-
lation to who represents them at the Council of 
Ministers. While I share Andrew Duff ’s view that 
‘the rights prescribed in Articles 39 and 40 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights concerning 
voting and standing in local and European elec-
tions’ are not ‘as comprehensive as the citizen 
rightly demands,’ I see little reason to think that 
this situation will change with the EU’s signing up 
to the ECHR, not least since ‘the people’ is one of 
the more complex and contested terms in the legal 
and political lexicon.
How, then, is this demos problem best addressed? 
Four simple general rules are available as options 
for resolving the legitimacy deficit that character-
ises the status quo:
1. All SCNs have national voting rights in the state 
of residence.
2. All SCNs have national voting rights in the state 
of nationality.
3. All SCNs have the choice between (1) and (2).
46.  Contribution published online on 15 March 2012.
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4. All SCNs have a time-differentiated combina-
tion of (1) and (2) which starts with (2) and, af-
ter a period of residence, switches to (1).
It is notable that (2)-(4) can be, more or less, com-
bined in a more complex rule:
5. All SCNs shall have a fair opportunity of acquir-
ing nationality in the Member State of residence 
and all SCNs who do not have nationality in 
their Member State of residence shall be eligi-
ble to vote in national elections of their Member 
State of nationality.
Any of these five general rules would suffice to ad-
dress the democratic wrong but which is the best 
choice? Or, to tie our discussion back to the pro-
posed ECI, why ought we privilege (1)? There are 
three dimensions to the issue of which is the best 
choice. First, which rule offers the best fit with the 
institutional structure of the EU? Second, which 
rule is easiest to adopt and implement? Third, 
what are the likely costs and side effects of the dif-
ferent rules?
On the first score, the ECI proposal doesn’t do well 
because it misconstrues the current composition 
of the EU as a polity. This claim can be elucidated 
by contrasting the EU with purely intergovern-
mental and fully federalised systems that are also 
committed to free movement within the territo-
rial area that they cover. In the case of a purely 
intergovernmental structure, the norm of free 
movement is grounded on a joint commitment to 
a shared aim or purpose such as, for example, a 
European market. In terms of the national citizen-
ship of the states involved in this intergovernmen-
tal project, the context remains largely equivalent 
to that of independent states who are not engaged 
in such a project, but not wholly since the shared 
purpose brings into play the principle that the 
partners to this project should not act to frustrate 
this joint enterprise and should, where compatible 
with their distinct national contexts and projects, 
aim to facilitate it. Such a principle could be ex-
pressed by, for example, offering preferential treat-
ment to the citizens of partner states for access to 
membership rights and for dual citizenship.
In the contrasting case of a fully federalised sys-
tem, free movement may serve instrumental pur-
poses but fundamentally expresses a basic liberty 
of citizens as federal citizens which requires that 
anyone exercising their right to cross state bor-
ders must not be disadvantaged at any level of the 
franchise within the federal structure. An obvious 
way to respect this democratic commitment is to 
adopt a residence-based rule for voting rights in 
the states that comprise the federal union. But the 
EU is neither a purely intergovernmental nor a 
fully federalised body. Because it isn’t simply in-
tergovernmental it is a democratic wrong for EU 
citizens who move across state borders to lose 
national voting rights; because it isn’t simply fed-
eral the ECI proposal of a residence-based voting 
rule isn’t an ideal fit as a way of ensuring political 
equality for EU citizens. Option (5), rather than 
option (1), looks like the best rule here because it 
aligns responsibility for political rights of nation-
als in the right way, that is, to the Member States 
through which EU citizenship is acquired.
Option (5) does less well though on the second 
dimension. As Alain Brun rightly observes, it is 
likely to be ‘tricky’ and ‘difficult’ to get all Member 
States of the EU to coordinate their national leg-
islation in this way (particularly if they have con-
stitutional provisions against expatriate voting). 
Here Brun’s suggestion of adopting option (3) and 
the ECI proposal of option (1) both look more 
straightforward and exhibit greater continuity 
with existing EU practices. This matters because 
it is relevant to ask not just what fits best but how 
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long it will take to remove the democratic wrong 
and harms at stake here.
On the third dimension, option (1) has both 
strong positives and negatives. On the positive 
side, it provides political representation in an 
SCN’s immediate context of governance and it 
would also resolve the quite radical disparities be-
tween the implementation of the EU rule on local 
voting rights (consider the comparison of France 
and the UK, for example, where in France local 
voting rights are restricted to the level of the com-
mune, while it the UK they include not only lo-
cal and county council elections but also extend 
to voting in devolved assembly elections in Scot-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland) since it would 
remove any constraints that pertain to the linkage 
of local and national representation (as occur, for 
example, in France where members of the Senate 
are chosen through an electoral college comprised 
on locally-elected officials). On the negative side, 
option (1) completely severs the political relation-
ship between citizen and their state of national-
ity and also breaks the widely held link between 
citizenship of the state and voting rights (although 
this link does not hold universally even between 
EU Member States, as the mutual granting of vot-
ing rights between the Republic of Ireland and 
the UK illustrates). Option (3) is, arguably, worst 
here since it provides the choice of either politi-
cal representation in the immediate context of 
national rule or maintaining a political link with 
one’s state of nationality without resolving dispari-
ties in relation to local voting and while breaking 
the citizenship-franchise link at national level. 
Option (5) delivers neither the strong positives 
nor the negatives of option (1). It maintains the 
linkage between national citizenship and suffrage 
at national level, and is likely to support a general 
easing of access to nationality of the state of resi-
dence for third-country nationals in the same way 
that EU rules on local voting have supported their 
extension to third-country nationals in a number 
of states.
So which option is best? Although I share Rainer 
Bauböck’s preference for option (5), I think that 
there is still a strong case for option (1) – and for 
this reason I would sign the ECI. 
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WHAT’S IN A PEOPLE? 
SOCIAL FACTS, INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
DIMITRY KOCHENOV
Dimitry Kochenov is Chair of EU Constitutional Law at the 
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Joining the majority of other contributors to this 
forum I fully support the useful and timely ini-
tiative for national voting rights for EU citizens, 
which has been overdue47. 
My argument builds around well-known but 
much ignored effects of the European integration 
project on the Member States and their societies 
which require adjusting our understanding of 
who is a foreigner in today’s Europe, i.e. what is 
a ‘people’ in the context of the European project. 
Given the wording of Article 25 TFEU, which al-
lows the Commission to propose additional rights 
of EU citizenship but requires unanimity in the 
Council and approval by the Member States, the 
change will not be easy. However, this would be a 
bad reason for not trying.
Should it not be up to the individual to decide who 
will participate in political life rather than up to the 
state with its random naturalisation procedures 
and nonsensical tests created to divide societies 
instead of uniting them?48 Hailing from a totali-
tarian regime myself I cannot overstate the value 
of being left alone, free from the state’s critique, 
endorsements, or ideas about ‘good life’. The crite-
rion of genuine ties that Bauböck preaches in his 
contribution to the present debate starts from the 
presumption of people’s inability to take respon-
sible decisions for themselves whether they have 
such ties or not, superimposing thus their judge-
ment with a state-mandated one. Given that those 
who do not have any interest in the state of resi-
dence are highly unlikely to participate in political 
life there, Bauböck’s contribution struggles hard 
with a non-existent problem. He does his best to 
justify the state-mandated selection of those who 
‘have the ties’ profoundly mistrusting those who 
actually feel sufficiently affected to demonstrate 
47.  Contribution published online on 17 April 2012.
48.  See my EUDO CITIZENSHIP Working Paper 2011/06.
that politically. As if the ties depended on state-
mandated blessings! It seems that only the ‘official’ 
certificates are meaningful, not the actual reality 
they are summoned to certify, reminding me of 
the absurd official documents issued by the cat 
Behemoth in Bulgakov’s The Master and Marga-
rita. Differently from Bulgakov’s hellish world of 
Stalinist Moscow, the EU has been built specifi-
cally to curtail states’ ability to improve ‘their’ peo-
ples’ lives at the expense of those across the bor-
der. Questions such as ‘Should a Polish worker be 
deported from the UK to free a place for a Scot?’ 
have been answered with the interests of all in 
mind, against state thinking or nationalist visions. 
I.
From the very first steps of European integration 
it was clear that the consequences of the European 
project for the states participating in it will be far-
reaching. Whether we like it or not, supranation-
alism and the voluntary conferral of competences 
by Member States to the EU have led to profound 
changes of the legal-political landscape in Europe. 
Even if the references to la fédération européenne 
in the 1950 Schuman Declaration are ignored, the 
initial goals of the project are undisputed. They in-
cluded a trade off in which some sovereign powers 
were exchanged for closer interconnectedness and 
peace. At the heart of the project lay the idea of 
putting a limit to what states can do.
While this logic is probably uncontroversial in 
the areas where competences have been expressly 
conferred on the Union, such as the customs un-
ion, the same rationale also affects areas which are 
not under the control of the supranational institu-
tions. This is as natural as it was predictable from 
the very beginning, since the core of the notion of 
the Internal Market on which the contemporary 
Union is built is teleological in nature. The supra-
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national institutional structure was put in place to 
enable the achievement of the Union’s goals, thus 
putting the teleological rationale at the core of the 
whole construct, as Judge Pescatore has explained 
forty years ago.49  A duty to help and not to hinder 
supranational integration made its way into the 
text in the form of the principle of Union loyalty. 
Consequently, any national law at any level, no 
matter whether it is generally within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States or not, can be 
squashed, should it stand in the way of achieve-
ment of the goals of the Union interpreted tele-
ologically.
II.
To expect that profound self-imposed limitations 
which the Member States took up when design-
ing and ratifying the Treaties would not have any 
consequences outside of the legal field is naïve as 
much as short-sighted. Legal change is responsi-
ble for social change. That the two are connected 
is hardly surprising. In fact, this is a testimony to 
the success of the legal-political endeavour in the 
first place.
The fact that French men and women cannot im-
agine a war with Germany is a great sign of the 
EU’s achievements. This is just the tip of the ice-
berg of change that the EU has brought into state 
behaviour, which has direct consequences for 
what is expected of states in Europe today. Ac-
cording to Philip Allott, we have witnessed a shift 
from diplomacy (using all the available means to 
promote the states’ ‘own people’s’ well-being in in-
teraction with others) to democracy (taking the 
interests of all into account) in inter-state relations 
in Europe (1991: 2485). In other words, selfish-
49.  Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch (vol.2, 
Bruylant, Brussels, 1972) 325.
ness and inward-looking construction of the state 
at the expense of others, putting the interests of 
states’ ‘own people’ above everything, gave way 
to the awareness of the interests and expectations 
of others. For concrete people the effects of these 
developments are as important as they are for the 
states these people inhabit. The fundamental shift 
from diplomacy to democracy means that favour-
ing ‘your own’ is prohibited in the majority of cas-
es: a Scot is not and cannot be better in the eyes 
of the British government than a Slovak. While 
implementation problems are well-known, the 
starting point is nevertheless clear. In the words 
of Gareth Davies, Article 18 TFEU prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality between 
EU citizens has largely abolished the nationalities 
of the Member States within the scope of applica-
tion of EU law (2005, p. 55). Even more, by grant-
ing EU citizens free movement rights, the Treaties 
de facto and also de jure made it largely impossible 
for the Member States to have any ‘immigration’ 
policy concerning EU citizens. In other words, 
modern EU states cannot give preference to their 
own nationals compared with other EU citizens 
and are not entitled to stand in the way of EU 
citizens exercising their Treaty rights. This means 
that from container societies of destiny (which is 
a synonym for the lack of individual choice) the 
Member States have turned into spaces for the 
expression of free will. EU law grants the major-
ity of EU citizens a right to be welcomed where 
they think they will feel at home and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union is ready to step 
in to protect such rights by defending EU citizens 
in their supranational capacity against Member 
States’ claims. This is a bitter pill for nationalists 
to swallow. Their nationality, however much glo-
rified in primary school education, means much 
less in the EU context than it would in a world 
where there is no Union in Europe. This is one of 
EU’s main achievements. 
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III.
The fusion of legal and social dynamics described 
above is responsible for the peculiarities of Euro-
pean states today, compared with other nations 
around the world. Although no one would dispute 
the sovereignty of EU Member States, it is abun-
dantly clear that their practical functioning in all 
the fields they could possibly aspire to influence 
is profoundly affected by the new socio-legal real-
ity of European integration. This is best illustrated 
by the interrelation between European states and 
their ‘peoples’. EU Member State have been trans-
formed from units of destiny into units of choice 
and are obliged by law to respect all those willing 
to leave forever and move to a different Member 
State. Many harbour now large numbers of indi-
viduals who, although they do not possess the lo-
cal nationality, cannot be stopped at the border, 
sent away, or treated worse than the locals. These 
are the EU citizens, i.e. the non-nationals who are 
non-foreigners. 
The developments described above are fundamen-
tal. Once destiny stops obscuring the view, respon-
sibility and freedom come into sight. This respon-
sibility and this freedom affect the essence of what 
the ‘peoples’ of the Member States are. Crucially, 
unlike the absolute majority of states outside the 
EU, Member States of the EU cannot shape social 
facts related to EU citizens’ movements. In other 
words, from the shapers and custodians of ‘their’ 
societies, as in Micronesia where those who are not 
‘ethnic Micronesians’ are not entitled to anything, 
or in Quebec where those who speak French are 
more welcome, the Member States have become 
mere observes of how EU citizens use EU law and 
their free will when crossing the ephemeral bor-
ders in order to organise their lives as they see fit. 
The strongest appeal of EU Member States in the 
eyes of mobile EU citizens is their relative invis-
ibility – they do not intrude into the lives of EU 
citizens choosing to settle outside their Member 
State of nationality. 
Why is this transformation important? It seems 
that it has profound implications for the moral 
reasons of accepting or rejecting social facts in 
framing policy and law. States actively involved 
in shaping immigration policy not only help the 
societies they serve. They also shape these socie-
ties by not letting some people in or mistreating 
others. Consequently, once it is known that they 
have this capacity, legitimate pretexts can be listed 
for not including some permanent residents into 
the notion of the ‘people’, such as ‘illegal’ Latinos 
in the US or, until very recently, aboriginals in 
Australia. Does the same hold for the states which 
are merely entitled to observe as those who chose 
them come and go? Once the ability to shape the 
society is lost thanks to the freedom guaranteed 
by supranational law invocable against the Mem-
ber States, the Member States are bound to face 
substantial difficulties in defining the ‘people’ con-
vincingly, should they have restrictions in mind. 
This goes far beyond municipal or EP elections, 
which the EU Treaties open up for all EU citizens. 
It goes to the very core of the relationship between 
the people and the state. The state sanction is not 
required for any EU citizen to belong de facto, and 
in many respects also de jure, to the people of a 
Member State.
Alongside with a handful of exceptions from the 
main non-discrimination rule, which are irrel-
evant for the absolute majority of EU citizens, na-
tional elections fall outside the realm of EU law. 
This is impossible to justify in the light of the de-
velopments described above. Once the Member 
States, acting via the EU, have effectively trans-
formed themselves from the shapers of society 
into the observers of how EU citizens use their 
rights, the exclusion of EU citizens without a lo-
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cal nationality from national elections becomes 
unjustifiable, as this boils down to ignoring social 
facts beyond the states’ control. This is exactly why 
Bauböck’s position is unfounded. It adopts a na-
tional model in ignoring social facts as a starting 
point. Since Member State nationalities are in the 
absolute majority of cases legally inconsequential 
for EU citizens travelling around the EU, connect-
ing democratic participation with naturalisation 
amounts to artificially inflating the importance of 
an ‘abolished’ status. 
While it is always easier to argue for not chang-
ing anything, in this particular case change is defi-
nitely required. Although practically speaking the 
impact of the initiative, should it be successful, is 
likely to be very limited, symbolically its signifi-
cance will be huge.
References
Allott, P. (1991). The European community is not 
the true European community. 100 Yale Law Jour-
nal, 2485-2500.
Davies, G. (2005). Any place I hang my hat? Or: 
Residence in the new nationality. European Law 
Journal, 11 (1), 43-56. 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe87
©
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
 2
01
1 
Pe
-E
p/
Pi
et
ro
 N
aj
-O
le
ar
i
Inclusive Democracy in Europe88
12
TESTING THE BONDS OF 
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The European Citizens’ Initiative proposing the 
extension of voting rights for resident non-nation-
al EU citizens to all elections in the host state is an 
important and timely initiative50. It is to be hoped 
that it will bring the key question about the nor-
mative and practical consequences of the develop-
ment of the EU as a ‘common citizenship area’ to 
the centre of attention. As David Owen’s contribu-
tion makes clear, the EU struggles with the chal-
lenges posed by the question of ‘who should vote 
in which election where’ because it is nestled – as 
a type of special purpose vehicle for the varied 
projects clustered under the heading of European 
integration – somewhere between the ‘truly’ fed-
eralised polity and the ‘purely’ intergovernmental 
association. The creation of EU citizenship and the 
remodelling of the treaties according to the ‘Lis-
bon’ schema do not provide a definitive normative 
answer to the question of how voting rights should 
be organised within this mixed polity in which the 
states remain significant actors. At the same time 
clearly the practical consequences of the exercise 
of free movement demand some sort of response 
– from the EU institutions and from the Member 
States – to the ‘democratic wrong’ (as Owen puts 
it) that arises because many of those who exercise 
their right to free movement end up, in one way or 
another, being disenfranchised in relation to all of 
the elections not covered by Article 22 TFEU, un-
less they choose the often costly and cumbersome 
route of acquiring the citizenship of the host state 
or are lucky enough to have the citizenship of one 
of the Member States which impose no conditions 
upon the exercise of external voting rights.
Accordingly, I am instinctively sympathetic to the 
ECI proposal, and will be happy to sign it, because 
it seems to me that this would be one of the most 
50.  Contribution published online on 17 April 2012.
effective ways in which this important issue could 
finally receive the attention it deserves.
Somehow, despite its centrality as the core founda-
tion stone of EU citizenship (even if EU citizen-
ship has a broader constitutional and political po-
tential that has yet to be realised), free movement 
still tends to be marginalised as a topic within 
popular and political debate in the Member States. 
The European Commission attests to this when it 
draws attention to the increasing number of com-
plaints that it hears about via the SOLVIT and the 
Your Europe Advice systems from aggrieved citi-
zens deprived of the rights that they are currently 
accorded (e.g. in local or European parliamentary 
elections), or unable to comprehend why the ex-
isting system does not protect them in respect 
of what is still regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of 
political participation, namely the right to vote in 
national elections. It is indeed reasonable to ask, as 
does Andrew Duff, why – if persons are mobile – 
they suddenly seem, as regards national elections, 
to come out from under the protective umbrella 
provided by Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR 
governing the obligations of states to organise free 
and fair elections for legislatures.
But for years, the issue of free movement and the 
rights to which it does, or does not, give rise has 
rarely been discussed in the media or in popular 
political discourse. And now that free movement 
does receive more attention, it is not always wel-
come. Many host Member State governments are 
too quick to say that free movers can get access 
to too many rights because apparently they have 
an unimaginable propensity for ‘benefit tourism’. 
It does seem reasonable to suggest that if the host 
state’s political community were balanced by the 
presence of socially, politically and economically 
integrated free moving tax-payers these types of 
arguments might gain a little less traction within 
the body politic. It has been clear since 2004 that 
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for some Member States the consequences of the 
free movement of labour are now more closely 
aligned to mainstream debates about immigration 
than to debates about the meaning of EU citizen-
ship and the about the constitutionalisation pro-
cess of the European Union.
But generally speaking, the Member States take 
depressingly little care to ensure that within the 
‘common citizenship area’ the citizenship experi-
ence is good for either their own citizens who are 
mobile or for the citizens of other Member States 
who are resident (or in some other way subject to 
the jurisdiction of the host state). For over the life 
course, the incidence of mobility is actually much 
higher than is the case when we count those who 
reside in another Member State at any given time. 
Much larger numbers of persons are thus affected 
directly or indirectly than tends to be assumed. 
So, in a way, it is good to reinforce the point that 
solving this particular democratic problem in 
the EU and its Member States is going to require 
concerted action at both the EU and the Member 
State levels. It cannot be solved at one level, with-
out thinking about the implications at the other 
level. And no solution is simple. All have signifi-
cant practical consequences or caveats. 
Certainly, it is impossible to think about the issue 
of voting rights for EU citizens without consider-
ing its implications in relation to national citizen-
ship. Rainer Bauböck thinks that the proper dem-
ocratic approach is to make national citizenship 
much more open to all long term residents who 
lack it, but who would like to make a sufficient 
commitment to be entitled to vote. He sees the 
two things as going hand in hand. But Bauböck 
also wants to ensure that national citizenship is 
equally open to EU citizens and to third-country 
nationals. Given the current trend in many states 
to heap more and more conditions on those ac-
quiring citizenship by naturalisation, unfortunate-
ly his wish to use this route towards democratic 
equality is as far away from political reality as the 
desire to see EU citizenship rights extended by 
treaty amendment to include the right to partici-
pate in host state national elections. Perhaps more 
realistic could be a push towards a more general-
ised acceptance of external voting within the EU, 
but while this route could potentially offer an av-
enue for all to participate in one set of elections, 
it does not necessarily let them participate in the 
one that they would choose. In other words, from 
a truly European perspective, both of those routes, 
which prioritise national solutions over suprana-
tional ones, do seem suboptimal.
Moreover, they might also seem suboptimal be-
cause they assume that the only way of ensuring 
that democratic participation is not undermined 
by the use of free movement rights involves direct 
attempts to persuade the Member States either to 
change their national laws on citizenship and/or 
external voting in a coordinated way, or to agree 
– as ‘masters’ of the treaties – to change the terms 
of EU citizenship itself. In fact, if Member States 
recognised more readily their responsibilities in 
respect of the common citizenship experience 
for both outgoing and incoming EU migrants they 
might be readier to change their national laws 
autonomously, or perhaps in concert with other 
states which provide reciprocity of rights, in order 
to build a more substantial common electoral area 
akin to the one that already exists in part between 
the UK and Ireland. One could then even imagine 
the circumstances in which the states could agree, 
with the assistance of the EU institutions, on a fa-
cilitative convention structuring these types of re-
ciprocal citizenship relationships.
But the Member States should not be the sole fo-
cus of attention. It seems to me that the debate 
about the character of the common citizenship 
area should be held in conjunction with wider 
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public deliberation about how, and whether, the 
EU should generate the types of closer bonds of 
solidarity that seem necessary for the purposes 
of solving the euro crisis or facing down environ-
mental challenges in the future. In that respect, 
the ECI should be seen as one strategy alongside 
others, such as political campaigns at the national 
level and strategic litigation testing out the po-
tential limits of EU citizenship or the effects of 
the ECHR. All of these steps are needed to raise 
awareness of this very important issue.
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This Initiative is to be welcomed if only for open-
ing up the debate and prompting the discussion 
here – which I have found most instructive51. This 
is an important issue that - with certain honour-
able exceptions, among them the earlier partici-
pants in this useful dialogue -has hitherto not re-
ceived much academic or political attention, yet 
resonates with many EU citizens. To give just one 
anecdotal example, last year UCL conducted two 
focus groups among EU citizens from other Mem-
ber States resident in London and the issue of na-
tional voting rights proved to be of far more con-
cern to them than votes for the European Parlia-
ment. Though not a scientific survey, it expresses 
in certain respects a key feature of the very idea of 
Union citizenship which, as a political scientist, I 
find can be lost in the predominantly legal analy-
sis of this topic: namely, the reliance of citizenship 
rights, including those associated with Union citi-
zenship, on politics in general and the state – in 
this case the Member States – in particular. It is 
this political context that makes voting rights such 
an essential part of citizenship, yet one, given the 
complexities and peculiarities of the EU’s political 
system, that raises a number of difficulties in the 
European context.
There is a growing tendency to see citizenship as 
simply the artefact of legal rights. This trend is es-
pecially prevalent in accounts of Union citizenship, 
where the key actor has been the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) and the majority 
of analyses come from legal scholars. Yet, any legal 
system has to be understood within the context of 
the wider political system of which it forms a part 
and on which it ultimately depends. Not only are 
laws both the product of and administered and 
made reality through political processes, but also 
courts belong to that political apparatus and are 
51.  Contribution published online on 30 April 2012
themselves political actors, whose mode of adju-
dication and the degree to which their judgements 
will be followed reflect the character and capacity 
of the political institutions within which they are 
embedded. To the extent that we wish the law and 
those responsible for its administration to have es-
sential democratic qualities – not least in treating 
all subject to them as political equals, whose inter-
ests deserve to be given equal consideration, with 
the laws applying equally to all –it is important 
that the law and the rights it embodies should be 
part and parcel of a democratic polity. It is for this 
reason that political rights are the defining attrib-
ute of citizenship. They form the ‘right of rights’ 
since they provide the means whereby citizens 
can ultimately enact and uphold – both directly 
and indirectly – all their other rights and assure 
they have the democratic virtues of showing them 
equal concern and respect with other citizens. In 
sum, the very features associated with the rule of 
law arise from the process of democratization and 
its accompanying effects on the legal system. It 
will be objected that rights serve as constraints on 
democracy and ‘majority tyranny’. However, this 
slogan proves empirically mistaken and overlooks 
the obvious fact that the main danger to rights 
comes from minority rule. Democracy has been 
instrumentally promotive of rights precisely be-
cause it obliges rulers to be responsive to as many 
of the ruled as possible. In so doing, it forces poli-
ticians to appeal as far as possible to interests and 
ideals that are equally and widely shared rather 
than simply to the narrow sectional interests and 
ideals of privileged minorities. At the same time, 
the democratic process engages citizens in recip-
rocal relations with each other. By endorsing the 
public polices needed to promote rights –such as 
a criminal and penal system, health care, schools, 
pensions, social security and so on – they also sign 
up to the correlative duties needed to sustain these 
policies, such as paying taxes.
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This argument might seem to lead inexorably to 
support for the Initiative. Yet, that moves too fast. 
For, as I noted, the EU political system is noto-
riously complex and renders the relationship be-
tween citizenship and political rights more com-
plicated as a result. European citizenship is ac-
cessed through national citizenship which, as the 
Treaty notes, it is designed to be ‘additional to’ 
rather than to ‘replace’. This position is consistent 
with the EU’s declared ambition to promote ‘an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ 
rather than to create a `European people’. Accord-
ingly, Union citizenship does not so much create 
access to EU level goods and services as ensure 
that its possessors are not discriminated against 
on grounds of nationality when they move to an-
other Member State. So conceived, Union citizen-
ship serves to promote mutual respect between the 
citizens of the different Member States by making 
them all potential citizens or dual citizens of all 
the other Member States should they move to any 
one of them, at least so far as the four freedoms 
that are central to the EU are concerned. Howev-
er, for this mutual respect to operate, it is impor-
tant that Union citizenship does not undermine 
the democratic systems of the Member States on 
which it is parasitic, and which are needed to de-
liver those rights agreed upon between them at the 
EU level. Moreover, two of the main channels of 
political representation within the EU’s own po-
litical system – namely, national parliaments and 
the European Council – are explicitly based on 
Member State citizenship, while even the suppos-
edly direct channel of the European Parliament is 
based on constituencies designed to give adequate 
representation to each Member State, with elec-
tions largely reflecting domestic concerns. So it 
is important that citizens should be represented 
through these channels, but not be doubly rep-
resented and only to the extent they can commit 
their representatives to pursuing sustainable poli-
cies that show equal recognition to the peoples of 
Europe.
Two concerns need to be addressed as a result of 
this multilevel arrangement, therefore, when con-
sidering the acquisition of national voting rights 
in another Member State.   It must be consistent 
with:
1. those exercising these rights regarding the na-
tional laws as applying equally to all and under-
taking the reciprocal obligations needed to sus-
tain the public policies on which the continued 
enjoyment of rights by all citizens within the 
Member State depend, and
2. the mutual recognition of the citizenship re-
gimes of all Member States and their conse-
quent equal representation within the EU’s po-
litical system.
David Owen’s fifth option in his contribution 
more or less meets these conditions, if read along-
side the caveats noted by Rainer Bauböck in his 
intervention. Thus, all second-country nationals 
(SCNs) should have a fair opportunity of acquir-
ing nationality and hence voting rights in another 
Member State after a minimal period of residence, 
while all SCNs who do not have nationality in 
their Member State of residence should be eligible 
to vote in national elections of their Member State 
of nationality. Meanwhile, though dual citizenship 
should be possible, its holders should only be able 
to exercise national voting rights in one coun-
try. This formula does constrain to some degree 
Member State autonomy over citizenship rules, 
but only to a minimal degree in ways that in many 
respects preserve its integrity. On the one hand, it 
seeks to ensure that those who do vote in national 
elections are committed to the obligations need-
ed to promote rights equally for all, on the other 
hand it ensures that there is no double voting for 
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elections that impact on EU policies, so that all 
are treated equally. It might be argued that natu-
ralisation should not be necessary. Certainly, I can 
see a case for those within the European sphere to 
be exempted from citizenship tests, with naturali-
sation automatic should they so choose. But the 
choice needs to be a considered one that involves a 
commitment to the long-term interests of the pol-
ity if voters are not to engage in rent seeking or 
free-riding behaviour of a kind that would under-
mine rights.
In remarking that ‘Union citizenship is destined 
to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States’ the CJEU has made it sound as if 
this new legal status represents the ‘right of rights’, 
and at least one contributor to this debate – Dim-
ity Kochenov - has read it in this way. But this ju-
dicial hyperbole ignores the extent to which these 
very rights rest on the underlying obligations that 
follow from the exercise of democratic citizen-
ship within the Member States. As such, national 
citizenship necessarily continues to provide the 
fundamental status of Union citizens. However, as 
the Court’s rhetorical formula continues, Union 
citizenship does have a key role in `enabling those 
who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their na-
tionality, subject to the exceptions as are expressly 
provided for.’ What I have suggested above is that 
the ‘same treatment’ must respect reciprocity be-
tween citizens within and between the Member 
States, and that the proposed limits on access 
to and the exercise of national voting rights are 
among those exceptions that should be ‘expressly 
provided for’ within a political organisation com-
mitted to the ‘ever closer Union of (democratic) 
peoples’. As such, the Initiative raises a key issue 
but proposes a misguided solution, at odds with 
the very nature of the EU. 
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My first article on political rights of non-citi-
zens immigrants was written together with my 
late colleague Bert Swart in 1978 for a journal in 
Rome52. Since then my ideas and publications on 
this issue were guided by three principles: (a) no 
taxation without representation, (b) the longer an 
immigrant is resident in a country, the harder it is 
to justify his exclusion from political rights only 
on the basis of his nationality, and (c) once vot-
ing rights have been granted to non-citizens for 
municipal elections there are no serious princi-
pled arguments against extension to parliamen-
tary elections. The second principle qualifies the 
first principle. Tourists and seasonal workers pay 
VAT, but that does not necessarily qualify them for 
voting rights. They should, however, have at least 
some other political rights, such as the right to 
demonstrate or the right to strike.
This being said, I do not support the campaign 
for extending voting rights of EU nationals to na-
tional elections in the Member state of residence. 
Five pragmatic arguments in my view outweigh 
the three principles mentioned above.
I.
I sincerely doubt whether being unable to vote 
in parliamentary elections in the host Member 
State in real life is a barrier to free movement. Of 
course, it may be construed as a legal obstacle to 
free movement. But did many Union citizens de-
cide not to use their right to migrate to another 
Member State or to return permanently to the 
Member State of their nationality, only because 
they wanted to vote in parliamentary elections in 
that state? Of course, the unequal treatment has to 
be justified. And yes, there is the problem of who 
52.  Contribution published online on 1 May 2012.
belongs to the demos or the people(s) of the Mem-
ber State(s). The German Bundesverfassungsger-
icht in 1989 gave the most restrictive definition of 
people: only nationals of the country. The Court of 
Justice in Eman & Sevinger stressed that the defi-
nitions of the concept ‘peoples’ vary considerably 
between Member States (judgment of 12.9.2006, 
C-300/04, point 44). I suggest that using the right 
to free movement brings certain advantages and 
certain disadvantages. Not having a guarantee 
that you can vote in national elections in the other 
Member State unless you acquire its nationality 
is one of the disadvantages. Empirical data indi-
cate that the participation of EU migrants in the 
municipal elections in the host Member State is 
relatively low and that a considerable part of EU 
migrants hide their migration to another Member 
State from authorities of the Member State of their 
nationality.
II.
Current Union law is clear. Both the TFEU and 
the Charter guarantee participation of EU mi-
grants only for the EP elections and the municipal 
elections in the host Member State. The right to 
participate in political parties is only guaranteed 
at ‘Union level’, not at national level. This was a 
clear choice of Member States during the negotia-
tions on those treaties. The legislator considered 
that voting at the national level was not within 
the scope of the Treaty as stipulated in Article 18 
TFEU. Only very weighty reason could justify an 
advice to the Court of Justice to overrule that clear 
choice of the legislator.
Inclusive Democracy in Europe98
III.
The national legislation of Member States on the 
voting rights of non-citizens and on the right of 
nationals abroad to vote in the parliamentary elec-
tions at home varies a lot. The differences are due 
to historical, political or other reasons. It is unwise 
to disregard those differences. The TFEU specifies 
that the Union shall respect cultural diversity. Dif-
ferences in political culture are part of that diver-
sity. I would plea to respect this diversity and to 
learn from the hot political debates, often going 
on already for decades on the extension of voting 
rights to long-term resident third-country nation-
als (also human beings) in Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain. There appears to be a differ-
ence in approach to this issue between the South-
ern and the Northern Member States. I would 
expect that in ‘new’ member states there could 
be more sympathy for the ‘restrictive’ Southern 
approach than for the more ‘open’ Northern ap-
proach. In several Member States the debate on 
extending voting rights to non-citizens or exten-
sion of that right to parliamentary elections has 
been explicitly linked to facilitation of naturalisa-
tion of immigrants, e.g. in Belgium, Germany and 
the Netherlands.
IV.
Granting voting rights for elections on the na-
tional level will require either amending the 
TFEU or using the procedure of Article 25 TFEU. 
In both cases unanimity of all 27 Member States 
is required. Moreover, in many Member States it 
would require amending the constitution and thus 
broad political consensus. That consensus simply 
is not available at present in most Member States 
on this issue. The constitutional amendments nec-
essary to introduce voting rights for nationals of 
other Member States in municipal elections were 
agreed because this issue was one minor point in 
a large package of changes contained in the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Presenting the extension of voting 
rights to the national level as an isolated issue to 
be realised by binding Union law probably will 
create a lot of opposition and negative publicity 
for the Union generally.
V.
This proposal will certainly raise the issue of ex-
tending voting rights to the national level for 
long-term resident third-country nationals. Why 
would a Polish or Portuguese national be allowed 
to participate in national elections after ten weeks 
or months of residence in France and a Swiss or a 
Turkish national be excluded even after ten years 
of lawful residence in that country? 
My first conclusion is: 
do not raise this issue in isolation but together 
with other relevant issues concerning political 
rights of EU migrants, such as voting rights in na-
tional elections for expatriates living in another 
Member State, the right of Union citizens to be 
a member of or establish a political party in the 
Member State where he lives and the possibility 
of facilitated naturalisation after having acquired 
the permanent resident right in another Member 
State (after a minimum of five years of residence).
My second conclusion is: 
do not propose binding Union law on this issue or 
try to make the Court of Justice impose a binding 
solution for this problem. Rather apply the open 
method of coordination by starting a structured 
dialogue with and between Member States, pos-
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sibly combined with the issue of the limits set by 
free movement law to nationality legislation of 
Member States. We may learn from the experience 
of the Nordic Union in dealing with the issue of 
extending voting rights to non-citizen residents, 
both of the Nordic countries and other countries, 
during the 1970s and 1980s by structured discus-
sions rather than imposing a common rule from 
above. With this in mind I would support the fifth 
option in David Owen’s contribution to this de-
bate.
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I am grateful to Philippe Cayla and Catriona Seth 
for kicking off this debate on the future of EU 
citizenship and the extension of voting rights in 
national elections for all EU citizens residing in a 
second Member State53.
I believe that the future of EU citizenship, its 
extension in scope and in nature, is now much 
more than in the past an essential element 
of the debate on the future of Europe itself. 
The introduction of an EU citizenship - al-
beit as a complement to nationality of a Mem-
ber State and in a context where nation states 
remain the main actors - has been an extraor-
dinary symbolic step defining the European 
Union as a community of values and rights. 
The right to vote in local and European elections 
in the country of residence remains the core of 
this process, together with the right to move free-
ly across borders. The exercise - albeit imperfect 
- of these rights has had an enormous symbolic 
impact on the concept of European identity, lead-
ing gradually to the acknowledgement of citizens 
that moving and residing in a second Member 
State means bringing with you in a big bag almost 
all the freedoms and rights you enjoy at national 
level, including the right to participate fully in a 
community’s social, economic and political life. 
The whole objective of making the Union an area 
of freedom, security and justice stems from a dy-
namic interpretation of the concept of EU citizen-
ship. The now binding Charter of Fundamental 
Rights embodies the idea that not only EU citi-
zens, but all persons and their rights must be and 
must remain the core of the European construc-
tion.
If persons and their rights have to remain the core 
of the European construction, then European citi-
53.  Contribution published online on 10 May 2012.
zenship must not only be fully exercised but ex-
tended in scope. 
In this respect - unrealistic as it may seem in times 
when the Schengen system has polarised the 
political discourse and nationality has featured 
prominently in populist electoral programs - I 
do think that the necessary evolution of EU citi-
zenship leads to a gradually growing relevance of 
residence as defining criterion for the exercise of 
related rights.
For this reason I would support the idea of a citi-
zens’ initiative proposing the extension to EU citi-
zens of the right to vote in national elections in 
the Member State of residence. I do not underesti-
mate the complexity of the institutional and con-
stitutional issues that this option would raise, but 
I am convinced that the initiative would trigger a 
necessary debate leading possibly to the gradual, 
temporary, conditional extension of this right in 
the medium run.
At the same time I do not share the view that we 
should ‘start with the Europeans first’. Although I 
am convinced that this could have a spill-over ef-
fect on the extension of citizenship rights to third-
country nationals at national level, I believe that 
EU policy makers should take up the political 
responsibility to accompany the initiative for the 
extension of EU citizens’ rights with a strong po-
litical initiative at EU level encouraging Member 
States to facilitate access to national citizenship for 
third-country nationals who are long term resi-
dents in a Member State, gradually leading to uni-
form approaches and criteria. 
I consider it particularly urgent to address the 
situation of second and third generations of third-
country nationals, that is children and youngsters 
often born and/or raised in a Member State, for 
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whom access to citizenship in that Member State 
is often rendered very complicated or even impos-
sible.
I am perfectly aware that rules governing EU com-
petences differ considerably when we address EU 
citizenship and the extension of citizenship related 
rights to third-country nationals. However I be-
lieve that from a political perspective these two 
processes have to be closely interlinked, in a pos-
sibly virtuous dynamic. 
 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe103
Inclusive Democracy in Europe104
16
VOTING RIGHTS AND 
BEYOND...
MARTIN WILHELM
Martin Wilhelm studied political science 
and economy in Greifswald, Sweden and 
Serbia. He then became involved in a 
European network of student cultural 
festivals in Norway and Hungary.  He 
worked for different institutions 
(Goethe-Institut, European Movement, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, the German embassy) 
in Serbia and France and produced a 
documentary film on mobility in Europe for 
the channel ARTE. In 2009, Martin Wilhelm 
went to Berlin and worked for the Zukunft 
foundation. Since 2010, Martin Wilhelm 
has been the manager of the association 
Citizens For Europe. His work focuses on 
issues of European democracy and on civil 
society projects.
Inclusive Democracy in Europe105
Last week, national elections in France and Greece 
have received unprecedented attention at the Eu-
ropean level54. At least in Germany, the media have 
almost obsessively stressed the impact of these 
elections on domestic politics and European Un-
ion policy-making. Some front page authors have 
wondered why Germans should not have, for ex-
ample, one fifth of a vote in the Greek and French 
elections and vice versa to live up to the principles 
of democracy’ (Die Zeit, No 19). Against the back-
ground of such reflections and demands, Catriona 
Seth’s and Philippe Cayla’s proposal does not seem 
all that revolutionary, affecting a rather small mi-
nority.
However, those who favour the proposed ECI 
have more in mind than just granting mobile EU 
citizens additional voting rights. Their underlying 
question is what kind of European Union polity 
they envision, and their underlying motivation 
is to push towards an ever-closer union among a 
European people. In that sense, we fully support 
this ECI, but not without emphasizing that, in the 
long-term, European people must become a post-
national and inclusive concept, overcoming the 
exclusion of third-country nationals.
Many sound legal and political arguments have 
been put forward in this forum. As an activist 
NGO, we have limited capacity to conduct scien-
tific research. Inspiring debates as in this forum 
build the theoretical backbone of our activities, 
nourish our visions of an inclusive Europe and 
help justify our projects and campaigns in the 
field of citizenship, migration and political par-
ticipation in Europe. That said, because we work 
on the ground, we are in a position to conduct 
reality checks; that is, we can detect the practical 
limitations of theoretical constructs and where 
they clash with the daily concerns of citizens. It 
54.  Contribution published online on 10 May 2012.
is from this point of view—an activist’s point of 
view—that I want to contribute to this debate. 
An ECI is a very resource intensive undertaking. 
International partnerships need to be built. Lan-
guage barriers need to be overcome. A commu-
nication strategy and hundreds of volunteers are 
needed to mobilise citizens. There is also the fi-
nancial burden that NGOs will face, and the tech-
nical challenges involved when registering the 
ECI or its online collection system for signatures. 
Additionally, an ECI has a high legal uncertainty 
concerning its content (admissibility) and a small 
probability of turning into legislation. (However, 
its potential for indirect impact through the crea-
tion of a European public debate should not be 
underestimated and is perhaps the true value of 
the ECI.) The proposed ECI demanding national 
voting rights for mobile EU citizens is especially 
challenging.
Authors in this forum have already discussed the 
ECI’s legal uncertainty; whether or not the ECI 
on residential voting rights will be accepted by 
the European Commission for further procedure; 
and the possibility of its legal implementation 
(unanimity in the Council). Another challenge is 
this one: Statistically speaking, every twelfth citi-
zen who would benefit from the ECI would need 
to sign it. More dramatically, every single second 
country national in Romania would need to sign 
it, if Romania was to be one of the seven countries 
(one million signatures, minimum seven coun-
tries, variable minimum of signatures per coun-
try). Hence, the ECI would already fail to collect 
one million signatures if it only addressed the mo-
bile elite. The initiators and we as NGOs need to 
address the public at large and construct an ECI 
narrative that concerns all European citizens in 
three ways. First, because voting rights are not as 
mobilising as genetically modified food or nuclear 
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power, the ECI narrative needs to go beyond the 
mere possibility of casting a vote in national elec-
tions. It needs to convey the European vision and 
state why this ECI can effectively realise the vi-
sion. Second, the narrative needs to include posi-
tive spill-over effects for third-country nation-
als to counter the argument that this ECI would 
further discriminate non-EU citizens and enlarge 
the emotional and legal gap between them and EU 
nationals. The case has already been made that 
the ECI proposed by Catriona Seth and Philippe 
Cayla would affect a rather small number of citi-
zens compared to the many million third-country 
nationals deprived of many more, and in some 
Member States of all, political rights. Third, the 
ECI narrative needs to be designed in a way that 
does not trigger nationalistic or anti-EU resent-
ments based on fears of loss of political control at 
the domestic level. It needs to address the ECI’s 
importance for the future of the EU and, at the 
same time, emphasize its marginal impact on do-
mestic politics (for Luxembourg, with 37 per cent 
second-country nationals, this would of course be 
difficult). These are pretty tough conditions.
Besides public support, political support is crucial, 
especially among national parliamentarians, as 
they are ultimately affected. Strategically speaking, 
one could sketch out which candidates and parties 
are most likely to benefit from the new constitu-
ency and win their support by relying on their no-
torious quest to keep their seats. In cities, districts 
and regions with large ratios of second-country 
nationals, candidates for the national parliaments 
are likely to be responsive. From running cam-
paigns on electoral rights, we know that politicians 
are most responsive and even get seduced to go 
beyond their party lines. National parliamentar-
ians may play also a crucial role in generating sup-
port for the ECI in the EU Council. However, their 
influence on the government as well as the respec-
tive minister sent to the Council varies strongly. 
In which way European parliamentarians could 
act as multipliers to support the policy process de-
pends on the role of the European Parliament in 
areas where the Council decides unanimously. Yet 
the ECI narrative should include substantial argu-
ments that would win them over, too. 
The above points are of course not all-encompass-
ing. They are meant to be a guide to the initiators 
and to complement the academic debate. We have 
already taken steps to support the ECI by develop-
ing the online tool www.vote-exchange.org, which 
allows for cross border debates on domestic poli-
cies among second-country nationals and their 
indirect participation in national elections in their 
country of residence. A French citizen residing in 
Germany votes for her or his German counterpart 
living in France, and vice versa. It is a tool to trig-
ger the public debate and more than a playground 
for all who already today want to live up to the 
goal of creating a European people.
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The contributions to the EUDO debate on whether 
EU citizens should have voting rights in national 
elections in the country of their residence are both 
enlightening and thoughtful55. They have provid-
ed a number of valuable reflections on matters of 
principle, policy, strategy, and tactics in the light 
of contemporary political developments at both 
European Union and domestic levels. By clarify-
ing matters of principle as well as issues of politics, 
they have outlined several trajectories and shed 
ample light onto the pros and cons of the Euro-
pean Citizens’ Initiative. 
Given the horizon of possibilities open to us, we 
are now obliged to exercise our liberty to decide 
whether we would support the proposal for a 
European Citizens’ Initiative on national voting 
rights. Let me state at the outset that I fully sup-
port it; after all, since the mid-1990s my work has 
consistently defended the grant of electoral rights 
in national elections to European Union citizens 
in the Member State of residence. Believing that 
circumstances do not decide (and should not de-
cide) and that deciding not to decide is not a cred-
ible option, the above line of decision has been 
prompted by the following four considerations.
The weight of principles
The contradiction between belonging fully to a 
polity as a contributor, collaborator, and burden-
sharer and at the same time being deemed as not 
fully belonging to it with respect to the enjoy-
ment of certain benefits, including national voting 
rights, is unsustainable form a democratic point of 
view. Robert Dahl and Carlos Santiago Nino have 
convincingly pointed out that democracy requires 
inclusion and, most certainly, the inclusion of all 
55.  Contribution first published on 19 May 2012.
those who have a long-term interest in a country 
and its institutions. In this respect, the full enfran-
chisement of Union citizens in the Member State 
of their residence is the only corrective to the ex-
isting ‘democratic wrong’, as Owen has put it. 
True, some might argue, here, that admission of 
Union citizens to the ‘national community’ of citi-
zens would undermine the distinction between 
nationals and aliens and dilute the national char-
acter of parliamentary elections. Others might be 
quick to point out here that such a reform might 
undermine national interests. Although such ob-
jections are reasonable from the standpoint of 
liberal nationalism, they need reassessment in 
light of the current state of European integration 
and the fundamental status of European Union 
citizenship. For in the eyes of European as well as 
national laws, Community nationals are neither 
‘aliens’ nor ‘strangers’; they are, instead, Union 
citizens endowed with a number of rights that 
the Member States must affirm. The Citizenship 
Directive (2004/38) has recognised this and has 
strengthened Union citizenship by establishing an 
unconditional right of permanent residence for 
Union citizens and their families who have resided 
in a host Member State for a continuous period of 
five years. Accordingly, limiting the political rights 
of permanent resident Union citizens, who are al-
ready members of the demos at the local level and 
permanent members of the community, hinders 
democratic participation by depriving them of an 
effective voice in the legislative arena.
In addition, as the American philosopher John 
Dewey has pointed out, ‘democracy is more than a 
form of government; it is primarily a mode of as-
sociated living, of conjoint communicated experi-
ence’ (1964, p. 87).  And this experience becomes 
dwarfed when national voting rights become a 
good reserved for co-nationals while EU citizens 
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who are long-term residents are relegated to the 
status of the subject. They look at their everyday 
lives and the levels of the contribution, the homes 
they have created and the homes they have aban-
doned in the Member State of origin and cannot 
understand why they should be viewed as ‘guests’ 
or foreigners’ in the community they call ‘their 
own’ and the country they have ‘chosen’ to make 
the hub of their lives. With the passage of time, 
their voices, initially inarticulate and gentle, are 
bound to become noisier as they see their taxes di-
verted into policy choices for which they have had 
not even a simple invitation to express an opinion 
for. 
Once the weight of principles is appraised, the 
space of ordinary experience and expectation is 
surveyed and measured and the rationale of Eu-
ropean integration of creating true associates by 
making the tag of nationality irrelevant when de-
cisions about how people should be treated are 
made is given the importance it deserves, then 
the proposed idea of extending political rights to 
national parliamentary elections in the Member 
State of residence does not give rise to a difficult 
dilemma. 
Tackling the democratic 
deficit without the 
methodological privileging of 
the state
Once the democratic deficit is acknowledged, 
questions of how best to correct it come into play. 
These questions, and their answers, have been dis-
cussed very eloquently by the contributors to this 
debate. The options on the table include the hori-
zontal opening of national citizenship or the ex-
tension of Union citizenship. By opting for the for-
mer, we implicitly recognise (i) that it is the Mem-
ber States’ business to correct the wrong; (ii) the 
national character of domestic citizenship should 
be preserved, and iii) that naturalisation should 
be the means of full participation in the nation-
al as well as European demoi. All three assump-
tions, however, clearly privilege the state and, by 
so doing, conceal the fact that the national state is 
called upon to resolve a wrong that its own con-
stituent organising ideas have created in the first 
place. All three assumptions also superimpose two 
different logics and realities; namely, the logic of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
and thus equalisation (full equality of treatment 
irrespective of nationality throughout the EU) 
(the logic of equality) and the national statist logic 
of turning aliens into nationals via naturalisation 
along with the underpinning rationale of cultural 
homogenisation in some form or another (the 
nation-centric logic).   However, these logics are 
very different and must be kept apart. Certainly, 
European integration has been premised on non-
discrimination and to assume that the state and 
its (national) ways should be given a theoretical 
and methodological priority with respect to the 
future development of EU citizenship denotes an 
ideological point of view. After all, why should not 
the citizens’ everyday lives, lived encounters and 
expectations matter as much as states’ interests in 
perpetuating the national citizenship narratives? 
And why should not the fundamental status of Eu-
ropean Union citizenship place itself inside states’ 
political domain and affirm its right to existence?
True, electorates in the Member States may not 
welcome the extension of EU citizenship to na-
tional parliamentary elections. They may react 
negatively and right-wing extremism might capi-
talise on it in order to mobilise people against the 
governing political elites and the EU. But this is 
something that can happen anyway with respect 
to any real or imagined policy reform. Can politi-
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cal imagination and socio-political change remain 
captive of conservative interests which seem to fix 
their gaze firmly on the past and on the artificial 
commonalities of race, ethnicity, language and na-
tional culture thereby underscoring not only com-
monalities of interests, commitment to a shared 
institutional framework and of shared collective 
practices, but also the  boundary crossings that 
preceded all the above commonalities, both real 
and imagined, and the crossings that take place 
continuously around us? Can we afford to become 
the subterfuge of a historical process that robs us 
of judgment?
The road travelled thus far
Having to decide which trajectory to follow with 
respect to voting rights in national elections and 
to reflect on the concerns outlined by the con-
tributors to this debate is not without precedent. 
It is important to remember that in the 1970s and 
1980s the same debate took place with respect the 
so-called ‘special rights’, which included the right 
of Community nationals to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in local elections in the Member State 
of residence. ‘Equal treatment of Union citizens in 
the political field’, ‘strengthening the feeling of be-
longing to one legal community’, ‘complete assim-
ilation with nationals as regards political rights’, 
‘creating a people’s Europe’ and ‘responding the 
expectations of Community nationals’ were the 
rationales underpinning the grant of local elec-
toral rights to EU citizens without a prior activa-
tion of national naturalisation procedures. Brave 
thinking at that time captured the dilemmas, 
weighed Member States’ concerns and, following 
such reflections and negotiations, the option that 
was favoured was ‘special rights’ rather than natu-
ralisation because it was important that Commu-
nity nationals were treated in host Member States 
as if they were citizens of those states. Promoting 
greater equality with nationals was more benefi-
cial than the opening up of the naturalisation gates 
because ‘the emphasis should remain on residence 
rather than nationality’ (European Commission, 
1975, p. 32).  
And in the mid-1970s, national electorates’ oppo-
sition to such an idea was considered, too. As the 
Commission stated at that time, ‘equal treatment 
of foreigners in the economic and social fields is 
accepted by public opinion, since this has long 
been a subject for frequent negotiation between 
States, the same does not apply to equal treatment 
of foreigners in the political field. This is a new 
idea and the public will have to be given an oppor-
tunity to get used to it’ (European Commission, 
1975, p. 30).  
Additionally, when the Treaty on European Un-
ion entered into force, several MS continued to 
resist the implementation of what was then Arti-
cle 8b(EC). In fact, by January 1997 of the fifteen 
Member States only eight had made the grant of 
local electoral rights for EU citizens a reality. Fears 
of diluting local elections, fears of challenging the 
primacy of national citizenship, fears of making 
the European Union a tangible reality and thus 
contributing to the sidelining of Member States 
were expressed frequently in the public domain, 
but none of these fears really materialised. 
The memory of what has taken place and of the 
institutional choices on offer in the 1970s, 1980s, 
and early 1990s is thus a decisive one at this mo-
ment. For if turn our gaze from the current initia-
tive toward the past, we can easily gain a glimpse 
of the solution. I would argue that this solution 
has created a path dependence that would make 
any other policy choice with respect to national 
electoral franchise a deviation and thus requiring 
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a clear justification. The proposed Citizens’ initia-
tive thus creates a turning point as far as the matu-
ration of EU citizenship is concerned. The ques-
tioning of the idea that political domains should 
be reserved for states’ own nationals is unfolding. 
And in the same way that the European Commu-
nity was not afraid to open local political spaces to 
non-national citizens of other Member States in 
the past, the time has come for the completion of 
this process and the realisation of equality of treat-
ment by fully enfranchising EU citizens automati-
cally in the Member State of their residence. 
Free movement and EU 
citizenship are not only about 
spacing; they are also about 
timing  
It is true that in both the literature on free move-
ment of persons and the relevant case law spatial 
matters relating to cross-border are the main fo-
cus. Changes of location, border crossings and set-
tlement in another Member States activate most 
(albeit not all) of the advantages that EU law offers 
to EU citizens. What is completely disregarded in 
all these ‘travelogues’ is that exercising EU citizen-
ship rights is also a temporal movement: a move-
ment of ‘before’ crossing a border and ‘after’; a 
shift from one collective imaginary and personal 
world to another collective imaginary and new 
personal world to be constructed; a change in per-
spective, viewpoint and system of beliefs; and the 
enjoyment of a sense of freedom and the daring 
opening of oneself to different rhythms of individ-
ual history and social surroundings. In this tem-
poral movement change unavoidably takes con-
crete manifestation in the form of the appearance 
of new interpretations of the social environment, 
a new frame of mind, new questions, new dilem-
mas and eventually new answers. Member States 
cannot afford to bracket this temporal movement 
that shapes the lives of their new residents and 
their ‘mutating’ individuality either by continu-
ing to subsume them under the fixed categories of 
home nationalities or by placing them into static 
and unchanging statuses. For the meanings, in-
terpretations, ideas, interests, expectations and 
meaningful relations that surround the life of EU 
citizens are not merely embodied in space; they 
also unfold in time. 
Domestic political domains thus need to acknowl-
edge that a new predicament brings about a reced-
ing past, decaying relations and entanglements in 
the light of new experiences, a new sense of world-
liness, new entanglements, new personal jour-
neys, new meaningful relations, new events and 
new political exigencies requiring responses. The 
temporal movement characterising settlement in a 
new environment is not only a process, but is also a 
variation, that is, change. Accordingly, democratic 
public spheres must be open to new participants 
and should be engagement promoters. Similarly, 
European Union institutions cannot afford to 
disregard this temporal movement, for they have 
been instrumental in lifting EU citizens from the 
imaginary of rooted publics and imparting onto 
them a sense of freedom and the consciousness of 
being treated with dignity and equality wherever 
they go in the territory of the Union. After all, this 
is what European integration was hoped to be able 
to accomplish since its early stages. 
Arguably, it would be a fundamental contradic-
tion, if, one the one hand, EU citizens were en-
couraged to move, cultivate new allegiances, form 
new orientations, have a European consciousness, 
create new realities, to be part of the fabric of the 
host societies and be treated as equal collabora-
tors and participants, while European institutions, 
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including the Council of the EU, refused to accept 
the full consequences, which include that EU citi-
zens would feel themselves as active collaborators 
and participants in society and politics, on the 
other. Shutting the gate of political participation 
in national elections and frustrating the legitimate 
democratic aspirations of all those who for one 
reason or another partook of the European project 
and became valued members of the community of 
their residence would be tantamount to condemn-
ing one of the biggest achievements of the Europe-
an integration project and making the proclama-
tion to encourage participation in the democratic 
life of the Union empty rhetoric.
Legal norms should reflect 
social practices and EU 
citizens’ lived encounters
Legal norms cannot afford to disregard both prin-
ciples and social practices. If they do, they will 
eventually lose credibility. The partial franchise 
of EU citizens is clearly not adequate. Nor does it 
provide a frank solution for the future. Its exten-
sion to national parliamentary elections is thus 
necessary and this can only be done by resisting 
the temptation to shut ourselves up in the pres-
ent and apply the ‘available’, that is, some stretch-
ing or opening up of national citizenship, but by 
deciding a clear announcement of the future, that 
is, by removing the existing restrictions in the ap-
plication of the principle equal treatment and by 
making national electoral participation available 
to all those EU citizens who are enmeshed in the 
Member States of their residence and have been 
sharing their burdens without any complaints for 
so many years.
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History demonstrates that the extension of partici-
pation rights is a process56. Not only is this true for 
national populations, who only gained universal 
suffrage after a struggle in which the percentage of 
those entitled to this right was growing over many 
years before reaching universal inclusion. It is 
also true for voting rights of non-nationals, rights 
which were extended to foreign residents only 
step by step, first to a selected group (for instance, 
those coming from former colonies) which was 
later on enlarged; or first to those who complied 
with conditions (for example, years of residence) 
which were subsequently lightened; or which in-
cluded first merely the right to vote and only later 
the right to be stand as a candidate, etc. 
Similar processes can be observed with regard to 
the type of election in which non-nationals have 
been entitled to participate. From this perspective, 
granting the right to vote in national elections 
for second country EU citizens is certainly a test 
on the bonds of solidarity among EU citizens, as 
Jo Shaw put it. But it also poses the question of 
whether, after twenty years of recognition in the 
EU of the right to vote and be elected for a selected 
group of non-nationals (European citizens) in se-
lected elections (local and European ones), time 
has come to include also the right to vote at the na-
tional level. In my opinion, we could be still miss-
ing some steps that should not be skipped before 
trying to reach that objective; steps that are of a 
practical as well as a legal nature.
First of all, if we think that voting in local and EP 
elections are not the only participation rights we 
would like to see associated with European citi-
zenship, and if, therefore, the idea is to go further, 
then the next step should be regional elections, 
rather than moving on directly to national ones. 
56.  Contribution published online on 21 May 2012.
Certainly, regional elections do not play the same 
role in all Member States, and there are some in 
which they do not even exist. But they are, never-
theless, quite relevant in those states with a federal 
or quasi federal territorial organisation. In some 
of them domestic law actually permits, in one way 
or another, the participation of foreign residents, 
so a future EU legislation transforming this into 
a European fundamental right for EU residents 
would not have to fill a complete vacuum. After 
all, EU citizens can already vote in elections for 
regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales and North-
ern Ireland. In addition, this right would prob-
ably not conflict with domestic constitutional law 
as much as the participation in general elections 
would, since general elections, either legislative or 
presidential, are intimately linked with the core 
idea of ‘national sovereignty’ (or whatever is left 
of it). Both political and legal arguments would 
therefore suggest putting regional elections as the 
next goal for European citizenship all over the Un-
ion.
However, even before embarking on any extension 
of voting rights for EU citizens, much could be 
done in order to ensure that existing rights, that is, 
participation in local and EP elections, can be ful-
ly exercised without practical obstacles. The low 
percentage of second nationals EU citizens who 
vote in those elections in the state where they re-
side may have different reasons, but surely the lack 
of accurate information and, in some cases, the in-
tricacies of the procedure play an important role. 
Take, for instance, the case of Spain: EU residents 
must enroll in the electoral census in order to vote, 
inscription in the municipal registry being insuf-
ficient. This is not only is a crucial difference with 
national voters (who are automatically included 
in the electoral census once they are registered in 
a municipality) but implies a number of practical 
problems, from linguistic ones to the incorrect, 
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but common, belief that an EU citizen can only 
vote in local elections in Spain after a declaration 
that he or she will not to do so in a municipality of 
his country of origin. That declaration is neither 
an exigency of Directive 94/80/EC nor of Spanish 
law, but it exists nevertheless in the form that EU 
citizens have to fill in to be included in the Span-
ish electoral census. The reason is that, according 
to Directive 93/109/EC, a declaration by a second 
country national that he or she will refrain from 
voting in the state of origin is a requirement for 
voting in EP elections in the state of residence. 
Since in Spain the procedure for EU citizens to 
vote is the same for EP and local elections, poten-
tial EU voters – and, what is worse, the Spanish 
electoral board as well – think that the declara-
tion to refrain from double voting applies to both. 
There is a significant number of EU ‘gerontoinmi-
grants’ who reside in Spain on a permanent basis 
but generally spend the summer months in their 
countries of origin and may be legitimately inter-
ested in voting both in host and origin countries’ 
local elections). 
As the last Report from the Commission on the 
application of the Directive 94/80/EC shows, 
practical problems like this one may be found in 
a number of Member States, revealing that much 
can still be done in order to increase the percent-
age of second-country nationals who actually ex-
ercise their right to participate in local elections. A 
similar conclusion may be drawn from the Com-
mission Report on the application of the Directive 
93/109/EC regulating EP elections, the modifi-
cation of which is currently under discussion al-
though unfortunately the debate in the EU institu-
tions has not yet reached the consensus necessary 
to make it possible.
The question of what to do with third-country na-
tionals, as posed by Rainer Bauböck’s and Hannes 
Swoboda’s contributions, also deserves much at-
tention. Non-EU citizens who are permanent 
residents in a Member State should be entitled 
by EU law to the right to vote in local elections 
before granting EU citizens additional rights to 
participate in national or even regional ones. The 
fact that this right is a part of EU soft law (as an 
ingredient of the idea of a civic citizenship) and 
that it is, subject to conditions, actually recognised 
by domestic law in a majority of Member States 
would surely facilitate the introduction of EU leg-
islation regulating it in the near future.
Last, but not least, there is of course the problem of 
the lack of legal competence of the Union to estab-
lish the right of second-country nationals to vote 
in national election in the state of residence. Given 
the practical impossibility that that right could be 
‘discovered’ by judicial action – even once the EU 
has acceded to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, the European Court of Human Rights 
would hardly rule that such a right derives from 
the Convention – a modification of the Treaties 
and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights would 
be necessary. The political (and economic) state of 
the today’s EU does not give rise to much hope that 
this idea could have any chance of finding its way 
into European politics, even applying the method 
of a cooperation among Member States, as Kees 
Groenendijk’s contribution suggests, instead of 
trying to produce legislation at the European level.
Of course, the expectation that the ‘Let me vote’ 
ECI promoted by Philippe Cayla and Catriona 
Seth is unlikely to be successful, or that practical or 
legal problems might arise if it were, are not strong 
enough arguments to justify refusing to support it, 
once you agree with the idea that European citi-
zenship should in the medium term include the 
right to vote and stand in national general elec-
tions. I would undoubtedly sign in. But the energy 
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and efforts that the ECI needs to achieve its goals 
could probably be better focused helping to ensure 
better implementation of the stage at which we 
are now. This means trying to reach a significant 
level of participation of second-country nation-
als at local or EP elections in the host country, 
or aiming at participation in regional elections as 
the next step in the process of strengthening Eu-
ropean citizenship.
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This initiative is a timely exercise with the upcom-
ing prospect of the European Year of Citizens in 
2013, and it has stimulated an interesting and use-
ful debate in which the various contributions have 
covered most of the key issues at stake in the pro-
posal57. There are however a few questions that I 
would like to raise to add to the discussion. 
The first concerns the definitions of residence and 
mobility: it seems to me that all the contributors 
have assumed that intra-EU migration is pretty 
much limited to the movement of citizens from 
one Member-State to another where they estab-
lish residence and then remain there, hence the 
apparent suitability of Bauböck’s proposal of the 
acquisition of dual nationality as being the opti-
mum scenario for this category of individuals. Yet 
the reality of mobility for a growing number of EU 
citizens, especially younger adults, is more fluid 
and complex than this, often involving a chain of 
moves from one country to another, with more 
or less extended periods of residence according 
to circumstances. I am thinking for example of a 
German friend, who has lived in the UK for ten 
years, having lived previously in Spain and France 
for six years each. How would any of David Ow-
en’s options cater for this kind of situation? And 
what of the young student, already having dual 
nationality through his/her parents, who decides 
to settle after a successful Erasmus experience in 
a third EU country: should he/she be allowed to 
take a third (or more) nationality? As regards the 
definition of residence, here too, with the growth 
of lifestyle migration, the concept has become 
much more fluid: the circumstances of some of the 
British residents in France that I interviewed re-
vealed in many cases a highly complex residential 
status and there was significant evidence of what 
Groenendijk refers to as ‘hiding their migration’, 
57.  Contribution published online on 1 June 2012
either from the host country or that of their na-
tionality, usually for reasons relating to health care 
or tax issues. How should residence be defined 
and proven? Fiscal registration? Electoral regis-
tration? Medical registration? There is currently 
no minimum requirement in terms of length of 
residence for registration for local elections, but 
for national elections, the five year period would 
seem to be reasonable; however, ex-pats who typi-
cally work to five year contracts, often moving 
from one country to another, would be constantly 
going back to square one. The idea of voting rights 
based on residence is less straightforward than it 
might appear.
My second question relates to the situation of 
EU citizens who migrate to non-EU countries of 
which they are not nationals: if national voting 
rights were guaranteed for EU citizens resident 
in other Member-States on the grounds that they 
should not be disenfranchised, would it then be 
acceptable for other EU citizens to lose their vot-
ing rights if they choose to migrate to a non-EU 
country, such as British citizens settling in the 
USA? Would this be their punishment for leaving 
the haven of the EU? 
My third question is about third-country nation-
als (TCNs), who are far more numerous than 
second-country nationals (SCNs), as Wilhelm 
has pointed out: several contributors have made 
the point that legislation at EU level would be im-
possible, and that the diversity of Member-States’ 
political and historical circumstances should in 
any case be respected, yet clearly the link between 
these two categories of migrants is fundamental 
to the EU’s perception of itself as inclusive or ex-
clusive. There are strong arguments in favour of 
giving voting rights at local elections to long term 
TCNs, as many Member-States already do, but 
this should not be at the price of increased xeno-
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phobic reactions. The dilemma is well illustrated 
by the French case: François Mitterrand’s cam-
paign manifesto in 1981 included a pledge to give 
the right to vote in local elections to all foreigners, 
but the opposition it aroused, articulated indirect-
ly through the rise of the National Front, meant 
that this was never implemented. Indeed, France 
was one of the countries that for various reasons 
put up strongest resistance in the Maastricht de-
bate to the voting rights enshrined in European 
Citizenship, but largely because many feared it 
would be the thin end of the wedge, opening 
the door to the same rights for TCNs. In spite of 
the electoral success of the National Front in the 
presidential elections, Socialist President François 
Hollande has indeed pledged to do just this, and 
we should watch closely to see if his government 
has the courage and political support in the new 
National Assembly to go through with it, in the 
face of claims by the mainstream Right as well as 
the National Front, of an implied ‘drift towards 
communitarianism’ and the spectre of Muslim-
dominated local councils organising women only 
swimming sessions and banning all pork products 
from school canteens. The false premise on which 
this scaremongering is predicated (many Muslims 
already have French nationality and therefore the 
right to vote at all elections) is all the more unjus-
tified when one considers the low rates of registra-
tion and participation in local elections by non-
national EU citizens in France, estimated at under 
15 per cent. Indeed, all the evidence suggests that 
if given the right to vote in local elections, only a 
small percentage of TCNs would actually use it. 
Which brings us to the fourth question of the low 
mobilising value of voting rights, as pointed out 
by Wilhelm. Cayla and Seth ask ‘Who wants to go 
and live in a country without being able to exercise 
full democratic rights?’, implying that few would; 
but the reality is surely otherwise, and it is quite 
clear from my own research in France and the 
UK that the vast majority of EU migrants do not 
take up their right to vote in local elections. Rod-
riguez’s contribution suggests a similar picture in 
Spain, and I agree that much more could be done 
to increase participation at this level before mov-
ing into demands for national voting rights. Yet 
many of the non-national EU citizens that I inter-
viewed, both in France and the UK, were far more 
concerned by the national vote than the local, and 
felt it impacted more on the reality of their lives: 
‘Why can’t I vote if I pay my taxes?’ was a com-
mon complaint. Long-term French ex-pats at least 
retain their right to vote in all elections in France, 
whereas the British lose all voting rights in the UK 
after 15 years, even if they continue to pay taxes 
there. 
So what answers can be found to all these ques-
tions and what contribution could the proposed 
ECI make here? Clearly, it makes a mockery of the 
democratic credentials of the EU if the very mo-
bility that it seeks to encourage, brings with it po-
litical disenfranchisement. Member-States should 
have to recognise this, through a process of con-
certed action between them and EU institutions, 
as advocated by Shaw, by adapting their national 
legislations as necessary: all countries should be 
encouraged to allow the possibility of dual nation-
ality, and those like the UK and Ireland operating 
restrictive policies towards ex-pats (at least two 
cases are currently being taken through the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights by British ex-pats 
living in Spain and Italy), should be urged to up-
date their laws in line with the first Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Within 
this more permissive legal framework, citizens 
should be allowed to choose, depending on their 
circumstances, whether to vote in their country 
of residence or of nationality, thereby signifying a 
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voluntary act of consent, and in no circumstances 
should any EU citizen be disenfranchised. 
How could these goals be achieved? It is clear that 
pressure needs to be exerted by citizens on both 
EU institutions and national governments to bring 
about the necessary changes, and in this respect 
the ECI has the great virtue of launching a debate, 
albeit so far within a very restricted circle of inter-
ested individuals. Whilst I do not think its draft 
objectives are sufficiently well defined or realistic 
to be successful as it stands, I would be prepared 
to sign the petition to get the ball rolling towards 
a wider audience.  
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It is encouraging to note that the Let me vote Eu-
ropean Citizens Initiative is attracting much sup-
port58. As much has already been said and com-
mented upon, I will limit my contribution to just a 
few additional points.
I.
This initiative launched by Philippe Cayla has my 
full support and I will sign it. As many have al-
ready pointed out, it has been successful in open-
ing a debate around an issue that has been over-
looked for too long. More importantly however 
it has also encouraged the EU institutions to start 
thinking about citizenship as a developmental or 
evolutionary concept. So far, there has been an ap-
parent reluctance to use Article 25 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which al-
lows introducing additional rights of EU citizens. 
The fact that this initiative has successfully been 
registered with the Commission on 1 June 2012 
will push citizenship forward beyond the present 
confines of the Treaties.
II.
Secondly, I believe that the right to vote is so funda-
mental to democracy that any arguments reflect-
ing the difficulties of putting it into effect pale into 
insignificance. It is simply unacceptable that the 
12 million citizens who make full use of their right 
to move freely around the EU should have to put 
up with not having their say in their host country. 
Moreover, an important percentage of these not 
only do not gain a right to vote, but also lose their 
voice in their country of origin (here it would be 
interesting to know just how many are in this situ-
58.  Contribution published online on 6 June 2012.
ation). Therefore, if one accepts that democracy is 
based on fundamental principles, it is not possible 
to claim that the denial of voting rights does not 
hinder free movement of citizens. Past contribu-
tions in this forum have already identified the ex-
isting difficulties in gaining voting rights and have 
also outlined different approaches to solving this 
problem, which are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. What is important is first of all to grant 
the right to vote to those citizens who have but 
a partial or no say at all in regional and national 
elections. Questions around how and when to do 
this are secondary issues. Indeed, some solutions 
as to how to make this change have already been 
proposed in this forum but there are many others. 
During several citizens’ panels organised in the 
framework of ECAS projects, it was argued that 
many European citizens would consider using an 
EU card which would – among other uses to facili-
tate free movement – allow them to vote in specific 
elections. This proposition of course raises many 
issues of data protection but shows that there is a 
strong desire to counter these practical difficulties. 
III.
Concerns around timing have been expressed, 
namely that it may be too early to implement such 
a change and that it would be rather more benefi-
cial to concentrate on improving the implementa-
tion and exercise of existing rights. This is often a 
very valid argument as civil society organisations, 
politicians and the EU Institutions tend to cre-
ate new rights and legislation for their own credit 
rather than enforcing present ones. Such consid-
erations, however, do not apply here. Launching 
this debate for the individuals who have no right 
to vote in their host country will also draw atten-
tion to the fact that they have an underused right 
– that is the right to vote in local and EU elections. 
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It is increasingly apparent that those who have no 
say at national level lose their interest in political 
involvement, as they feel side-lined. Indeed, it is 
perhaps too easily forgotten that an ECI such as 
this one must be seen, first and foremost, from 
the very basic perspective of the citizen entitled 
to sign it. Their lack of participation in European 
elections in particular has a detrimental effect on 
citizenship, which is not to be ignored at a time 
when citizens’ attachment to the EU is in decline. 
According to Eurobarometer, the past couple of 
years have seen a noticeable 5 per cent decline 
of citizens who believe that membership of their 
country in the EU is a ‘good thing’.  An incremen-
tal approach to European citizenship can work, 
for example in the case of social rights and entitle-
ments but it is certainly more questionable in the 
area of political rights where the contradictions 
are too apparent and become disincentives. 
IV. 
The European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) has 
been much involved in supporting ECIs having 
set up several support systems, organised many 
awareness raising events and disseminated infor-
mation to ECI initiators and organisers. Presently 
it is also working on setting up an Online Signature 
Collection system, which will meet the specified 
requirements of the European Commission and 
provide organisers with a secure server. Philippe 
Cayla has accepted a real challenge, as any ECI 
which deals with citizenship will by its very nature 
encounter many difficulties. Indeed, as this debate 
has shown, intra-EU migration is extremely com-
plex both legislatively and pragmatically. One key 
obstacle will also arise during signature collection 
due to the scattered geographical distribution of 
those most likely to sign it. Increasing evidence 
here at ECAS has also shown that social media of-
fer no shortcut for this complex and bureaucratic 
procedure of collecting signatures. It will be no 
easy task, but given that the ECI will inevitably en-
counter considerable obstacles, we must do every-
thing to ensure its success. Citizenship needs civil 
society.
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The contributions to this forum have mixed two 
arguments that share some common concerns but 
do not fully overlap59. The first one has to do with 
Union citizenship and its associated rights, the 
role of Union citizens for the political project of 
the European Union and the boundaries of a ‘Eur-
odemos’. It is therefore, broadly speaking, an argu-
ment about the status of Union citizenship and a 
particular group of people: the nationals of other 
EU Member States. 
The second argument is more encompassing and 
concerns non-citizens who otherwise obey laws 
and pay taxes but have no voting rights. One way 
to enfranchise these people is for Member States 
and the EU to grant residents voting rights and 
this is what the European Citizenship Initiative 
‘Let me vote’ proposes. The other way to achieve 
this result is by naturalisation - an option for 
which Rainer Bauböck, David Owen and  Kees 
Groenendijk have argued convincingly. It is im-
portant to point out that naturalisation is an indi-
vidual method of enfranchisement not a collective 
one. What both these methods seek to accomplish 
is to transform these persons from subjects into 
active citizens and thus to redress what Owen calls 
the democratic wrong. In other words, this argu-
ment is primarily about democratic deficit and the 
tensions and ills it causes in liberal democracies 
where not all their people have the right to vote. 
This is a general argument and it applies not only to 
Union citizens but to all disenfranchised persons 
including non-EU migrants. Furthermore, this ar-
gument applies not only to EU Member States but 
to all liberal democracies. If political rights need 
to be extended in order to fix the democratic defi-
cit, then all residents and not only Union citizens 
should acquire these rights. But doing so one has 
to be aware that, as Dimitry Kochenov warns, that 
59.  Contribution published online on 13 June 2012.
this exercise would only lead to another problem: 
the ‘who are the people’ question.
The matter at hands is, however, not about the 
general democratic deficit in societies of immigra-
tion, but about European integration and the piv-
otal role Union citizenship plays for the European 
Union project. I propose therefore an argument 
for portable political rights for mobile Union citi-
zens.
Political rights for mobile 
Union citizens
Compared with their fellow citizens, mobile Un-
ion citizens lose their political rights in the home 
country and most of the times they do not regain 
them at destination. This situation produces a 
cleavage between the mobile and the stationary 
Union citizens in the Member State of origin as 
well as in the Member State of residence. In this 
context, mobile Union citizens have only limited 
voting rights at the local level and in elections for 
the European Parliament while stationary Union 
citizens enjoy full political rights.
So far my argument is in line with Bauböck’s: mo-
bile Union citizens should not be penalised for ex-
ercising free movement right. However, we differ 
on the solution: voting rights in national elections 
should be portable across the EU and linked with 
(legal) residence. This mechanism is not new. It 
has guided the implementation of the EU rights 
Union citizens enjoy today: social contributions 
and pensions, medical insurance, local voting 
rights, etc.
In this scenario, Union citizens would be the ones 
deciding where they want to exercise their vot-
ing rights. They could register their residence in 
the destination country and transfer these rights 
there or they could ‘hide’ their change of residency 
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from their country of origin and continue to enjoy 
political rights there. Sociological studies on the 
lifestyle of mobile Union citizens show that they 
skilfully combine rights they have ‘at home’ with 
rights they have in their new homes.  Where Un-
ion citizens would choose to vote if they had the 
opportunity to do it either in their country of ori-
gin or of residence remains an open question.  But 
I bet that for most people, social ties and political 
loyalties will change with the passing of time.
Why naturalisation solves too 
little too late
When foreigners naturalise, they become citizens 
with full citizenship rights. They gain not only po-
litical rights but also access to a set of privileges 
reserved to nationals. The most common reserved 
privileges are public sector employment, service 
in the army, access to non-contributory social 
benefits and, of course, the right to vote in nation-
al election. It seems that a naturalisation option 
might actually solve the problem of disenfran-
chisement. And, it would do so not only for mo-
bile Union citizens but also for their children and 
children’s children. Why then is naturalisation not 
the most appropriate solution for Union citizens? 
First of all, changing the rules of acquisition of 
their citizenship in 27 countries in order to   make 
it easier for Union citizens to naturalise will take a 
lot of time. And, second, even if this happens na-
tionality policies alone would not enfranchise Un-
ion citizens with political rights. At best, it would 
bring stronger incentives for this group of people 
to acquire citizenship and, with it, voting rights. 
What this means is that the democratic deficit 
would persist until all Union citizens naturalise. 
This process might again take many decades be-
cause the decision to naturalise is ultimately an in-
dividual and personal one. Furthermore, judging 
from the low naturalisation rate amongst Union 
citizens, this moment might not arrive ever for the 
first generation of Union citizens. 
A common EU directive granting Union citizens 
such rights directly achieves more and faster than 
naturalisation. Once implemented, this directive 
would automatically and simultaneously enfran-
chise all Union citizens.
Secondly, most contributions in this forum have 
presented enfranchisement by naturalisation and 
by voting rights as mutually exclusive alterna-
tives. In fact, the two options tend to go hand in 
hand with each other. For instance, those Member 
States that have a more open access to citizenship 
also give long-term residents the right to vote in 
local elections (the Scandinavian countries and 
the Netherlands as opposed to Spain, Italy, Greece 
and most new EU Member States). 
Thirdly, given that these are Union citizens we are 
talking about, it seems to me disproportionate to 
ask them to naturalise, and often also to renounce 
their original citizenship, in order to gain political 
rights. It is disproportionate for non-EU migrants 
but even more so for Union citizens. 
Why that? Is there anything special about Union 
citizens who live in the European Union? Are they 
different from other foreign nationals living in a 
country other than their own somewhere else on 
the globe? I believe the answer to this question 
is yes. Member states and their citizens are part-
ners in a shared European project with a common 
market, common economy and freedom of move-
ment. Because of the specificity of the situation, 
alternative ways of political inclusion are prefer-
able to naturalisation. 
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In addition, supporters of enfranchisement 
through naturalisation should also consider that 
by becoming a citizen in the country of residence 
a naturalised Union citizen would lose some of the 
substantive EU rights which she would otherwise 
enjoy as a Union citizen who resides in another 
Member State. A naturalised Union citizen would 
thus be less a Union citizen than a new national 
citizen.
Political rights for Union 
citizens reloaded?
Since political rights at the local level have already 
been agreed upon and implemented by the Mem-
ber States (many of which had to change their 
constitutions to allow non-nationals to vote or 
stand for office) then why is there still a debate on 
whether or not to enfranchise Union citizens? 
Dora Kostakopoulou rightly point out in her con-
tribution that many of the arguments made in this 
forum had been put forward when these rights 
were first introduced only two decades ago. This 
is a road we have walked before. This time, how-
ever, it is not a matter of starting afresh but rather 
a matter of extending the existing political rights 
to national elections.  
If the European Citizens Initiative ‘Let me vote’ 
proves successful, it would do much good for the 
development and understanding of Union citi-
zenship. Critics have long argued and for good 
reasons that this form of citizenship is little more 
than a legal status that developed in a piecemeal 
fashion largely through decisions the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union. Nonetheless, a success 
of the ECI would demonstrate that there are real 
people, with names and surnames, who support it 
and claim more rights. 
In conclusion, the main question this forum has 
asked is whether Union citizens should gain vot-
ing rights in national elections.   While there is 
some disagreement on the method by which they 
should achieve these rights - via naturalisation or 
direct enfranchisement – it is important to high-
light that all contributors have argued in favour of 
full political enfranchisement of Union citizens. 
None of the contributions considers satisfactory 
the status quo which limits the voting rights Un-
ion citizens have to local and EP elections. 
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In the space of a couple of months in 2012, France 
has held four elections, two for the Presidency, 
two for the National Assembly. One of us voted 
on all four occasions. The other on none. We are 
both law-abiding, tax-paying citizens in full-time 
employment. We are both of voting age. The dif-
ference is that one of us is a Frenchman living 
in France and that the other lives and works in 
France, thanks to free circulation which is at the 
heart of the European union, but holds British na-
tionality and can therefore not vote in the country 
in which she resides, works and pays taxes. It is 
in order both to foster a true spirit of European 
nationhood and to correct such lacunae that we 
launched our ‘Let me vote’ ECI and the EUDO 
forum debate. Though neither of us is competent 
to comment on the finer points of EU and con-
stitutional law, we have both been impressed by 
the wide-ranging and challenging proposals and 
demonstrations set out by the different partici-
pants and would like to express our deep gratitude 
to those who have taken the time to make their 
feelings and ideas known, whether they ultimately 
come out totally or partially in favour of or against 
our initiative. We can only agree with Dora Ko-
stakopoulou’s opening remarks, when she notes 
that the different contributions to the forum ‘have 
provided a number of valuable reflections on mat-
ters of principle, policy, strategy, and tactics in the 
light of contemporary political developments at 
both European Union and domestic levels.’ She 
adds: ‘By clarifying matters of principle as well as 
issues of politics, they have outlined several trajec-
tories and shed ample light onto the pros and cons 
of the European Citizens’ Initiative.’ The variety 
and depth of the comments tend to confirm that, 
as Jo Shaw states, the ECI is a timely initiative on 
an important question. 
We would like to start by stressing a point which 
the eminent specialists who have expressed their 
ideas have perhaps not always taken fully into ac-
count, i.e. the limits which the very procedure of 
ECIs imposes. Our ECI’s object has been analysed, 
but not its starting point: a valiant but fragile citi-
zens’ committee. We are neither an institution 
within the Union, nor a political party, a trades-
union or even a powerful lobby. We are a small 
group of well-meaning citizens, strong believers 
in the European cause, but with no means other 
than those afforded by the ECI’s procedure. The 
procedure itself is very restrictive: it only allows us 
to make suggestions which can lead the European 
Commission to propose legislative measures with-
in the framework of existing treaties. There is no 
possibility therefore for us to encourage actions in 
the field of nationality, for instance, or with regard 
to the rights attributed to third-country nationals, 
as some contributors like Ángel Rodríguez seem 
to suggest. We feel strongly that such questions are 
outside our scope. In addition, it must be noted 
that the requirement of collecting a million signa-
tures within a year is a very tough one and that the 
only chance of meeting it is for an ECI to have a 
simple, clear and ambitious object.
Our contention is that there is a case to be made 
for Europeans to be granted a form of super-
citizenship, in the tradition of the civis romanus 
who was a citizen of Rome without losing his own 
statehood. We believe that at a time when Europe 
is increasingly seen as a bureaucratic and costly 
system with no positive impact on everyday life, 
a form of European citizenship which would al-
low one to vote in all elections of one’s country 
of residence when within the EU, could only en-
hance our feelings towards the Union and serve 
to foster increased implication in its development. 
It would be a concrete way of recognising that we 
share a common culture and that our future lies 
in a common destiny. David Bellamy can reassure 
those who see mobile EU citizens as benefits tour-
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ists. On the whole, those who are interested in an 
initiative such as our ECI are quite the opposite: 
dedicated professionals, open to European cul-
tures and languages, conscious of a shared herit-
age, desirous to contribute to a peaceful and pros-
perous future for the EU.
What are our ECI’s fundamental 
objectives?
There are three of them:
1.  To give European citizenship its full meaning 
by making it grant access to all fundamental 
rights, including the right to vote, whatever 
one’s country of residence. It is a principle of 
equality for Europeans.
Dimitry Kochenov makes a very useful point with 
his question: ‘Who is a foreigner?’ Surely an EU 
national within the EU, whether in his or her home 
state or elsewhere, is not a foreigner and must not 
be treated as such. Dora Kostakopoulou adds that 
it is unsustainable in a democracy to ask people to 
contribute fully but only to treat them as de facto 
second-class citizens. 
2. To give mobility (i.e. the principle of free 
movement within Europe) its full scope.
There is general agreement amongst the authors 
that the current situation entails a serious demo-
cratic deficit and that it is absurd that this should 
derive from the exercise of one of the EU’s core 
rights: free movement. As David Owen points out: 
‘This is a democratic wrong since it is not demo-
cratically legitimate that a person lawfully exercis-
ing a civil right shall in virtue of such exercise be 
deprived of a political right.’ Is this dysfunction of 
democracy, as Rainer Bauböck suggests, only the 
case for those who, like Britons or Danes, do not 
keep home voting rights permanently wherever 
they live? Is it not, rather, the case for anyone who 
is integrated in their country of residence in ev-
ery respect (working, speaking the language, pay-
ing tax etc.) but deprived of the democratic rights 
granted to those who were born there (or whose 
parents were born there), but who may, in the most 
extreme of cases, never go there. When you move 
from Perpignan to Calais or from Aberdeen to Ex-
eter, you vote for the mayor of the town in which 
you live. You do not forever cast your vote in the 
ward in which you were born. In the same way, 
would it not be logical to consider that you take 
your voting rights with you when you move over-
seas but stay within the EU? In a true European 
Union, living in Vienna or in Seville should be of 
no more consequence than moving from Genoa to 
Milan: you should not be disenfranchised because 
you have chosen to exercise your right to mobil-
ity – Roxana Barbulescu’s analogy with the por-
tability of pensions or medical insurance across 
national borders within the European Union is a 
demonstration of the fact that rights acquired in 
one EU State can be enjoyed in another. As a mat-
ter of consequence, we do not believe that simply 
ensuring that all EU citizens maintain a perma-
nent right to vote in their home nations is the ap-
propriate solution: we are most directly affected 
by what happens in the land in which we live and 
work – if income tax is to increase in Greece, this 
is less likely to have instant consequences on the 
everyday existence of Greeks living and working 
in Brussels, than if it goes up in Belgium. Martin 
Wilhelm’s vote exchange system implicitly rec-
ognises that citizens can feel more immediately 
concerned by the political situation of the state in 
which they reside than by elections in their home 
country.
3. Finally, to give the democratic principle, ‘No 
taxation without representation’ its full mean-
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ing. This is a consequence of applying the prin-
ciple of solidarity to all residents.
This principle, which launched the American 
Revolution, is already recognised locally, as Kees 
Groenendijk stresses. It must be extended at re-
gional and national levels too: Europeans resident 
in the EU pay income tax as well as local taxes. 
Currently, we are being taxed and some of us, like 
the pigs in Animal Farm, are more equal than oth-
ers. Even the Commission has to agree that this is 
the case, as Andrew Duff ’s recent exchange about 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
shows.
Objections and Answers 
to the ECI
 In this context, let us take another look at some of 
the objections set out by certain contributors.
1. The main objection is that a European citizen 
who resides in another Member State must take 
out its nationality if s/he wants to vote there. 
Answer: clearly, if the principle of free circulation 
is to apply, any European has to be able to move 
to another EU country whenever s/he wants to – 
why not every year if the labour market makes this 
desirable? One can recall here that Olivier Blan-
chard, the IMF Chief Economist had imagined in 
1998 that the Euro zone could fail because of lack 
of fluidity in the European labour market. Asking 
EU nationals to acquire another EU nationality in 
order to be able to vote does not seem to offer an 
apposite answer: in these changing times, many of 
us will live and study in several EU states within 
our lifetime – Sue Collard helpfully gives a couple 
of examples of people concerned by such moves. 
Does this mean that each time we take up resi-
dence in a country we should pick up the national-
ity, thanks to simplified procedures? Or would this 
not debase the concept, were we to end up, rou-
tinely, with three, four or five passports? As Rainer 
Bauböck suggests, citizenship should be seen as a 
lifelong status. Unlike him we feel that, as a result, 
one EU passport should be enough for anyone: 
citizenship of any EU nation should make one an 
EU citizen, wherever one lives. This is not to pre-
clude anyone from holding a second EU citizen-
ship or to deny anyone dual nationality. Acquiring 
a country’s passport should not, however, be a pre-
requisite in order to vote in its national elections if 
one is already an EU citizen within the Union. As 
Alain Brun puts it in a nutshell: ‘I understand Eu-
ropean citizenship as the right to be considered as 
a national by any Member State other than the one 
whose nationality I hold, as soon as I am in rela-
tion with its authorities, in one way or another.’ Or, 
to echo Dimitry Kochenov’s words: ‘Since Mem-
ber State nationalities are in the absolute major-
ity of cases legally inconsequential for EU citizens 
travelling around the EU, connecting democratic 
participation with naturalisation amounts to ar-
tificially inflating the importance of an abolished 
status.’ In addition, Roxana Barbulescu makes a 
very interesting comment when she opposes the 
individual solution of naturalisation and the col-
lective process of enfranchisement of EU citizens.
Obviously, no one is going to change nationalities 
every year. In addition, on a legal level, questions 
of nationality are outside an ECI’s scope.
2. Second objection: it is more urgent to improve 
the current situation, viz access to and partici-
pation in municipal and European elections, 
and prudent to limit the demand for new rights 
for Europeans to regional elections. 
Answer: be that as it may, such a proposal would 
never be attractive enough to collect a million sig-
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natures. We fail, in addition, to see the legitimacy 
of giving limited voting rights to EU citizens. Why 
should it be all right for them to elect their mayor, 
but not the member of a legislative assembly or a 
president? A collateral advantage of our ECI is that 
granting EU citizens full voting rights in their host 
country would probably increase general aware-
ness of – and interest in – European elections. This 
would in turn almost certainly boost the turnout 
and the visibility of such polls. A bold and supra-
national step, such as the one we propose, would 
also give Europe a more definite structure, de fac-
to, rather than leaving it stuck in a halfway house 
between a confederation and an association.
3. Further amendment: conditions of residence 
and the question of whether one could poten-
tially vote in two countries need to be envisaged. 
Obviously such issues will have to be dealt with, 
but they are not within our remit.
4. Last objection: dealing with third-country na-
tionals is paramount. 
Should they acquire EU citizenship, third-country 
nationals would of course benefit from our ECI, 
but their rights are outside its scope.
There are clearly political, philosophical and legal 
aspects to take into account – there would also be 
economic consequences to any change in the sta-
tus quo. Debates about EU citizenship are, more 
than ever, debates about the future of Europe it-
self – and thus carry huge symbolic value too. 
Hannes Swoboda rightly affirms that ‘the neces-
sary evolution of EU citizenship leads to a gradu-
ally growing relevance of residence as [the] defin-
ing criterion for the exercise of related rights.’ As 
in clothes shops where ‘one size fits all’ generally 
means nothing will be a perfect fit for anyone, our 
ECI falls short of some people’s ideal scenario. The 
five options David Owen sets out offer unequal 
advantages, though he stresses that the ECI ticks 
a number of boxes. Obviously we are aware that 
obtaining and implementing voting rights for EU 
nationals in their country of residence (or allow-
ing them to choose between voting in their home 
country and their state of residence) will be an up-
hill struggle. However, Tony Venables hits the nail 
on the head when he states that ‘the right to vote is 
so fundamental to democracy that any arguments 
reflecting the difficulties of putting it into effect 
pale into insignificance’.
The different cases made for and against our ECI 
in the EUDO forum debate have but strengthened 
our resolve. There is broad consensus that the cur-
rent situation is untenable. The idea that our pro-
posal is ‘timely’ is mentioned several times and we 
can only see this as an encouragement, along with 
the fact that most contributors affirm that they 
will sign it. We are grateful to them for this. We 
believe, more than ever, that our case is a strong 
one. The fact that our ECI has been officially vali-
dated shows that our proposal does not fall out-
side the Commission’s scope. Next year (2013) is 
the European year of citizens. Let us do all we can, 
together, to right democratic wrongs and endow 
European citizens with full voting rights wherever 
they choose to reside within the EU.
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